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Letter from the Editor

Letter from the Editor
On behalf of the Editorial Board, I am proud and
honored to present the newest edition of the Penn History
Review. Since its inception, the Penn History Review has published
select articles reflecting high-level scholarship, researched and
written by undergraduates of the University of Pennsylvania.
Additionally, this issue includes an article written by Sahand K.
Rahbar, a junior at Princeton University. As one may expect, the
Penn History Review is dedicated to publishing historical scholarship
from all geographic and thematic areas; as a result, perhaps
it is striking that this issue highlights one region in particular,
North America. Furthermore, each paper revolves around topics
pertinent to or in the same time period, the nineteenth century.
While the decision to publish a selection of papers centered in
the same region and century with overlapping themes was not
purposeful, I nonetheless believe that these attributes strengthen
and complement each piece. Indeed, the questions, concerns, and
narratives addressed by each author emphasizes how the leading
individuals discussed within each respective paper possessed a
shared ethos and enthusiasm for making a difference upon our
contemporary world.
The first article is entitled, “Spies All Their Lives”: African
American and Military Intelligence During the Civil War, by Carly S.
Mayer. This work highlights an otherwise poorly documented
but vital strategy employed by the Union military during the
American Civil War: the recruitment of African Americans as
spies. In doing so, the Union infiltrated the South, gathered an
immense amount of intelligence, and helped shift the balance
of the war to save an otherwise splintering country. Specifically,
the reader will understand the unique and natural skills African
Americans provided, ultimately proving themselves to be one of

Penn History Review

6

Letter from the Editor

the most indomitable and furtive weapons that helped cause the
collapse of the short-lived Confederate States of America.
The War That Congress Waged, written by Varun K. Menon,
is the second work featured in this publication. This paper is
a chapter excerpt of a thesis, which describes the setting and
impact of the role of the United States Congress in asserting
itself in American foreign relations from 1811 to 1826. In this
particular chapter, the author notes how Congress’ decision was
led by the determined Henry Clay, who not only transformed the
role of Speaker of the House, but who also used his powers to
induce war between the United States and Great Britain starting
in 1812. In this piece, the reader will realize how under Clay’s
leadership, Congress adopted a new means of authority that
would impact the future role and history of the United States.
The third article in this issue is The Fallacy of the Ideological
Press: How American National Newspapers Reacted to the French Revolution
from 1789-1793, by Aaron R. Senior. The author introduces his
research by noting the significance of the inception of national
newspapers in the United States in the 1790s, then analyzes how
three specific newspapers confronted and responded to the early
developments of the French Revolution unfolding across the
Atlantic Ocean. Indeed, the author demonstrates how national
newspapers embraced and espoused their respective political
ideologies; however, the author then distinguishes his work
with careful analysis to discover that this relationship was not
as resolute as historians previously believed. Indeed, the reader
learns how newspapers altered national politics in the United
States by not conforming to their expected political ideologies.
The final work printed is Sahand K. Rahbar’s “The Evil
of the Age”: The Influence of The New York Times on Anti-Abortion
Legislation in New York, 1865-1875. In this essay, the author
objectively reviews how the emergence of The New York Times,
particularly through an article written by Augustus St. Clair,
galvanized the New York Legislature to reevaluate and compose
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new laws pertaining to abortion. As the author points out, this
decision by the state legislature is especially shocking when one
considers that these amendments to the legal canon were codified
quickly in an organized and efficient manner after a period of
legislative dormancy regarding the issue. Ultimately, the reader
grasps how The New York Times emerged as a leading newspaper
and how it effected government in the American Postbellum
Period.
Additionally, this issue presents abstracts submitted by
seniors who undertook the challenging, yet rewarding, process
of writing honors theses in history. In doing so, the Penn History
Review promotes additional research and scholarship in the field
of history, by offering its readership a preview of the eclectic
and fascinating variety of topics. Congratulations to all of the
senior honors students who have embarked upon this endeavor.
The Editorial Board also would like to extend a much
deserved thank you to Dr. Siyen Fei, Undergraduate Chair
of the History Department, and to Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the
Undergraduate Advisor of the History Department. As a result
of their advice, support, and advocacy, the Penn History Review
demonstrates its commitment to publishing high-caliber original
work written by undergraduate students. Moreover, the Editorial
Board would like to thank both the faculty at the University
of Pennsylvania and at other schools across the country who
promoted this publication to their students and to those students
who submitted their work for consideration. Finally, the Editorial
Board wishes to express its gratitude to the Department of
History and the University of Pennsylvania for providing us with
the opportunity to expand and to enrich the field of history with
unique and academic literature.
On a more personal note, I would like to thank all
of the members of the Editorial Board for their efforts and
dedication to making this issue of the Penn History Review a
reality. Admittedly, it will be difficult to lose our graduating
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editors, Kate Campbell, Leila Ehsan, and Taylor Evensen; they
have contributed so much over the years. I especially want to
thank and congratulate Taylor, our Editor-in-Chief Emeritus, for
everything she has done, including her guidance and patience
with me during this transitional semester. Nevertheless, I remain
excited about this publication’s future; it is with tremendous
pleasure that this semester, we welcome two new editors to our
team, Michael Torcello and Alex Weissfisch. Lastly, I want to offer
my appreciation to my friends and family, whose encouragement
and support cannot be overstated.
Congratulations to all of the editors and authors who
have contributed to this Spring 2016 issue of the Penn History
Review!

Aaron C. Mandelbaum
Editor-in-Chief
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Kilkenny Cat Fight Cartoon with Union General Ulysses S. Grant,
published in June 25, 1864 issue of Harper’s Weekly

Penn History Review

10

Spies All Their Lives

“Spies All Their Lives”:
African Americans and Military
Intelligence During the Civil War
Carly S. Mayer
In December 1863, an Irish-born Confederate officer of
the Army of Tennessee concluded that only one measure could
possibly save the slaveholders’ republic. Major-General Patrick
Cleburne, panicking about the sequence of devastating defeats
suffered by his army, proposed that the Confederacy arm and
emancipate its slaves. Such an assertion from a southern senior
military officer was astonishing, to say the least. The Confederacy
went to war to preserve the institution of slavery and to defend its
right to exist as the only independent slaveholding republic.1 Yet,
Cleburne’s memorandum starkly revealed the reality of the war—
that slavery was no longer the “great…truth” that Confederate
Vice President Alexander Stephens had claimed it to be in March
1861.2 Over the course of the struggle, Cleburne insisted, the
institution of slavery had become one of the Confederacy’s
“chief sources of weakness.”3 Although Cleburne’s proposal
was never adopted, his core contention highlighted the immense
threat enslaved African Americans posed to the embattled
Confederacy.
In the address to his fellow officers, Major-General
Cleburne recounted the humiliating circumstances of the
Confederacy during the war. “Every soldier in our army already
knows and feels our numerical inferiority to the enemy,” he
affirmed, and, “if this state continues much longer we must
be subjugated.” Moreover, Cleburne identified “the three
great causes operating to destroy us,” specifically, numerical
inferiority of southern troops, inadequate supplies, and, most
shockingly, the increasing military cost of slavery.4 He explained
Penn History Review

11

Spies All Their Lives

that slaves worked actively against the Confederacy, serving as
an “omnipresent spy system” and deterring Southerners from
fighting Union troops because they had to ensure that their slaves
were “not free to move and strike like the enemy.”5 Because of
slavery, Cleburne affirmed, the South was forced to wage war
“with the Union army in front and ‘an insurrection in the rear.’”6
Slaves had become, in every sense, “the enemy within.”7
Even prior to Cleburne’s realization of slaves’
contributions to Union military intelligence, southern planters
and military officials recognized the immense problem of slave
allegiance. Planters routinely complained about their slaves’
insubordination, unsure of how to control the restive population.
These planters feared that slaves were endlessly assisting Union
officials throughout the South, posing an acute threat to the
Confederacy that was seemingly impossible to halt. From the
civilian viewpoint, slaves, who were “absen[t] of the political ties
of allegiance,” were utterly undermining the Confederacy; they
had indeed become the Confederacy’s “most vulnerable point.”8
The reality was undeniable—enslaved, escaped, and
freed African Americans greatly assisted the Union war effort.
This thesis aims to uncover the military and naval intelligence
contributions of African American men and women during
the American Civil War (1861-1865). In particular, it focuses
on why and how African Americans participated in clandestine
activities—what made them excellent scouts and guides, how
they contributed in Union campaigns, and the means they used
to undermine the Confederacy on its plantations and in its
households.
The independent slaveholding republic fell victim not
just to Union forces but also, significantly, to the determined
resistance of its enslaved population. The Confederacy’s fleeting
existence demonstrates that, in so many ways, human chattel
made history: they cemented the destruction of the Confederacy
and the institution of slavery. War transformed enslaved men
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and women into the “enemy within” that the Confederate South
was simply unable to suppress.
In May 1861, Union Major General Benjamin Butler
occupied Fortress Monroe, Virginia, which served as an
important staging ground for naval operations and intelligencegathering activities along the coastlines of the Carolinas. Beyond
its strategic significance, Fortress Monroe served as the grounds
where Butler and the region’s slaves forged the first alliance
between the Union Army and the South’s enslaved population.
Butler recognized that fugitive slaves possessed exceptionally
valuable information regarding Confederate activities and a
superior understanding of local southern terrain.9 Accordingly,
he deployed fugitives’ talents against the Confederacy.10 When
Butler was transferred from Fortress Monroe to the Department
of the Gulf in early 1862 to lead “the land forces destined to
cooperate with the Navy in the attack upon New Orleans [in
Louisiana],” he knew that slave military intelligence would again
play a critical role.11 Thus, Butler recruited Abraham Galloway, a
fugitive slave and northern spy, to assist in the perilous campaign.
This was far from Galloway’s first Union intelligence
task. In April 1861, by the recommendation of abolitionist
George Stearns, Massachusetts’s war leaders recruited Galloway
to serve as a spy in the Confederacy.12 Galloway did not stumble
upon the Union camp in his attempt to escape the South nor did
he beg for admittance into the camp as a safe haven; rather, in
all certainty, he was sought after to participate in the northern
intelligence network.13 Galloway routinely aided in Union military
operations, traveling extensively behind enemy lines and risking
his life infiltrating unfamiliar southern plantations.
The logic behind Galloway’s recruitment was seemingly
incontrovertible. Who better to stealthily blend into Confederate
society than a black man born and raised in the South? Who
more adept to penetrate the Confederacy than an ex-slave
who previously escaped to the North? And yet, Galloway’s
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recruitment to the Union intelligence network marked one of
the first instances that Union military leaders recognized the
potential of slaves to undermine the Confederate war effort.14
At the start of the American Civil War, President
Abraham Lincoln and the federal government were politically
committed to defeating the South, irrespective of slavery.15 In
his proclamation on April 15, 1861, President Lincoln promised
“to avoid any destruction of, or interference with, property,”
namely slavery.16 “Certain it is that the Republicans…are ‘no
friends of slavery,’” Treasury Secretary Samuel Chase assured a
prominent Kentuckian, “but it is just as certain that they have
never proposed to interfere…with slavery in any State.”17 Thus,
the fluid relationship between Galloway and Butler would not
have been feasible in most Union commands.18 That spring, the
prevailing military opinion was that a northern victory should
pose no threat to the rights of southern slaveholders to hold
African Americans in bondage. A few days after Butler occupied
Fortress Monroe, for instance, Major General George B.
McClellan, later commanding field general, reassured Virginia’s
Unionists that he would not confiscate their slaves. Indeed,
McClellan promised to fight “for my country and the Union, not
for abolition…” and to “crush any attempt at insurrection.”19
Abiding by this sentiment, Union forces routinely vowed that
they would not interfere with southern property, most essentially
slavery, upon attacking the South.20
Accordingly, when Major General Butler encountered
slaves entering Fortress Monroe, he specifically labeled them
“contraband of war” to obliterate any obligation to return them
to slaveholders who claimed them as property.21 If his troops
had acquired a Confederate wagon or mule, would they have
contacted their rightful owners to return them? In reality, the
Union troops simply would have put the acquired resources
to good use. Thus, while Butler’s use of the term “contraband
of war” was loose, his argument made logical sense. When he
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justified his decision to the Union War Department, President
Lincoln deemed it unobjectionable. In early August 1861, the
United States Congress formulated the general principle into
The First Confiscation Act, which ordered the forfeiture of any
slaves utilized in direct assistance to the Confederate war effort.22
This resolve was directly tested at the end of August 1861, when
Major General John C. Frémont, Commander of the Western
Department, exercised stern measures to suppress guerrilla
activity.23 On August 30th, he declared martial law throughout
Missouri, mandating, “the court-martial and execution of all
persons taken with arms in their hands within Union lines.”24 As
a way to punish those who abetted southern partisans, Frémont
ordered the property of active dissenters confiscated and their
slaves declared free, asserting that the proclamation was of
military necessity. President Lincoln contested the order, stating
that the permanent future condition of slavery “must be settled
according to laws made by law-makers, and not by military
proclamations.”25 Frémont was thereby instructed to rescind
the emancipation provision. Accordingly, Butler’s “contraband”
order and Frémont’s unsuccessful proclamation determined the
limits of acceptable military interference with slavery during the
first years of the American Civil War.26
Growing recognition of fugitive slaves’ military value,
specifically of their local knowledge and their experience to
spy, scout, or guide Union troops, slowly eroded the policy
of exclusion. Yankee Colonel Simon H. Mix of the 2nd New
York Cavalry attested to their importance in assisting military
expeditions into Confederate territory. “In all our expeditions in
North Carolina we have depended upon the negroes as guides,”
Mix claimed, “for without them we could not have moved with
any safety.” He was particularly grateful for slaves’ guidance in
the Low Country, as “nowhere in the swamps of North Carolina
can you find a path where a dog can go that the negro does
not understand.”27 “Upwards of fifty volunteers of the best and
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most courageous,” reported Vincent Colyer, superintendent
of the poor in New Bern, North Carolina in 1862, “were kept
constantly employed on the perilous but important duty of
spies, scouts, and guides.”28 In these tasks, Colyer recounted,
slaves barely escaped with their lives, as they were pursued on
several occasions by bloodhounds and taken as prisoners.29 He
affirmed that African American operatives were “invaluable and
almost indispensible [sic]” and “frequently went from thirty to
three hundred miles within the enemy’s lines” to “bring back
important and reliable information.”30 Such accounts confirmed
that many Union leaders had begun to recognize the advantages
and the value of slaves’ intelligence.
In March 1862, Congress instituted The Act Prohibiting
the Return of Slaves, which barred Union soldiers from returning
fugitive slaves to their owners. The new article undermined the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850—which legally required all runaway
slaves to be returned to their masters—and marked a turning
point in federal policy.31 In April 1862, Major General Abner
Doubleday’s instructions to Colonel J.D. Shaul, Commander
of the 46th New York Infantry, cited the new article of war in
requiring his troops to treat fugitive slaves “as persons and not
as chattels.” “Under no circumstances has the commander of
a Fort or camp the power of surrendering persons claimed as
fugitive slaves as this cannot be done without determining their
character,” Doubleday affirmed. When asked by the commander
if it would be better to exclude fugitive slaves altogether from
Union lines, Doubleday responded, “…they bring much valuable
information which cannot be obtained from any other source.
They are acquainted with all the roads, path fords and other natural
features of the country and they make excellent guides. They
also know and frequently have exposed the haunts of secession
spies and traitors and the existence of rebel organization. They
will not therefore be excluded.”32
A July 1862 article in the Chicago Tribune cemented this
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opinion, advocating for an “immediate alliance with the slaves
of rebels” as they were the most versatile guides, a sort of “live
map.”33 The article continued:
Oh, how must the Genius of rebellion have
grinned, from her outlook, at the misguided
wandering in an unmapped wilderness of
an army of invasion! Maps! Useless works
of the engineering art, when negroes, live
maps, that could see, and walk, and talk,
and point with the index finger—crowds
of them—stood expectant within reach of
our army, and hungered and thirsted to be
employed to conduct us to the enemy by
the driest and best paths—maps capable of
leading us, with unerring certainty, through
the woods to the lowest and weakest parts
of the line of entrenchments the rebels had
thrown up…aged maps, sold from plantation
to plantation, through the Peninsula, and
familiar from ancient coon-hunting, and still
persistent night wandering, with every road
and swamp in it…would have led our army
right up to the places of weakness…I knew
108,000 men in April last who, under such
guidance and such God-speed, would have
stormed the gates of hell.34
The Chicago Tribune reporter, like Doubleday, promoted the
Union’s collaboration with slaves in gaining military intelligence.
Many Union military officials, however, resisted utilizing
slaves in their military campaigns. “Not all Union officers
welcome blacks into their lines,” explained Captain C.B. Wilder,
Superintendent of Contrabands at Fortress Monroe, as “many
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were suspicious of the abandoned and self-liberated slaves.”
These officers “lacked a forthright commitment to emancipation”
and “placed a higher value upon potentially loyal slaveholders
than upon demonstrably loyal slaves.”35 Specifically, Major
General Don Carlos Buell, Commander of the Army of Ohio in
Kentucky, sought to exclude all slaves from Union lines despite
the fact that slaves provided “in every case the most reliable
as well as important information of the rebel movements” to
officers in Kentucky and Tennessee. In April 1862, the Chicago
Tribune reported that Major General Buell received “the means of
detecting officers and spies lurking in Nashville [in Tennessee],”
critical information that enabled him “to nip a conspiracy in the
bud and prevent an insurrectionary movement.” Nonetheless,
Buell denied the intelligence of slaves, “…a people who are
naturally enemies to those who hold them in bondage.”36
Yet, other Union military officials quickly learned the
value of African Americans’ willingness to provide intelligence
and became staunch opponents of proslavery military policies.
Initially, like most Union generals at this pre-emancipation stage
of the war, Major General Ormsby M. Mitchel, commander
of a division of the Army of Ohio, did not encourage slave
rebellion. He scrupulously conformed to Buell’s orders regarding
fugitive slaves. However, Mitchel’s subordinates denounced
such obedience. One commander of an Ohio regiment offered
his resignation in protest against Mitchel’s order–issued at the
express direction of Buell–to expel fugitive slaves from the
camps of their division. Characterizing the order as “repugnant
to my feelings as a man,” the officer threatened to abandon his
service if forced to obey it. Although only a few other officers
and enlisted men took such a principled stance, several faulted
Mitchel for “inconsistency in regard to the eternal negro
question.”37 Their resentment toward Buell’s solicitude for the
rights of slaveholders, and of Mitchel’s subservience to Buell,
was made blatantly apparent.38
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Military circumstances prompted Mitchel to dissociate
himself from Buell’s policy though. In late March and early April
1862, as the majority of Buell’s army moved southwest from
Nashville to join the other western armies at Pittsburg Landing,
Tennessee, Mitchel’s division marched south toward Huntsville,
Alabama, in the heart of the Tennessee Valley plantation district.
Deep in enemy territory and attempting to guard several hundred
miles of railroad and river, Mitchel depended on slaves for
information about Confederate concentrations and movements.
“With the assistance of the Negroes in watching the River,”
Mitchel expressed, “I feel myself sufficiently strong to defy the
enemy.” He later revealed that African Americans were “our
only friends” and that “in two instances I owe my own safety
to their faithfulness.”39 In gratitude, Mitchel promised military
protection to his slave allies, “who have given me valuable
assistance and information.” In May 1862, he wrote to Secretary
of War Edward M. Stanton requesting the “protection of my
government” for “slaves who furnish us valuable information.”
Like his subordinate, Mitchel affirmed that if his request
were disapproved, “it would be impossible for me to hold my
position.”40 Stanton endorsed the appeal. “The assistance of
slaves is an element of military strength which under proper
regulations you are fully justified in employing for your security
and the success of your operations,” Stanton replied, and to
abstain from its use “would be a failure to employ means to
suppress the Rebellion.”41
Mitchel corresponded with Stanton one month later
in defense of the slaves who assisted him. After reading a
republished letter in The Philadelphia Inquirer that caused him “to
fear that the Commanding General of the Army has returned
to their masters, Slaves, to whom I promised the permanent
protection of the Government of the United States,” Mitchel
wrote to Stanton attesting that these slaves “had rendered
valuable services, and had obtained for me most important
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information.” He begged for Stanton’s intervention on behalf
of these slaves, for “if they fall into the hands of their masters,
their lives will not be safe.”42 Assistant Secretary of War Peter H.
Watson responded to Mitchel’s panicked letter, avowing that the
newspaper’s statement had “no significant authority to sustain it”
and thus Mitchel’s promise to the slaves was upheld.43
At this pre-emancipation stage of the war, Mitchel’s
appreciation of slaves’ assistance to Union troops fighting in
the South was quite progressive. Even after January 1, 1863,
Union military officers baselessly differentiated between fugitive
slaves and outlined in a complex array the circumstances under
which they should and should not be welcome in Union camps.44
For example, Brigadier General Henry Hayes Lockwood, a
commander of volunteers in the lower Potomac, affirmed that
“military camps shall not be used as places of public resort or for
idlers” and all should be denied admittance except those providing
information. “Information will be sought for from all sources
and rewards in money,” Lockwood declared, “with protection
from danger from giving information may be promised to all,
White and Black.”45 There was, seemingly, a difference drawn
between accepting slaves as fugitives and accepting the integral
intelligence that they brought with them.
The value of military intelligence held by enslaved,
escaped, and freed African Americans became undeniably
apparent. “It is utterly impossible for us to subdue the rebels,
without an alliance with their slaves,” the Chicago Tribune detailed
in July 1862, as “we have everywhere been helpless without
these blacks, or exposed to hap-hazard.” The report recounted
numerous Union military blunders and claimed that “this
alliance with the slaves would have saved the precious, timewasting preparations.”46 Moreover, Union Colonel of the 1st
South Carolina Volunteers Thomas W. Higginson astutely noted
that slaves “have been spies all their lives.” “You cannot teach
them anything” with respect to clandestine activity, Higginson
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revealed, and “I should not attempt to give them instructions…
they would better be able to teach me.” Higginson realized that
slaves had practiced dissemblance and stealth throughout their
lives. Nearly from birth, they learned “to travel furtively at night,
to communicate surreptitiously, and to defend themselves”; they
already mastered the arts of masquerade, disguise, and forgery.47
Abraham Galloway was chief among them. At the
commencement of the war, he traveled to the Confederacy seeking
“to go South to incite insurrections.”48 Galloway joined Butler’s
command at Fortress Monroe in May 1861 and “possess[ed]
the fullest confidence of the commanding General.”49 In the
following two and a half years, Galloway deployed his covert
intelligence against the Confederacy from the Chesapeake Bay to
the Mississippi River, risking his life skirting slave patrols, enemy
scouts, and Confederate army units. Reporting directly to one
of the Union Army’s highest ranking field officers, Galloway
seemingly played a significant role in Union intelligence in
Virginia. In a letter to a colleague in the fall of 1863, Brigadier
General Edward A. Wild, a colonel in the Army of the Potomac,
succinctly noted Galloway’s service as a spy: “I would like to do
all I can for Galloway, who has served his country well.”50
Former slaves such as Galloway were uniquely suited to
operate behind enemy lines: they were familiar with southern
life, able to fade unobtrusively into local slave communities, and
conditioned to living by guile and by stealth. African Americans
utilized their local knowledge and their experience to guide Union
troops through the southern terrain. Accustomed to traveling
furtively between southern plantations, they “were as thoroughly
acclimated as the black snakes and alligators that bask in these
Southern waters.”51 Additionally, African Americans’ knowledge
of the physical geography was especially helpful to Union
soldiers. When two Northerners escaped from a Confederate
prison camp in Columbia, South Carolina, they chanced upon a
large plantation in Pickens District. The plantation’s slaves readily
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“provided information about the local terrain, the movement of
Confederate troops, the location of practical supplies, and the
presence of rebels and political sympathizers alike.” They also
advised the soldiers “to stop at the home of John W. Wilson,
a strong Union man.”52 Virtually everywhere Union soldiers
traveled, they encountered slaves such as these ready to provide
geographical information about the local terrain, the movement
of Confederate troops, the location of pickets and armaments,
and the presence of rebels and political sympathizers alike.
Additionally, slaves crafted maps of the South, consisting
of paths unknown to their masters. Such cartographic diagrams—
shared amongst slaves and with Union troops—illustrated “the
shortcuts and winding paths that crisscrossed the land and
plantation boundaries and led out into the woods, along which
people and goods moved clandestinely.”53 When W.L. Curry of
the 1st Ohio Cavalry was cut off from his command south of the
Tennessee River and was seeking safety, he met “a colored man
going to mill with a sack of corn on his back” who revealed that
he was only ten miles away from his destination. “He directed me
the way I should go,” Curry recalled, “and cautioned me to keep
away from public roads, as the country was full of rebel cavalry
and I was liable to be picked up at any moment.”54
Similarly, James Pike, a Texas-born white Union spy,
received vital assistance from slaves he encountered while
struggling to find his way back to his command in northern
Alabama in the late summer of 1862. Having spent the night
soaking wet after falling into a swamp, Pike chanced upon a
plantation, where he befriended the working slaves and sought
out their assistance. One young slave guided Pike away toward
Huntsville, Alabama. Pike recounted, “My guide seemed to be
perfectly at home in the swamp, and piloted the way for three
miles over a string of logs, which seemed to be arranged by
accident, and not design, so as to form a complete chain across
it, so that we were landed on the opposite side without wading a
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step.”55 Curry and Pike, astounded at the secret pathways that were
revealed to them, were lucky beneficiaries of slaves’ surreptitious
travel methods.56 Such instances affirmed that “contrabands”
provided “some of the most valuable information” regarding
the “position, movements, and plans of the enemy, use of
topography of the country.”57
African Americans’ greatest concealment was, naturally,
their skin color, which allowed them to observe, eavesdrop,
and carry back information to Union lines without suspicion.
“Slave cover” rendered African Americans “so ubiquitous” in
a southern household “that neither the table, the parlor, nor
the sleeping room has any secrets from them.” They “catch up
on everything that is said,” a Chicago Tribune reporter attested in
August 1861, and “their opportunities for getting information
are vastly better than those of the poorer class of whites…”58
William Robinson, a driver and house servant on a North Carolina
plantation, was “the kind of slave whose mobility and access
to white conversations provided him with valuable information
and the means to relay it.”59 Although he was illiterate, he
nonetheless outfoxed slaveholders by learning how to “listen
carefully to every conversation held between white people.”60
According to the Chicago Tribune, slaves such as Robinson “hung
about groups of whites,” their “countenances unutterably stolid,
or grinning with stupid indifference,” as if they neither heard
nor understood, yet actually retained and transmitted everything
said.61 In his autobiography, late nineteenth century black activist
Booker T. Washington recounted that slaves “got knowledge of
the results of great battles before the white people,” owing to
the clever machinations of the bondman assigned to pick up the
mail. “The man who was sent to the office would linger about
the place long enough to get the drift of the conversation from
the group of white people,” Washington revealed, and “the mailcarrier on his way back to our master’s house would as naturally
retail the news that he had secured among the slaves.”62 In these
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ways, slaves were constantly a step or two ahead of their masters.
Union military officials such as Lieutenant Colonel
Josiah Given, a commander of an Ohio regiment, benefited
from such covert activities. While stationed in Tennessee in
December 1862, Given received information from a slave named
Johnston, who arrived at his pickets and informed him “that he
overheard [a party of the southern cavalry] tell his master that
they were going to a certain point on the road from Shelbyville
to Fayetteville that night and would attack and capture a supply
train that was to pass there in the morning.” Acting upon this
information, Given sent two infantry companies, accompanied
by Johnston who served as a guide, to surround and to capture
the enemy. “They reported to me to have found everything just
as [Johnston] represented,” Given attested.”63 Simply by working
as human chattel within southern homes, slaves were capable of
utterly undercutting those who were fighting a war to keep them
in bondage.
“Slave cover” proved so effective for Union intelligence
that Sarah Emma Edmonds, a white northern woman, disguised
herself as an African American male to infiltrate the Confederacy,
crossing gender and racial lines. Edmonds “dyed her skin with
silver nitrate, donned a minstrel wig, and posed in a double
disguise as a man and an African American.”64 Playing the role
of a man named “Cuff,” she worked in Confederate kitchens
and ramparts, and collected information on troop figures,
fortifications, and morale. “Of one thing I am sure,” the Chicago
Tribune reported, “that the negroes, whose cunning and duplicity
are wonderful, have a pretty fair idea of what is going on, and
only await the word to work fearful mischief.”65
Beyond their own aptitude for clandestine activities,
African Americans advantageously exploited the ways in which
white men perceived black men and defined the American Civil
War. At the war’s onset, the majority of white men, northern
and southern, did not seriously consider African Americans
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part of the war effort.66 Historian Stephanie McCurry explains
that whites on both sides of the war viewed the conflict as the
“Brothers’ War,” meaning white man against white man, not one
in which slaves were included to participate. It was “the brothers
who brought it on in their (divided) capacity as the people,” she
explains, “and the brothers assumed it would be theirs to fight.”67
Despite being excluded from political life (i.e. citizenry), slaves
were counted, as labor, in the southern war effort; Confederate
white men believed firmly that slaves were one of the
Confederacy’s “most potent elements of strength.”68 McCurry
reveals that Confederates assumed adamantly that “the southern
negro ha[d] no sympathies with Northern abolitionists.”69 African
Americans could not seek out more than that kind of oblivion,
which allowed for their penetration of Confederate lands. Thus,
African Americans were capable of taking advantage of the
southern collective mindset that could not envision them as
agents actively undermining the Confederate war effort.
In fact, southern slaveholders entered the war confident
in their slaves’ devotion to the Confederacy. No master pondered
if his slaves would participate in the war, McCurry notes, as “racial
ideology provided all of the proof needed of slaves’ willingness
to serve the masters’ cause.”70 In his March 1861 “Cornerstone
Speech,” Confederate Vice President Stephens explained that
the Confederacy’s “foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests,
upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white
man; that slavery is his natural and moral condition.”71 Thus, the
Houston Telegraph declared, “if slavery is what we believe it to
be—the best form of society—it is not only fitted for peace but
for the exigencies of war.”72 Human bondage was not considered
a “necessary evil”—it was deemed a legitimate advantage to the
southern war effort.
Such racial ideology solidified slaveholders’ risky
undertaking. “One salutary result of the movement in favor of
Southern independence has been the awakening of Northern
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minds to the true relations existing between the negro and the
white man,” wrote a Louisiana editor in March 1861. “The idea
of the equality of race is a figment,” he maintained, as “the
negro is happiest” when in servitude.73 Accordingly, Chief of
the Confederate Bureau of War Albert T. Bledsoe affirmed
“that almost every slave would cheerfully aid his master in the
work of hurling back the fanatical invader.”74 “They would as
soon suspect their children of conspiring against their lives,” a
correspondent of the Charleston Mercury stated, affirming that
planters had absolutely nothing to fear regarding their slaves
in wartime.75 In fact, “many masters…have actually called their
slaves together and given them long pretended ‘explanations’
of the pending troubles,” the Chicago Tribune reported in August
1861, “and told them bug bear stones of what the Abolitionists
in ‘Old Abe’s’ army would do to them if they ever got them
in their clutches.”76 Thus, enslaved men and women were to be
entirely disposed depending upon their masters’ consent.77 Early
thoughts of slavery as an element of strength in the war rested
upon the baseless assumption that slaves would simply join the
southern effort.
As secessionists boasted about the advantages of
slavery to a republic at war, their slaves sought to undermine
directly that very notion. Nearly everywhere behind Confederate
lines, slaves attempted to be informed of military and political
developments, which, in a variety of ways, eroded the customary
masterly authority. According to Booker T. Washington, slaves
in the hills of western Virginia “watched…every success of the
Federal armies and every defeat of the Confederate forces…with
the keenest and most intense interest.”78 Indeed, a former slave
who lived in a remote section of east-central Texas divulged,
“during them times just like today nearly everybody knows what
going on” and that slaves helped “news travel pretty fast.”79
Major General Butler’s experience outwitting local
planters in New Orleans demonstrated slaves’ intimate knowledge
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of southern activities. Following his successful amphibious
assault on Hatteras Inlet in North Carolina in August 1861,
Butler traveled to New Orleans and took command of the city.
While attempting to bring order to the city, he implemented
“speedy and condign punishment” of southern offenders, which
fostered a prevailing belief “that nothing could be done there
that [he] could not find out.” It was supposed that Butler had
“the best spy system in the world.” That was quite true, yet not
in the way Confederates imagined. In early June 1862, Butler was
informed of a series of “sewing bees” taking place in the house
of a Confederate woman, where secessionist women gathered to
craft a flag to send to a Confederate New Orleans regiment. When
he confronted the ringleader, she instinctively denied his charges.
“General, you must be mistaken; you have been misinformed
as to the person,” she claimed. Butler retorted, “Madam, if I
were you I wouldn’t deny that which you know and I know. You
have had that flag made; it is finished and in your house; and I
should get it from there now, as I have seen fit to move about
it, if I had to take down your house from roof to hearth-stone.”
After revealing the flag, she asked Butler, “which of those girls
gave information about this flag?” as she was certain that “it was
not one of my servants.” “‘I have no objection to you secession
women eating each other like Kilkenny cats,” Butler replied, “but
you may accuse her unjustly. It may be your servants, which I
suppose you have.” She adamantly retorted, “No, it was not my
servants, General; that won’t do.” Butler later revealed in his
private writings that, in truth, “the negroes all came and told me
anything they thought I wanted to know.”80
A similar instance of surreptitious slaves emasculating
their ‘patriarchs’ was recorded in the diary of Julia LeGrand, the
daughter of a successful Louisiana planter and a New Orleans
resident.81 James Woodson, a slave of Jack Toney in Fluvanna
County, Virginia, escaped from his cruel master and reached
Union troops under the command of General Philip Sheridan,
Penn History Review

27

Spies All Their Lives

then raiding Virginia. The fugitive directed Union soldiers to
the home of his former employer and had his master tied up
and whipped as Woodson’s master had done to the former
slave countless times. Woodson then guided the Union soldiers
to abundant stores of armaments, which they took away or
destroyed on the spot.82 Such activities aggravated Southerners
and prompted them to further punish their slaves. Likewise,
the slaves on John Williams’s plantation in Helena, Arkansas,
exposed their master’s small supply of arms and ammunition.
Lieutenant M.H. David recalled, “When upon investigating his
‘negroes’, I ascertained that Williams had in his possession [guns
and rifles], which he had just denied saying he was an honest
man and did not have any use for arms, or ammunition…
consequently I had his house minutely searched…” David found
many guns, some of which were even hidden within his wife’s
belongings. Similar to Butler’s confession, David admitted, “The
‘negroes’ told me that [Williams] had [the arms and ammunition]
the night before…”83 Ultimately, masters least appreciated
being undermined. A Louisiana editor and slaveholder, John H.
Ramsdell characterized this best when he described his slaves
as “ungrateful and vindictive scoundrels who took possession
of their master’s property, pointed his place of refuge out to
the enemy, or voluntarily acted as guides to them in their
marauding overspreading of our country.”84 Yet, slaveholders
were helpless—the slaves were the enemy within.
The continuation of extensive black communication
networks formed during the antebellum period allowed
intelligence to travel over long distances, which further revealed
the limits of slaves’ supposed allegiance.85 “Somehow or other, by
some secret telegraph which cannot be detected, whatever one
learns is speedily communicated to the rest,” the Chicago Tribune
reported in August 1861.86 John Azor Kellogg, Colonel of the
6th Wisconsin Infantry Volunteer Regiment, found the slave
“telegraph line” in Georgia’s northeastern highlands particularly
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useful in reporting on military activity within the region. Kellogg
was so impressed with the information slaves provided that
he characterized slaves “as a class, better informed of passing
events and had a better idea of questions involved in the struggle
between North and South, than the majority of that class known
as the ‘poor white’ of the South.”87
George Washington Albright, born a slave but who
would later serve in the Mississippi State Senate as a free man
in the 1870s, revealed a far better coordinated network of
communication in Marshall County.88 “That was my first job in
the fight for the rights of my people,” he recalled, “to keep [slaves]
informed and in readiness to assist the Union armies whenever
the opportunity came.” Fifteen years old at the time, Albright
had been “a runner for what we called the 4-Ls—Lincoln’s Legal
Loyal League” and consequently, “traveled about the plantations
within a certain range and got together small meetings in the
cabins.”89 The South Carolina planter and politician James Henry
Hammond was certain that he could see the disconcerting results
of such communication networks “on all the negro faces” on
his plantation, Redcliffe, in late June 1863. Hammond took little
comfort in the “peculiar furtive glance with which they regard me
and a hanging off from me that I do not like.”90 Such complaints
resounded in the diaries and letters of numerous slaveholders
remaining at home or refuged at other sites, and testified to what
could be considered a “second front” opened by slaves within
the Confederacy.91
Masters’ knowledge of the lengths to which their slaves
went to assist the enemy obliterated their fictions of passivity and
loyalty. “It eventually registered at every level of the Confederate
regime, from the plantation to the high officials of central state
authority,” McCurry affirms, and spawned a series of significant
adjustments in the southern conduct of war. In August 1862,
slaves from Beaufort, South Carolina and Savannah, Georgia
arrived at Union lines carrying valuable information threatening
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the safety of local Confederate troops. Accordingly, southern
officers instructed to “make a reconnaissance up the country
around Summerville, South Carolina” due to the “disturbance
and alarm…caused by gangs of runaway negroes, leagued
with deserters in that neighborhood.”92 A few months later,
Confederate Colonel Lawrence Keitt confirmed the persistent
need for troops in coastal South Carolina to guard all of the
inlets along the coast. McCurry notes, “It was knowledge of
those kinds of inland waterways and the number and precise
position of Confederate troops, pickets, fortifications, and guns”
that slaves “conveyed in astonishing detail to federal forces in
Beaufort.”93 Thus, Keitt assigned more men, whom he could
not afford to relinquish from his own operations, to join the
“three cavalry companies…and two infantry companies” already
assigned to guard and patrol the coast.94 Keitt’s understanding
of vulnerable points of exit and entry along the coast of South
Carolina demonstrated the challenges slaveholders faced in
trying to keep the enemy out when there was another enemy to
guide them in.95
Similarly, in November 1862, a Confederate Major
Jeffords ordered the removal of the slaves of Mr. Warren, an
Ashepoo River planter, on “incontestable proof ” that they were
“in continual intercourse with the enemy” and thus endangered
his picket line. Jeffords’ commanding officer confirmed the truth
of the charges against local slaves. When he sent a scout “who
pretended to be a Yankee” to test “one or two negroes near the
enemy’s lines,” they provided him with “all the information an
enemy could desire in regard to position and strength of my
pickets.”96 Union naval men operating on the South Carolina
rivers relied on this type of intelligence to strategize and
plan their operations. “It is a matter of notoriety,” lamented
Confederate States District Attorney P.H. Aylett, “in sections of
the Confederacy where raids are frequent that the guides of the
enemy are nearly always free negroes and slaves.”97
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In an attempt to maintain southern order and prevent
slaves from assisting the Union, the Confederacy created
the “Twenty Negro Law” in October 1862, which provided
exemptions from military service to those who owned twenty
or more slaves.98 Among planters and state officials, the “Twenty
Nigger Law,” as white southerners called it, generated demands
to protect plantations and curtail escape to the enemy. In late
1863, near the town of Charlotte, North Carolina, a planter
requested a military exemption for his brother so that “order and
discipline” might be better maintained “in the neighborhood.”99
Women, who remained on plantations as their husbands served
in battle, also voiced their fears publicly, writing hundreds of
letters to state and Confederate officials imploring that men be
released from military service to control slaves. “I fear the blacks
more than I do the Yankees,” confessed Mrs. A. Ingraham of
Vicksburg, Mississippi. In Virginia, one woman observed that
living with slavery in wartime was like living “with enemies in
our own households.”100 The imperatives of controlling a restive
slave population strained relations within the Confederacy
and confirmed that slaves were, in fact, the Confederacy’s
“open enemies” who were “well calculated to do [the South]
immense injury.”101 The “Twenty Negro Law” was only the most
conspicuous political example of how slaves, the “second front,”
came to undermine the slaveholders’ republic.102
Having first been seen as an element of strength, slaves
unquestionably became the enemy within the Confederacy, as
they fled readily to Union lines and provided Union soldiers
with pertinent information. Thus, in January 1864, MajorGeneral Cleburne proposed to emancipate slaves to “enlist
their sympathies” in the Confederate cause, which blatantly
acknowledged slaves’ potent impact on southern society.
“Wherever slavery is once seriously disturbed, whether by
the actual presence or the approach of the enemy, or even by
a cavalry raid,” Cleburne recorded, “the whites can no longer
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Application submited by Confederate Private Lycurgas Rees in May 1864
for exemption from military service on the grounds of owning fifteen slaves, in
accordance with the terms established by the “Twenty Negro Law”
passed by the Congress of the Confederate States of America in October 1862
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with safety to their property only sympathize with our cause.”103
Slavery forced the Confederacy “to wage war with the Union
army in front and ‘an insurrection in the rear,’” becoming “in a
military point of view, one of our chief sources of weakness.”104
Despite the fact that both sides in the war starkly
recognized the clandestine activities of freed, enslaved, and
runaway African Americans, their legacies are fleeting in
historical memory. Cloaked in secrecy and often illiterate, African
Americans’ covert work is rarely recorded. “Not surprisingly,”
historian David S. Cecelski writes, “Galloway’s duties as a spy
consigned the details of his missions to the shadows.”105 Galloway,
Butler, and other Union officers whom the former slave assisted
were continually reticent about precisely where Galloway
traveled and what he did; they put little, if anything, into writing.
While Galloway occasionally alluded to his service as a spy in
postwar years, he never divulged the particulars of his covert
activities behind enemy lines.106 An excerpt of a later speech to
the Republican State Convention in Raleigh, North Carolina, in
September 1867, demonstrated Galloway’s oblique manner of
discussing his service as a Union spy: “I rendered good service
to this government—if I didn’t do it publicly, I did it privately.”107
In particular, how Galloway survived in the Deep South after
being captured at Vicksburg in 1862 and suddenly reappearing
at a Union camp in New Bern, North Carolina, in mid-1863
remains unknown. He was illiterate and never transcribed how
he managed to escape from a Confederate stockade or prison
camp in Mississippi and how he traversed from the heart of
the Confederacy back to New Bern.108 A later edition of the
newspaper Anglo-African proved the only exception, as it alluded
to Galloway being captured on the “distant Southern strand,”
but provided no further information.109 Most likely, Galloway
never fully revealed his experience as a captured Union spy in
Mississippi.110 His life as a slave, fugitive, and spy trained him
to take caution habitually, hardly provoking him to publicize his
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efforts.111
Like Galloway’s records, most military records of African
Americans’ covert activities are utterly incomplete.112 What remains
are military correspondences noting the assistance of “negroes,”
indistinctly termed together and devoid of any recorded identity.
Nonetheless, each and every “negro” undoubtedly shaped the
five-year conflict that resulted in a Union victory.
By April 1865, the reality was evident: the attempt to
build an independent slaveholding republic had failed. The
southern vision crumbled in the face of Union forces and the
heroic resistance of its own enslaved population. Rather than
furthering its own ideals, the Confederate war effort cemented
the destruction of slavery.113 The war itself highlighted that the
slaves’ “war within” was boundless, that they undermined the
Confederacy in ways unimaginable.114 The slaves proved, time
and again, their vast abilities to assist the Union Army and Union
Navy, so much so that by 1865, some Confederates even argued
for the eradication of slavery to ensure their own safety and the
survival of their own country.
The war itself produced the very conditions that enabled
African Americans to participate in northern clandestine
activities and become so detrimental to the southern cause—it
was precisely because of their exclusion from the political, and
thereby military, arena that allowed for their casual exploitation
of the Confederacy. Despite the fact that southern planters and
mistresses suspected and feared their slaves’ insurgent activities
throughout the war, African Americans continually participated
in covert activities throughout the five-year struggle. The war
transformed the society it sought to preserve.
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As the leaves began to reach their boldest reds, oranges,
and yellows across the Potomac River Valley in early November
1811, Henry Clay and his family finally arrived in the nation’s
capital after a seemingly endless journey along the rugged roads
from their Kentucky home. His wife, Lucretia, had insisted
that their six children accompany her if she were to sustain the
long trip to Washington D.C. Ever the “Great Compromiser,” a
reputation he was destined to earn over a long career ahead of
him in the United States (U.S.) Congress, Clay acquiesced to her
demands in order to gain the desired outcome: he wanted his wife
to be at his side for the beginning of this next exciting chapter
in his life.1 The 34-year-old Kentucky Republican had come to
Washington D.C. to begin his third stint in Congress, having been
previously appointed by the Kentucky Legislature two times to
temporarily replace outgoing senators. This time, Clay returned to
the capital for his first full congressional term in the U.S. House
of Representatives after his election by the voters of Kentucky’s
5th district.2
Washington City, as it was called in those days, was a far
cry from the magnificent marble capital it would later become.
Built in the middle of a swamp off the Potomac River on land
ceded from Maryland and Virginia to create the permanent federal
District of Columbia, the settlement possessed hardly any of the
trappings that might lead one to even call it a city, much less the
capital of an independent country. In fact, it paled in comparison
to even its neighboring towns in the District, Georgetown and
Alexandria. European ministers representing their home nations
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Representative Henry Clay (DR-KY) transformed the
office of Speaker of the House into a position of unprecedented political power in the Federal Government

in the American capital considered it a “hardship post,” as far
removed from what they considered the civilized world as possibly imaginable. Members of Congress would have strongly
agreed. The landscape of the city was marked by disorganized
clusters of disparate wooden houses and storefronts that dotted
muddy lanes.3 Senators and representatives lodged in one of the
few ramshackle boarding houses populating the city during the
sessions, which usually ran from December to April or to May
of the next year, depending on how much business had to be
addressed. Given the wretched conditions of the nation’s capital, the legislators left town in a hurry as soon as Congress adjourned, leaving the city with hardly any residents. Since the
livelihood of the city was almost entirely dependent on governPenn History Review
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ment, business essentially halted after adjournment.4
At the top of Jenkins Hill, what we call Capitol Hill
today, was perched a beautiful white marble building designed
by Dr. William Thornton, with two wings on either side that
held the respective chambers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.5 The gleaming United States Capitol and the
President’s House (the White House) stood in stark contrast to
their bleak surroundings, but nonetheless were the first symbols
of a burgeoning capital city and a rapidly ascendant American
Republic. Outside of deliberative sessions held at the United
States Capitol, members would normally conduct most of their
personal business at their rented rooms at the boarding houses.
There they wrote and read correspondence, received constituents,
and parleyed with other congressmen. Clay and his family took
up residence for the session at Mrs. Dowson’s boarding house,
down one of the unpaved alleys leading up to Capitol Hill.6
Even before arriving in Washington City, Clay was
devising his next move regarding what had become the
paramount political issue of the day: the prospect of war against
Great Britain. Since his last time in the capital, he had become
the leading voice for a faction that believed the United States
faced a crisis of national honor in the face of continued British
aggression. The present tensions had begun when the U.S.
professed neutrality in the Napoleonic Wars that were consuming
the European continent and much of the Atlantic World. Neither
Britain nor France seemed to respect this position, instead opting
to seize private American vessels attempting to trade in the ports
of the enemy. At the recommendation of President Thomas
Jefferson, Congress enacted an embargo on all goods imported
or exported overseas in order to pressure Britain and France to
respect American neutrality.
This policy backfired, proving disastrous to the young
republic’s economic health while extracting no concessions from
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either power.7 Despite several instances of French violations,
it was the former motherland’s especially bold offenses against
U.S. sovereignty that pricked the American conscience most.
Repeated instances of naval seizures on the high seas and
ongoing military aid to agitated Native American tribes on the
western frontier reinforced Clay’s publicly-stated conclusion that
the young republic had no other choice but to fight a second
war of independence. “Is the time never to arrive when we may
manage our own affairs without the fear of insulting his Britannic
Majesty?” Clay had implored his colleagues in the Senate a year
earlier, “Is the rod of British power to be forever suspended over
our heads?”8
With animated orations such as that, Clay carved out
a reputation across the country as the impassioned firebrand
for the movement to defend the nation’s integrity through war
with Great Britain. “The Western Star,” as he was being called,
was not alone in this quest. In fact, the 34-year-old Kentuckian
formed the vanguard of a rising coalition of Republicans
derisively labeled by their enemies as the “War Hawks.” These
younger members from the southern and western regions mainly
sat in the House, and prominently included John C. Calhoun
(DR-SC), Langdon Cheves (DR-SC), William Lowndes (DRSC), Felix Grundy (DR-TN), and William Wyatt Bibb (DR-GA).
They agitated for armed conflict with Great Britain in retaliation
for the offenses they believed that nation had committed against
U.S. sovereignty. There was also a controversial claim that the
War Hawks meant to expand the nation territorially through
war, especially by invading and annexing British Canada. The
War Hawks surprised the Republican Party establishment by
organizing quickly following their election and by coalescing
around a central legislative strategy to lead the nation into
war.9 On the eve of the first session of the 12th United States
Congress, the young War Mess, as the core Hawks were known,
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met for dinner at Mrs. Dowson’s boarding house to discuss their
strategy for the next day and the coming months.10 Little did
they know that they were on the verge of ushering in a new
age in American politics and foreign affairs, one that would see
the Congress come to exercise unprecedented influence over the
foreign relations of the United States.
THE TRAILBLAZING TWELFTH CONGRESS
In the rapidly ascendant American Republic of the early
nineteenth century, the 12th United States Congress (elected to sit
from 1811 to 1813) heralded a new era of legislative assertiveness
in national politics and particularly in foreign affairs. There were
many accompanying trends both domestically and internationally
that would facilitate the emergence of Congress as an independent
pole from the executive branch in the foreign policy-making
process during the next eighteen years. First, the 12th Congress
constituted one of the youngest groups of lawmakers in
American history to take control of the legislative branch. Public
discontent with the inept gridlock of the previous Congress had
caused angry constituents to clean the House and the Senate of
its many seasoned incumbents in favor of young challengers who
promised decisive action. The result was perhaps the greatest
electoral purge in American political history: with 62 freshmen,
44 percent of the entire House membership in the 12th Congress
was new amid some states replacing their entire delegations.11
Following this slaughter at the ballot box, the majority of new
members in the House were under the age of forty, including
the 34-year-old Clay.12 These young representatives accurately
represented a young nation whose average national age was only
sixteen years old.13 This unprecedented youth and inexperience
in Congress, coupled with a clear voters’ mandate for legislative
action to confront the ongoing international conflict, no doubt
had an effect in reforming modes of thinking about how the
legislative branch should engage in international affairs and
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American statecraft.
The significance of this shift is reinforced by examining
the career trajectories and legacies of the freshmen entering
Congress between 1811 and 1815. The two momentous sittings
of the legislative branch that witnessed the full declaration and
prosecution of the War of 1812, as well as the 12th and 13th
Congresses (the “War Congresses”), would give birth to the
careers of some of the finest statesmen in American history.
A prominent sketch and series of biographies from Congress
written in 1850 names the men who were viewed as the most
important legislators of that time. In addition to Clay and
Calhoun, there was Daniel Webster (F-NH), John Forsyth (DRGA), Nathaniel Macon (DR-NC), William Gaston (F-NC),
Thomas Pickering (F-MA), John W. Taylor (DR-NY), Charles J.
Ingersoll (DR-PA), and William Rufus King (DR-AL).14 All were
members of the House and, with the exception of the veterans
Pickering and Macon, were freshmen in either the 12th or 13th
Congress. As the 1850 biographer would later observe of these
prominent lawmakers, “most of them [were] just starting, with
generous rivalry, upon their race of distinction.”15 Simply put, the
young men that were entering the federal legislature during the
12th and 13th Congresses amid the buzz of war were to reshape
the landscape of American politics in the next half century. It is
interesting to note for our purposes that of the eight freshmen
mentioned, five received their start on committees of foreign
affairs or gained early prominence in foreign policymaking.16
The assertive transformation in legislative thinking
symbolized by the entrance of an emboldened generation of
young lawmakers was also augmented by a second ongoing trend
in the country: the meteoric expansion of the nation and the
resulting legislative apportionments in the West. As the nation’s
population had roughly doubled in the approximately twenty
years since the Constitution’s ratification in 1788, the House
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in particular was growing at a rapid pace. Between the census
years of 1800 and 1810, the national population soared from
5.3 million to 7.2 million, while the geographic land area of the
country expanded by 865,000 square miles to 1,682,000 square
miles.17 As a result of the nation’s exponential growth, the House
ballooned from 65 seats at its inception in 1789 to 181 seats for
the 13th Congress in 1813.18 This proliferation would have major
implications for the structure, operation, and temperament of
the House: with each admitted state and newly-created seat, it
was increasingly untenable for the body to function in its original
form as a collegial assembly that lacked deliberation restrictions
and a hierarchical leadership order.
These constraints most assuredly caused the House
to reshape itself during this period, a process which would
accelerate during the 12th and 13th Congresses with the War of
1812. The reformed House of Representatives would emerge
from the metamorphosis with more responsive, polished, and
effective mechanisms that would facilitate its freshmen members’
legislative assertiveness in foreign policymaking and international
statecraft in the coming years. Additionally, it is significant to note
that population gains (and thus, legislative apportionment gains)
were coming largely from the recently admitted western states.
The interests for war with Great Britain among this region’s
electorate were intimate and clearly delineated: the British were
suspected to be actively aiding and abetting Native American
tribes led by Shawnee Chief Tecumseh’s confederation in their
repulsions of white settlers. Each defeat on the frontier was a
smarting reminder of the former motherland’s continued hand
on the continent.19 Given these circumstances, it is no wonder
that the young War Hawks faction mobilized so quickly and
gained a position of preeminence in the House within one
election cycle.
The third trend was the breakdown of the original twoPenn History Review
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party system, at least in terms of congressional caucuses, which
was beginning to run its course as early as the 10th Congress
(1807-1809).20 With the Federalists now nationally irrelevant and
fading into the sunset of American history, Thomas Jefferson’s
dominant Republican Party (the Democratic-Republicans) was
already splintering into four discernable factions within Congress:
the Clintonians, disciples of the aging Vice President George
Clinton (DR-NY), who harvested votes in New England and
New York from the flagging Federalists by advocating commercial
and shipping interests; the Tertium Quids (or simply, Quids),
“old school” Jeffersonian Republicans who adhered to the strict
constitutionalism and limited federal government approach of
their clarion Representative John Randolph of Roanoke (DRVA) and tied their long-term electoral hopes to the potential
political resurgence of James Monroe of Virginia; the Invisibles,
a peculiar faction largely relegated to the Senate that faithfully
rallied to the banner of Senator Samuel Smith (DR-MD) in his
personal and political crusade against Secretary of the Treasury
Albert Gallatin; and finally, a faction of Republicans who
remained loyal to the Jefferson Administration and still looked
to the White House for leadership.21 Nothing better exemplified
the collapse in the Republican Party’s unity than the boycott of
some sixty Clintonians (who supported James Monroe) from
the party’s presidential caucus that nominated Secretary of State
James Madison of Virginia for the 1808 ticket instead.22
These fissures were exacerbated by Jefferson’s increasing
resignation from national politics as his departure from the
Presidency grew imminent; during the course of the 10th Congress,
he had failed to exercise the leadership and discipline necessary
to maintain his party’s unity for his successor. Considering that
neither party had instituted proper partisan leadership structures
in the legislative branch, the result was a total collapse in party
cohesion.23 For reasons that will be explored next, President
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James Madison was powerless to prevent the full fracturing of the
Republican caucus in the 11th Congress (1809-1811). So while the
United States’ two parties remained nominally the Federalists and
the Republicans, the latter’s commanding majorities in the House
and the Senate no longer translated into legislative decisiveness.
The sum outcome of these circumstances was a power vacuum
in both chambers that at worst threatened to render Congress,
and the republican form of government, irrelevant; but at best,
it provided the perfect conditions for a new, fervent faction of
lawmakers to seize command of the entire body and impose
their will on the nation with the full constitutional arsenal of
legislative powers ascribed to the federal legislature.
A fourth unavoidable contribution to an environment
conducive to legislative assertiveness in foreign affairs was the
man who occupied the White House when the 12th Congress
took office in late 1811. James Madison, the “Father of the
Constitution” and the first President to have served in a
post-Constitution Congress, was considered the preeminent
champion of legislative supremacy among the Founding Fathers.
“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily
predominates,” Madison had stipulated without qualification in
The Federalist No. 51, a viewpoint that he more or less maintained
throughout his entire tenure of public service.24 In general, the
Virginian believed that the executive should submit to the will
of the national legislature for democratic governance to be truly
successful. Perhaps because of this principled commitment to
legislative government, Madison proved to be different from his
three presidential predecessors.
Previous executive administrations had featured forceful
and occasionally overbearing leadership that significantly
influenced the mechanics of Congress. President George
Washington, “Father of the Nation” as he was, commanded a
peerless respect over the government with a cabinet of legendary
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American Revolution Era figures that included the two major
partisan poles of the time: Alexander Hamilton and Thomas
Jefferson. Despite or probably because of his refusal to seize
power for himself in the wake of the American Revolutionary
War (1775-1783), Washington was a particularly powerful
executive whom the American public and its representatives
held in the highest regard. His successor, John Adams, was
survived by a mixed legacy of enhancing federal power through
unbridled executive authority during the Quasi-War (1789-1800).
And Thomas Jefferson, father of the Republican Party (the
Democratic-Republican Party as it is called today) and ostensible
champion of limited federal and executive authority, exercised
enormous influence in Congress with overwhelming majorities in
both chambers keen to prove their loyalty to him with their every
action. The first two decades of the American Republic had thus
witnessed the powerful force of partisan politics emerge from
leadership within the executive branch.
But in contrast to his strong-armed predecessors,
President Madison seemed to depart in varying degrees from
the first three administrations’ reliance on executive authority
and on more assertive leadership in both foreign and domestic
affairs. Madison’s republican ideology and insistence that the
bulk of national decision-making remain with and in Congress
seemed to preclude him from attempting to dominate or to
coerce the legislative body in the ways that his predecessors
had.25 Unlike Jefferson, Madison was neither willing nor capable
of wielding the presidential influence (especially in terms of
partisan leadership in the Democratic-Republican caucus) that
his preponderate forerunner had mastered to gain his desired
outcomes in legislative action. Furthermore, and unlike his three
predecessors, Madison’s election by a congressional caucus would
ensure that his political leash originated in the legislative branch.
Unlike Jefferson, who raised his congressional colleagues to their
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positions, Madison owed his own position to his congressional
colleagues.26 In the words of Professor Marshall Smelser, “As
the creation of the caucus, Madison could never dominate his
makers.”27 As one shall see, this fact in particular would have
major ramifications in the charge for war in 1812. In summary,
while the party collapsed internally amid the factional crisis
in Congress, help seemed unlikely and unable to come from
Madison’s White House.
An early sign that Madison was not prepared to confront
Congress, especially in foreign policy, came when he nominated
his former Jefferson Cabinet colleague Albert Gallatin as
his first Secretary of State in 1809. Instead of employing his
recent electoral mandate and unquestioned leadership of the
Democratic-Republican Party to squash what appears to have
been a petty personal fight over patronage as his predecessor
likely would have done, Madison allowed the Senate to reject his
appointee with no noticeable backlash.28 Led by the Invisibles
faction of Republicans, the Senate then proceeded to impose
their will upon Madison by pressuring him to appoint their
candidate of choice, Robert Smith, the brother of Senator Samuel
Smith (DR-MD). The Senate undoubtedly knew that Smith was
opposed to many aspects of Madison’s foreign policy and was
more than willing to collude with members of Congress in order
to accomplish his pro-war agenda.29 Instead of presiding over an
administration that would execute his wishes without question,
Madison was mired down by Smith and his congressional allies
within the Cabinet itself.
The Senate had trodden over Madison and essentially
planted one of its own in his administration’s most important
post. To accomplish his simplest foreign policy movements, the
President had to outmaneuver his own primary diplomatic agent,
who naturally held more of an allegiance to Congress than his
constitutional superior. Madison thought he could be his own
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Secretary of State, but by 1811, he finally had enough and
demanded Smith’s resignation after a bitter series of published
exchanges regarding their differences.30 This first incident only
reinforced the growing characterization that Madison would
more or less accept Congress running roughshod over him
whenever it pleased in order to avert inner-governmental conflict.
Time after time in the coming years, Madison would propose
diplomatic action to Congress that would ultimately die for lack
of executive inclination to exert political pressure.31 As one shall
see, the leadership of the young 12th Congress would prove more
effective in pressuring the legislative-minded Madison to enact
their will rather than his own.
THE HOUSE THAT CLAY BUILT
The combination of an unusually large freshmen
population in the 12th Congress, the rapid expansion of the
nation’s legislative apportionments (particularly in the West),
the fracturing of the two-party system, and the stewardship of
a hesitant and ambivalent President precipitated the dynamic
developments in the legislative branch’s foreign policy agency.
Through political and institutional change within, due to
the rapid proliferation in the body’s membership mentioned
earlier, the House of Representatives in particular would
become the bellwether of major developments in this unusual
era of legislative preeminence in international affairs. The
monumental transformations in the making were portended by
the unprecedented election of Henry Clay as Speaker of the
House on November 4, 1811, the first day the 12th Congress
convened.32 With the predetermined support of his War Hawks
faction, Clay was chosen from a cadre of well-known Republican
veterans to lead the House in his first day in the legislative body.
Never before (excluding the first session of the House in 1789)
had a freshman been elected to lead the chamber, a feat that has
since not yet been replicated. Clay’s elevation to the Speakership
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signaled the tremendous authority that the House’s young
freshmen would wield beginning on day one of the first session,
as well as the unparalleled period of institutional and political
change in Congress that the War Hawks were about to unleash.
Almost in diametric opposition to the institution one
knows in the present age, the House of Representatives was
an indistinctly-formed body that lacked specialization and
hierarchy. As discussed earlier, the Jeffersonian Republican
ideal of equality among legislators dictated that the House of
Representatives operate much more in the way one thinks of
the Senate today: members more or less had equal speaking
rights and opportunities to serve on select committees, while
strong leadership positions and rigid disciplinary structures
were virtually absent. All forms of hierarchy and specialization
were looked upon with suspicion, meaning that clear leadership

Although this image depicts Clay speaking in the Senate Chamber in
1850, the Kentuckian was known for his oration and leadership skills
throughout Congress
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chains or substantive standing committees were not present.33
Although likely not realized at the time, even by Clay himself,
the Kentucky freshman’s elevation to the Speakership was a
major institutional milestone in American political history that
would have major implications for the distribution of power in
the House of Representatives and for bringing about the end
of the idealized Jeffersonian legislative system. Until that point,
the Speakership had been largely apolitical and constitutional
in nature, mimicking the presiding officer of the British House
of Commons. The Speaker enforced House rules and ensured
that members were accorded equal rights and fair opportunities
to speak, but normally abstained from active political processes
occurring within the body. In attempting to further his legislative
goal of declaring war on Great Britain, Clay transformed the
position into one of unrivaled political authority in the Congress,
perhaps second nationwide only to the President of the United
States.34
As mentioned before, Clay’s power play was facilitated by
his War Hawks faction, of which he was the undisputed leader;
thus, Clay became the first Speaker of the House who was
simultaneously a party leader. Given that both the DemocraticRepublicans and the Federalists lacked a clearly delineated
structure of party leadership within either chamber—a feature
that was to hasten their respective downfalls in the coming
decades—political leadership had previously originated in the
executive branch either from Cabinet secretaries or the President
himself. Clay’s War Hawks changed this. Although they were a
minority within the Republican Party, these energetic freshmen
organized themselves remarkably well and coalesced aggressively
behind a coherent platform of war with Great Britain. The result
was a bending of wills in an amorphous and fractious Republican
Party that had not filled the leadership vacuum created by
President Jefferson’s departure from national politics.
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Holding the Speakership with a partisan mandate from
his War Hawks, Clay steadily manipulated the position’s nascent
powers in order to accomplish his faction’s primary objective
of declaring war on Great Britain in 1812 and of effectively
contriving the major political office that one knows today as
a byproduct of that charge. Clay interpreted the House rules
to further his faction’s war mission, used his constitutional
discretion to set the chamber’s agenda, and controlled debate
recognition while sometimes participating and voting, hitherto
unseen in the Speakership.35 But of all the Speaker’s powers that
Clay manipulated to gain undisputed command of the House’s
legislation and political action, the most significant was the
committee appointment powers. The powers themselves were
a result of the previously mentioned growth of the House: it
had been the original custom for the entire House to elect the
membership of every committee as the Senate still continued to
do, but the need for expediency in an exponentially-expanded
legislative body forced the House to defer to the Speaker’s best
judgment.36
Although generally expected to be fair and impartial in
appointing, Clay did not deploy this power neutrally. Immediately
after his election, he packed committees with War Hawks and
other members loyal to him, while appointing faithful chairmen
to help him prosecute the House’s war mission.37 As a result,
Clay had consolidated extensive powers into the Speakership
against the backdrop of the war charge in early 1812. As both
party leader and presiding officer of the House, he was able
to empower the War Hawks with unprecedented influence in
driving the House agenda, while crushing his opposition in both
established parties through ruthless exercise of the Speaker’s
constitutional authorities as a means of keeping order.38 In
observing the dangers of Clay’s rapid concentration of authority
within the Speakership, Josiah Quincy III (F-MA) remarked in a
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floor speech, “His power is, in truth, the power of the House.”39
Of course, Clay’s maneuvers were not without backlash;
when the Speaker appeared to be willing to use his recognition
powers to curb the length of debate given the size of the body
and the necessity for swift action, Representative Hugh Nelson
(DR-VA) proffered an amendment to the House Rules so that
“when the previous question is ordered to be taken, upon the
main question being put, every member, who has not already
spoken, shall have the liberty to speak once.”40 While Nelson was
also a Republican, he was closely allied with Representative John
Randolph and his ultra-conservative Tertium Quid Republicans,
who quickly became Clay and the War Hawks’ main opposition.
As a sign that Clay’s anti-war opposition was mounting,
Nelson’s amendment was also defended by members of the
Federalist minority who were also reeling for a shot at the young
Speaker. Others lamented Clay’s manipulation of the Speaker’s
committee appointment powers to satisfy his political will for
war. Representative Samuel Taggart (F-MA) noted that even a
random selection of committee chairs would result in “more
respectable chairmen than those placed in that situation by the
Speaker. The business however itself of the Speaker selecting at
pleasure the characters composing the several committees is in
itself a monstrous feature in our Government.”41
But this opposition would be unable to ground the
rising Western Star, who more than anyone in the entire nation
was adamantly leading the country into war. Even some of his
greatest political rivals, including then-Representative Daniel
Webster (F-NH), could not deny the power that Clay had
wielded in the Speaker’s chair. His lifelong friend and biographer
summarized Clay’s position during the 12th and 13th Congresses:
“Certainly, no one has ever presided over any deliberative body,
in this country, with more personal popularity and influence
than Mr. Clay. He governed the House with more absoluteness
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than any Speaker who preceded or followed him.”42 Through
the course of the 1812 warpath, the Speaker would only further
cultivate his power; as a result, Clay’s practices have become the
commonly-accepted prerogatives of House Speakers and are the
conventions that make the position so powerful today.
Externally and in terms of relations with the other
branches of government, the consolidation of authority in a
dominant Speaker empowered the House of Representatives
to promote its constitutional and political interests through
the recognition of its single and directly accountable voice for
the large chamber. With the realistic promise of swift political
action and party discipline, the Speaker could now negotiate
authoritatively in meetings with both the Senate and the
President, and that is exactly what Clay did. Beginning in the
spring of 1812, he and other House leaders began regularly
initiating meetings with the President and his Cabinet to advance
their war charge. The consolidation of the House’s leadership
powers in the Speaker would further the lower chamber’s external
agency and give the War Hawks tremendous leverage over both
its legislative counterpart and the Executive Branch. Since the
Constitution only stipulates that the Speaker is a presiding officer
for the House in a parallel fashion to the Vice President and
President Pro Tempore in the Senate, it is fascinating to consider
that the Speakership may have never become more than what
the Presidency of the Senate or its British antecedent are without
Clay’s formative machinations in pursuit of the war goals of
1812.
Clay was also riding the waves of the second major
institutional transformation in the House of Representatives:
the standing committee system. Since the 1st Congress (17891791), both the House and the Senate had opted not to create
a formalized standing committee system. Instead they retained
the Continental Congress’ previously discussed practice of
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appointing temporary “select committees” as needed. In keeping
with a common belief held especially among Jeffersonian
Republicans that the Congress should accord equal standing
for all legislators, select committees were preferred as a way
of diminishing specialization and hierarchy in both chambers
while retaining the majority’s authority. Many lawmakers also
began to view temporary select committees as a way to guard
against undue executive influence. During the first years of the
new government under the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton,
Secretary of the Treasury and father of the Federalist Party,
favored the referral of legislative proposals to executive
departments before congressional committees in keeping in
line with his program to build a government characterized by
a dominant executive branch.43 The Jeffersonian Republicans
though, who gained control of the House in the 2nd Congress,
vehemently opposed this proposed practice under their doctrine
of legislative supremacy. This controversy of institutional
organization had followed on the heels of the Pacificus-Helvidius
debates and further contributed to the great partisan divide
between the Federalists and the Republicans in the 1790s.
In response to Hamilton’s advances, congressional
Republicans had barred the President, Cabinet secretaries, and
other executive agents from initiating reports, coming to speak
on the House floor, and introducing legislation in Congress,
conventions that have remained in effect to the present day. All
were measures taken to combat the growing concern that “the
Executive had swallowed up the legislative branch,” as Jefferson
had put it. By the end of the Washington Administration and the
first four Congresses, the House and the Senate had both solidly
committed to developing their own methods for obtaining
information and for gaining expertise that was independent of
executive officers and agencies.44 Defeating Hamilton’s procedural
design and asserting full legislative autonomy “put an end to a
tendency that could have moved the country in the direction
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of British cabinet government,” as historian George Goodwin
noted in attributing the reasons that the U.S. government
developed with separate but equal branches despite Congress’
original institutional similarity to the British Parliament.45
Although the institution of the committee provided
Congress with the means to resist undue executive influence,
the House of Representatives and the Senate still largely relied
only on temporary select committees to fill the essential duties
of conducting reports and authoring legislation by the time that
Clay entered the legislative body. The common practice at the
time was for the entire House to resolve itself into a “Committee
of the Whole,” not only to hammer out the essential elements
of any legislation in open debate, but also to assign a select
committee to fulfill that action further, although with very
specific instructions. The lack of independent, permanent, and
specialized committees owed itself to the widespread Jeffersonian
belief that “committees with substantial policy discretion and
permanence might distort the will of the majority.”46 Thus, select
committees were dissolved immediately upon completion of
their carefully delineated task.
But by the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century,
the House, due to its growing size, was finding it inexpedient
and impractical for the body to resolve aspects of legislation and
other actions before committing it to a lower panel. The remedy
was the standing committee, a subset of the legislative body with
well-defined membership, a fixed subject-matter jurisdiction,
and an indefinite lifespan, rolling over from one Congress to the
next.47 The permanency and specialized autonomy of standing
committees enabled the House to generate more legislation,
gather more intelligence, exercise greater oversight powers over
the executive branch, and enhance legislative activism in virtually
all respects. While the House’s small standing committee system
was no more than a rudimentary fixture by the 12th Congress,
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the institution would continue to mature with every session until
blossoming right before the 1820s.48
For those Tertium Quid Republicans such as John
Randolph who opposed both specialization and hierarchy in the
legislature, Clay’s manipulation of the Speaker’s appointment
powers was doubly painful at a time when committees were
gaining more practical autonomy through the growing practice
of granting themselves independence to report legislation
on their own volition, rather than solely by commission of
the Committee of the Whole. While Clay only presided over
the creation of two new standing committees during the War
Congresses and referred more business to his packed select
committees, he would press for a fully-institutionalized system
after the War of 1812, possibly to keep order in reaction to the
breakdown of his secure war coalition.49
While the warpath to 1812 facilitated dynamic
developments in the House of Representatives, the Senate
remained relatively static during the course of the 12th and 13th
Congresses. Whereas the House was in the process of laying
down a standing committee system and selecting a powerful
presiding officer in the eventful months leading up to war, the
Senate remained the slow and cerebral body that the Framers of
the Constitution no doubt had in mind. The Senate’s standing
committee system would not be created until 1816, while the
body’s small size and its lack of a centralized leadership structure,
specialized policy units, and electoral turnover relegated it
to a position of receiving the major foreign policy initiatives
of the day from either the House or the President. Thus, the
majority of the aggressive legislation related to the war and other
overseas endeavors originated in the House during the years of
1811 through 1815.50 This difference in initiative between the
two chambers reflected their respective paces of institutional
development, especially with regards to standing committee
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establishment.
While the House had slowly adopted a standing committee
system (especially perpetuated during the past few years by the
demands of the war), the Senate had remained relatively stagnant
and unchanging. Now in one fell swoop, it adopted a fully-fleshed
network of standing committees and surpassed the House with
just one motion (the House’s standing committee system was
still immature, with a sizable amount of jurisdictions still under
semi-standing committees, including foreign affairs). Although
the senators, likely did not realize at the time the gravity of
this motion, their adoption of its institutional changes would
fundamentally alter the upper house forever and decisively usher
in the age of American government by committee that one
arguably still lives in to this day.
The difference in legislative initiative was also reflected
in public sentiment, which considered the Senate as the duller of
the two powers in the legislative branch. Whereas Senate sessions
were short and featured few speeches, the much greater volume
and breadth of colorful debate within the House ensured much
wider publicity and awareness of that chamber. It is consistently
recorded during this period that while reporters jostled for
position in the House gallery, the Senate scarcely attracted an
audience; newspaper volume certainly reflected that.51 Writing
to Secretary of State James Monroe in late 1810, Clay reflected
on his decision to run for election to the House despite his
position in the Senate: “Accustomed to the popular branch
of the Legislature, and preferring the turbulence (if I may be
allowed the term) of a numerous body to the solemn stillness of
the Senate chamber, it was a mere matter of taste that led me,
perhaps injudiciously, to change my station.”52 While the dullness
of the chamber may have corresponded to the lack of legislative
initiative, the Senate’s deliberative manner had its own ways of
influencing the war charge by acting as the brakes on the House’s
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breakneck speed.
THE COERCION CHARGE
After exploring why the 12th Congress, the first
“War Congress,” was in many ways a novel body and how it
initiated many of the institutional transformations that would
accommodate the new legislative assertiveness of its younger
War Hawk members in particular, the actual path to and through
the War of 1812 is equally riddled with legislation embodying a
new diplomatic assertiveness in Congress. While the purpose of
this work is not to document how Congress legislated the War
of 1812, this paper will explore how the legislative body led the
nation into the war and will investigate its impact on cultivating
a new age of congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs by the
end of the military conflict. The 12th Congress opened in the
wake of a series of diplomatic volleys between the United States,
Great Britain, and France that had begun shortly after President
Madison had taken office two years earlier in March 1809.
Where Jefferson’s disastrous Embargo Act of 1807 had
failed to assert American neutrality in shipping rights, Madison
proposed an honorable peace when relations with Britain briefly
improved in the honeymoon of his administration: the British
would repeal the Orders in Council (1807), which dictated seizure
of neutral shipping to France and to French continental allies,
and the U.S. would repeal the recently-passed Non-Intercourse
Act (1809), which prevented trade with both Great Britain and
France.53 After Congress wholeheartedly accommodated this
agreement with appropriate legislation in June 1809, Madison
regretfully announced that the British Cabinet had rejected the
agreement he had negotiated with British Minister to the U.S.
David Erskine.54 And so, the trade restrictions were reenacted
and the economic hostilities resumed. The relationship with
Great Britain was deteriorating with each passing day.
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With Madison’s diplomatic efforts faltering, Congress
decided to take matters into its own hands through the legislative
process. Out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (still a
select, or temporary, committee at this time), Chairman Nathaniel
Macon (DR-NC) reported legislation supported by the executive
administration (and championed by Madison’s Secretary of the
Treasury Albert Gallatin) that restricted French and British ships
from trading in American ports. Macon’s Bill No. 1, as it became
known, also stipulated that the President would be authorized
to issue a proclamation lifting the sanction on either power that
removed its edicts violating American neutrality. Nonetheless,
the Invisibles in the Senate, who considered anything touched by
Gallatin anathema, thoroughly amended Macon’s Bill No. 1 and
sent it back to the House. After exchanging amendments amid
fierce debate across both chambers for most of the 1810 session,
the House eventually acquiesced to the Senate and enacted a
revised version that what would be called Macon’s Bill No. 2 on
May 1, 1810, which Madison begrudgingly signed into law.55
The new revision on international trade law lifted all bans
on commerce with Britain and France for three months. If either
one of the two nations repealed their edicts on seizing American
shipping during this period, the President of the United States
would be compelled to proclaim a renewed embargo on the
other (unless that nation also repealed its offensive edicts).56
Congress hoped that one of the two European powers would
see an opportunity to damage their arch-nemesis through this
legislation, and Emperor of the French Napoleon Bonaparte
did not disappoint the federal legislature. The French Emperor
was quick to assure Madison that he would comply with the
Americans to spite the British. In compliance with Congress’
legislation, Madison then issued a proclamation lifting any
restriction on France and renewing the embargo on Britain.
But to the Americans’ horror, Napoleon quietly reneged on
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his promises and allowed French ships to continue marauding
vessels originating from the United States. Meanwhile, tensions
with Great Britain were at an all-time high: accidental naval
skirmishes in 1811, first between the U.S.S. Spitfire and the
H.M.S. Guerriere and then fifteen days later between the U.S.S.
President and H.M.S. Little Belt, renewed concerns that the British
were encroaching on American waters and impressing American
sailors and citizens in the British Royal Navy. In these two naval
incidents that smacked of the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair with
Britain just four years earlier and in the total inability to hold
Napoleon to his word, the American public could not help but
feel that the 11th Congress and President Madison had brought
them back to square one.
This was the dire state of affairs when the 12th Congress
arrived in Washington D.C. to begin their session early at the behest
of the President. Clay and his allies immediately used Madison’s
opening message reporting on the breakdown in diplomacy to
appoint a new House Foreign Relations Committee that was to
be headed by Chairman Peter B. Porter (DR-NY) and would also
include War Hawk leaders Calhoun and Grundy. Unfortunately,
Clay would also be forced to observe traditional seniority
conventions and appoint John Randolph to the committee, but
Clay hoped his War Hawks would drown out the shrill of his
dogged opposition leader.57 The committee immediately became
the focal point in the American charge towards hostilities with
Britain; just a little over a week later, the committee completed
a report on the Little Belt Affair and concluded that the nation
should prepare for the eventuality of war by raising 10,000 regulars
in the standing army and by providing for the contingency of
50,000 volunteers.58 Upon formally introducing the report to the
whole House for deliberation, Chairman Porter had no qualms
in stating unequivocally that “it was the determination of the
committee to recommend open and decided war.”59
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Together with his colleague Senator William Branch
Giles (DR-VA), de facto pro-war leader of the Republicans
in the Senate, Clay managed the charge for war by carefully
controlling the flow of defense legislation out of committees in
Congress.60 Over the course of the next four months, Congress
mainly legislated provisions for the war: in January, it provided
for an army of 25,000 regulars (which the skeptical Randolph
scoffed at) and appropriated $1.9 million in armaments for both
the army and the navy; in February, it enacted controversial
tax articles to finance the war; and in March, ig directed the
President to borrow up to $11 million at six percent interest
in order to meet any war-related contingencies.61 But in reality,
these measures did little to truly prepare the armed forces (which
relied almost entirely on local militias due to Republican fears of
a national standing army) for war with the British. In an effort to
save money, most articles were to be invoked only in the event
that war was officially declared. Cutting corners on the defense
legislation would cost the nation dearly in the coming conflict.62
Clay and his allies were poised for success in the House by
assembling a dominant coalition of war-supporting members.
All that remained was coercing those last holdouts in the Senate
and in the White House into accepting what the War Hawks had
already proclaimed was necessary.
By March 1812, President Madison was besieged on all
sides by those treating war with Britain as inevitable. But he was
reluctant to accept the dismal prospect of prosecuting a war
that he believed the nation was unprepared for, and deployed
peace envoys to Britain to discuss terms under which war could
be averted. Meanwhile, Clay and the House Republicans could
hardly restrain themselves from knocking down the doors of
the White House in their haste for war. Employing his mandate
in the House, the Speaker designed a wholesale program for the
executive administration to follow step-by-step so that Congress
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could declare war. Through his actions, Clay was setting new
markers in the relationship between the executive and the
legislature, enhancing the agency and the initiative of the latter.
In a March 16 note to Secretary of State Monroe, the Speaker
directed:
That the President recommend an Embargo to last say
30 days, by a confidential message: That a termination
of the Embargo be followed by War: and, That he also
recommend provision for the acceptance of 10,000
volunteers for a short period, whose officers are to be
commissioned by the President.
In the margins of the same note, Clay explained why he was
pursuing such vigorous action from the executive:
Altho’ the power of declaring War belongs to Congress,
I do not see that it less falls within the scope of the
President’s constitutional duty to recommend such
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient than
any other which, being suggested by him, they alone can
adopt.63
Clay thus instituted the convention in American political
tradition for the President to send a war message to Congress before
such a declaration was given.64 The President, apparently also of
the opinion that the embargo should precede any declaration of
war, acceded to the Speaker’s demands with the condition that
it be sixty days long so that the diplomatic mission to Britain on
the U.S.S. Hornet would have ample time to return. On April 1,
1812, the President’s message was delivered to Congress as Clay
had stipulated. As the measure was being debated in the House,
Representative Randolph gained the floor and denounced the
origins of Madison’s recommendation: “it comes to us in a very
questionable shape or rather in an unquestionable state… and is
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not the wish or measure of the Executive.”65 Randolph claimed
that it was the House Foreign Relations Committee, not President
Madison, which had designed the plan for an embargo followed
by war and that the committee’s manipulation was leading the
nation headstrong into an undesirable conflict.66 He was not far
off from the truth: Clay and his cohorts were orchestrating the
war efforts in both political branches of government through
coercion and the newly-pronounced powers of Congress that
the young Speaker had managed to master in the course of a few
months. After some changes in the Senate, Congress enacted a
90-day embargo.
Sometime following the adoption of this embargo,
a committee of War Hawk congressmen led by Speaker Clay
forced a private meeting with Madison to discuss the President’s
reluctance to commit to war. As was the case for the public
then, there is no transcript or records of that encounter; the
proceedings were and still are entirely open to speculation by
those not privy to its details. In fact, there may have been two
separate meetings spread out between April and May, the first
one regarding the War Hawks’ desire to strike a potential plan
Madison was formulating to send fresh peace envoys to Britain
and the second one involving the faction’s desire to force Madison
to send a message to Congress asking for war. While the number
of meetings or the precise discussion may never be known,
Federalists and Tertium Quid Republicans seemed confident in
what was transpiring in front of their eyes: Clay and the War
Hawks were twisting the President’s arm in their insatiable quest
for war. They claimed that the members had threatened to use
the previously-discussed power of the congressional caucus to
withhold Madison’s re-nomination for President in 1812. They
also denounced the act by implicating Clay and the War Hawks in
floor speeches, letters, and newspaper articles for years to come;
historians have still not resolved to what degree these coercive
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meetings affected the nation’s entrance into the War of 1812.
What can be ascertained, however, is that at least one of the
meetings did occur in May and pressure was applied in some
fashion on Madison to produce a war message in the same
manner Clay had demanded that the President recommend the
embargo. Whether it was because the congressional faction left
him with no other choice or because he sincerely believed that
war was necessary, Madison would ultimately acquiesce to the
War Hawks’ expectations. His decision was reinforced by the
return of the U.S.S. Hornet from Europe bearing no news of
concessions from the British.67
On June 1, 1812, President Madison sent a confidential
message to Congress outlining the grievances of the United
States against Great Britain and the current state of affairs
between the two countries, concluding, “We behold, in fine,
on the side of Great Britain, a state of war against the United
States, and on the side of the United States a state of peace
toward Great Britain.”68 Madison recounted the reasons why his
countrymen were so distressed: impressment of citizens on the
high seas, seizures of naval vessels, violation of neutral trade,
encouragement of Native American raids in the west, and a
general lack of regard for the sovereignty of the nation. But the
President did not go so far as to explicitly ask the Congress to
declare war, instead deferring to the Congress to deliberate the
necessity of war:
Whether the United States shall continue passive under
these progressive usurpations and these accumulating
wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of
their national rights, shall commit a just cause into the
hands of the Almighty Disposer of Events, avoiding
all connections which might entangle it in the contest
or views of other powers, and preserving a constant
readiness to concur in an honorable re-establishment
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of peace and friendship, is a solemn question which
the Constitution wisely confides to the Legislative
Department of the Government. In recommending it to
their early deliberations I am happy in the assurance that
the decision will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic
councils of a virtuous, a free, and a powerful nation.69
While Madison had certainly documented the extent to
which British offenses constituted substantial threats to American
sovereignty, his conclusion clearly lacked a decisive call to action.
Never before (or never since) had there been such a vague “war
message” delivered by a president to Congress. Astonishingly,
Madison outlined equally the benefits of not only a declaration
of war, but also those of maintaining the peaceful status quo.
One reads this conclusion and doubts whether he believed the
U.S. should commit to war at all, and wonders if Congress was
truly influenced by the presidential message as it has been on
several occasions since. Madison’s skepticism about declaring
war was further complicated by his ambivalence over the role
that he, as President, would play in resolving the complication at
hand. Ultimately, without any appreciable executive pressure, the
decision was truly left to the legislative body that had instigated
armed conflict in the first place: the House of Representatives.
Immediately following the war message, Randolph and
his Tertium Quid Republicans moved that the measures for war
be considered by a Committee of the Whole. The majority of
the House rejected this measure and Speaker Clay gained a major
victory: the House Foreign Relations Committee would have sole
jurisdiction of drafting the articles of war. This was a significant
moment in the House’s history, as it confirmed the viability of
the House Foreign Relations Committee as an autonomous unit
that would generate its own opinions and legislation, well-suited
to efficiently accomplish its diplomatic goals in insulation from
rogue elements in the legislative body. Now-Chairman John
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C. Calhoun led his committee to its private chambers to begin
preparing a report and resolution for declaring war on Great
Britain. Two days later, the South Carolina freshman would
announce the committee’s findings: “The period has arrived
when the United States must support their character and station
among the Nations of the Earth, or submit to the most shameful
degradation.”70 It seemed from the swiftness of the House’s
mobilization (it was rumored that Calhoun’s report had already
been written in the previous month) and the apparent origin
of the message’s impetus in Congress that Madison’s message
was merely being employed by the War Hawks as an obligatory
symbol to assuage concerns that the executive branch was not
prepared to prosecute the war. With the way in which the war
was about to unfold, it would seem as though these concerns
were well-founded.
The House easily adopted the House Foreign Relations
Committee’s report and its draft of the declaration of war on
Great Britain, 79 yeas to 49 nays.71 Clay then had the engrossed
resolution sent to the Senate for its consideration, beginning on
June 14. The next thirteen days would leave Washington D.C.
in limbo and the nation in suspense, as the Senate debated
war behind closed doors. With the Clintonians, Invisibles, and
Administration Republicans all favoring different forms of war
and the Tertium Quid Republicans as well as the Federalists
opposing war outright, the process was excruciatingly painful;
amendment after amendment and philosophical debate after
debate mired the Senate down in procedure. The Senate’s
convention of unlimited speaking certainly did not hasten the
process. In total, there were over eight key votes on war measures
during the process; many were decided within the margin of only
one or two votes. Ultimately, the Senate adopted the House’s
resolution, 19 yeas to 13 nays; this remains the slimmest margin
in either chamber for a declaration of war in American history.72
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Clay and the War Hawks finally had their war; they
had successfully silenced their opposition in the Tertium Quid
Republicans and Federalists while bullying the White House into
accepting the burden of prosecuting a daunting campaign against
perhaps the greatest power on Earth at the time. Moreover, they
had proven in the first major instance since the ratification of
the Constitution that the impetus for landmark action in foreign
policy could originate within Congress. No matter to what degree
President Madison and his Cabinet may have favored war, the
clear leadership had emanated from Congress. But Clay and his
allies were about to learn that declaring war was by far the easiest
part in the strenuous and bloody process of directing the nation
through conflict; the coming war was going to test Congress
and make even its most ardent proponents of war ponder the
outcome they had so jubilantly celebrated in 1812.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE RISING
The war charge of 1812 produced another development
in congressional statecraft whose significance has not been fully
explored. With the prospect of war seeming to dominate every
aspect of the country’s international consciousness when the 12th
Congress opened session in late 1811, lawmakers searched for
every possible opportunity to extend pressure on Britain beyond
the single dimension of bilateral Anglo-American relations;
legislators realized that pressure could and must also be levied
upon British allies and proxies in the Western Hemisphere.
American leaders were particularly tempted by the possibility
of encumbering Britain’s key ally, Spain, whose vast empire
remained a major impediment to U.S. ambitions to expand across
the Americas.73 The opportunity seemed to present itself in the
crescendo of the Age of Democratic Revolutions in the colonial
arenas of Latin America. On the western shores of the Atlantic,
the Americas brimmed with the revolutionary energies first
unleashed in the United States, France, and Haiti. The conflicts
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were sparked by Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula
in 1808, which launched Spain and Portugal into absolute
disarray. King Charles IV of Spain was forced from his throne,
while Portugal’s royal family fled for Colonial Brazil to escape
Napoleon’s clutches; both the central governments in Madrid,
Spain and Lisbon, Portugal collapsed with little warning to their
imperial possessions.74
The Emperor of the French installed his brother,
Joseph Bonaparte, on the Spanish throne at the head of a proxy
government that claimed the entirety of Spain’s vast overseas
possessions. However, the reality was that Napoleon had chopped
off rather than replaced the head of the already moribund Spanish
Empire. With no central authority in Latin America remaining,
the Spanish and Portuguese colonies established their own local
juntas that claimed varying degrees of loyalty to the beleaguered
House of Bourbon in opposition to the Bonapartists. Despite
the nominal profession of loyalty to Spain by many of the Latin
American colonies, major political and social upheaval that had
been swelling beneath centuries of rigid imperial rule was just
beginning to touch the surface.75 Congress was well aware of these
profound developments in Latin America, considering the advent
of revolutionary movements a particularly timely opportunity
for American statecraft in light of the rivalry with Great Britain.
Given that Spain was one of Britain’s most important allies and
that there was a chronic lack of compassionate feeling between
the U.S. and its imperial neighbor, there were many in both the
House and the Senate of the 12th Congress who wished to see
the United States capitalize on developments southward in order
to enhance American power and deter British influence.
By 1810, President Madison and Secretary Monroe had
deployed various classes of agents across Latin America to
provide reconnaissance on the deteriorating situations in the
various colonies to the south, as well as to foster relationships
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for American political and economic interests. Much to the
expense of their own nation’s interests, American agents
witnessed the British making inroads with the revolutionary
juntas by obtaining most favorable statuses in trade agreements
and building hegemony over the region in the absence of any
comparable power.76 Given the collapse of Spain and Portugal
and the preoccupation of France, the United States was the only
nation in a position to independently deter the growing British
influence in the Western Hemisphere.
Although the Madison Administration had begun
appointing agents across Latin America, harboring revolutionaries
in the U.S., and allowing them to purchase munitions, there
were still many gaps that needed to be filled in order to craft an
acceptable American grand strategy to resist the British threat. But
while the British were clearly winning on the ground, American
agents suggested that it may not be too late to mount a challenge;
there was discontent with the imperial superpower in nations
such as Buenos Aires (later Argentina) and Venezuela, with many
revolutionaries viewing the intensifying British imperial influence
with suspicion. At the same time, these revolutionaries looked to
their neighbor to the north to provide them with the natural
support they felt they deserved in their efforts to proclaim
independence under the banner of republicanism.77 American
agents stressed that the U.S. could use minimal resources to begin
building its own rival sphere of influence over the tumultuous
dominions of Latin America.
Correspondence with the Venezuelan Congress that
implored assistance for their cause of full independence
provided the perfect opportunity for the U.S. to commit its
attention southward while the great European powers were
occupied in their struggle with Napoleon for control of their
own continent. There were many in the House and the Senate
who looked favorably upon this development and supported an
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American insertion in the revolutions of Latin America. Chief
among those in Congress intent on architecting a comprehensive
Western Hemisphere policy in an era of emerging juntas was none
other than Henry Clay.78 The young Speaker would have his first
of many opportunities to shift the House’s attention southward
after President Madison delivered his first message to the 12th
Congress on November 5, 1811. While the communication was
largely devoted to the ongoing tensions with Great Britain and
other matters of diplomatic importance, Madison mentioned
in passing, “it is impossible to overlook those developing
themselves among the great communities which occupy the
Southern portion of our own hemisphere, and extend into our
neighborhood.”79
As was the practice at the time, the House of
Representatives resolved itself into several select committees
based on particular topics touched upon in the President’s
message to provide a substantial congressional response either
in the form of a report and/or some appropriate legislative
action. Physician and scientist Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchill
(DR-NY) was chosen as the chairman of the committee that
was referred to address the small portion of the President’s
message that related to the Spanish American colonies. The
following month, Representative Mitchill wrote to Secretary of
State Monroe to request that any discrete information available
regarding the independence of Spanish American colonies be
released to the House committee.80 Responding to Mitchill’s
request, Secretary Monroe furnished a copy of Venezuela’s
declaration of independence. According to Monroe, this
copy had been specifically transmitted to the United States
government by order of the “Congress, composed of deputies
from those [Venezuelan] provinces, assembled at Caracas.”81 The
House committee now knew that the Venezuelan Congress was
actively soliciting the attention of the United States, undoubtedly
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seeking the legitimacy and support of the first republic in the
Western Hemisphere in their struggle for a certain measure
of sovereignty. Although this is the only such declaration that
Monroe had received by the date of his letter on December 9,
1811, Monroe informed Mitchill, “it is known that most, if not
all of them [Spanish American colonies], on the continent, are in
a revolutionary state.”82
On December 10, Representative Mitchill reported on
behalf of the House select committee on Spanish American
colonies. Specifically, Mitchill presented a report on the origins
and status of the Latin American revolutions and recommended
the adoption of a resolution encouraging the establishment of
independent democratic and federal unions by revolutionary
forces in the Spanish American colonies:
Whereas several of the American Spanish provinces,
have represented to the United States that it has been
found expedient for them to associate and form Federal
Governments upon the elective and representative plan,
and to declare themselves free and independent—
Therefore be it
Resolved, by the Senate and the House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
they behold, with friendly interest, the establishment
of independent sovereignties by the Spanish provinces
in America, consequent upon the actual state of the
monarchy to which they belonged; that, as neighbors
and inhabitants of the same hemisphere, the United
States feel great solicitude for their welfare; and that,
when those provinces shall have attained the condition
of nations, by the just exercise of their rights, the
Senate and House of Representatives will unite with
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the Executive in establishing with them, as sovereign
and independent States, such amicable relations and
commercial intercourse as may require their Legislative
authority.83
Mitchill’s report and its accompanying resolution was a remarkable
first step in the formation of a comprehensive American policy
towards the burgeoning Latin American nations. While the
young 12th Congress faced the daunting prospect of war with
the greatest sea power of the age, it did not shy away from the
prospect of envisaging a grand framework for statecraft in the
emerging community of nations in the Western Hemisphere.
The 12th Congress had gumption in proclaiming to Latin
Americans that it felt “great solicitude for their welfare” and was
congratulatory towards their ideological choice to dislodge the
“actual state of the monarchy to which they belonged.”
As preeminent Western Hemisphere historian Arthur
Preston Whitaker of the University of Pennsylvania pointed
out in his landmark work, The United States and the Independence
of Latin America, 1800-1830, the Mitchill committee’s resolution
was foundational because “it was the first statement of the kind
made by any organ of the United States government.”84 The ideas
expressed in the resolution defined two ideological principles that
would become salient features in the language employed by U.S.
politicians and officials to justify “solicitude” for the entirety of
the Americas: hemispheric solidarity and republican fraternity.
The former expressed the notion that the Western Hemisphere
constituted a new world independent of and removed from
the European sphere, while the latter suggested that the U.S.
felt obliged to care for the new Latin American nations due to
their adoption of the same republican and federal principles that
characterized the U.S. Constitution.
The sentiments of Mitchill’s resolution would become
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enshrined in American statecraft for decades to come as the
justificatory cornerstone of U.S. guardianship over the Western
Hemisphere. These considerations in the select committee on
the Spanish American colonies built upon the 11th Congress’
work just a year earlier in enacting the so-called “No Transfer
Principle” by a joint resolution of the House and the Senate.
Tracing its origins to the Washington Administration and later
arguments in Congress furnished by Federalists such as Senator
Gouverneur Morris (F-NY), the No Transfer Principle sought
to articulate U.S. opposition to the transfer of certain colonial
territories in the Americas from one European power to another,
particularly Spanish colonies to British domain.85 This legislation
would become another pillar of American foreign policy in the
nineteenth century.
Both the Mitchill Resolution and the preceding No
Transfer Policy contained vital components of the celebrated
Monroe Doctrine of 1823. But while the Monroe Doctrine
would only come over a decade after these first beginnings
in Congress, the common narrative of American diplomatic
history seems to accord President James Monroe and Secretary
of State John Quincy Adams with complete credit for this nowessential canon of U.S. foreign policy principles. In other words,
the Monroe Doctrine was an exceptional milestone architected
with the energy of the executive branch, however, the evolution
of this principle was at least a decade in the making and involved
a collaborative process of alternating action between both
political branches of government. The Mitchill Resolution was
undoubtedly an important precedent to the Monroe Doctrine.
Even the great American diplomatic historian Dexter Perkins
mentioned the resolution in his discussion of influences on
the President’s foreign policy position in his tour de force, A
History of the Monroe Doctrine.86 Furthermore, it is important to
realize that when President Monroe first unveiled the policy in
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his speech, it did not seem at the time to be a groundbreaking
transformation of American foreign policy. In fact, between
1825 and 1895, the “Monroe Doctrine” (as it would later become
known) was almost absent as a recognized executive policy from
the nation’s politics and history.87 When examining the full record
of policymaking with regards to U.S.-Latin American relations,
the Monroe Doctrine seems unremarkable as a departure from
existing foreign policy; it is more appropriate to consider it as
a more substantive articulation of policy that had already been
burgeoning in Congress and the Department of State for years
since, at least, the Mitchill Resolution in 1811.
FIRST IN WAR, FIRST IN PEACE
While Clay and his allies had painted a rosy landscape
of a painless victory in which the U.S. would usurp the British
from Canada and the entire hemisphere with little more than the
Kentucky militia, the reality was that the young congressional
faction had no clue as to how difficult it would be to wage war
on the world’s foremost superpower at the time. Both before and
after the 12th Congress took office in the fall of 1811, neither
the House nor the Senate was inclined to seriously shoulder
the tribulations necessary to arm the nation for its ostensibly
“inevitable war.” This lack of preparation translated onto the
battlefields in the summer of 1812. In repudiating a solely seabased conflict and confirming that territorial expansion was
indeed a goal of the conflict, American forces first moved on
Canada in a land expedition that was met with ignominious defeat
and a counter-attack by the British on the garrison at Chicago in
the U.S.-controlled Territory of Illinois. When General Henry
Dearborn attempted to resuscitate the American campaign
in November, state militias refused to follow him into enemy
territory; this served as a direct abrogation to Clay’s claims to the
House earlier in the year that state militias could be relied upon
for excursions into Canada.88 By the end of 1812, as Congress
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reconvened in Washington D.C. for its second session, the
American cause was looking lost before it had even really begun.
Now came the dirty work: Congress had to work with
the executive administration to direct the war that the legislative
body had produced. In his landmark dissertation, Congress During
the War of 1812, William Ray Barlow chronicled the conduct
of the 12th and 13th Congresses and how they set precedents
“criticizing, objecting, amending, and at times initiating war
efforts.” While the President and Congress enjoyed a more
collaborative relationship after the defeats of 1812, there were
still several instances of crossfire between the executive and the
legislature on particular measures of combat and diplomacy. Each
attempted to influence the other with every new consideration.
One such instance was the charter of a national bank, which
would become the central issue of American politics in the
coming decades: Congress insisted on instituting it to finance
the war and President Madison resolved to veto the measure.
Reverse instances came when the executive administration
continually submitted appropriations necessary to maintain the
war effort, with each item scrutinized by the House and rarely
written off in the amount requested.89
During the course of the war, the House of
Representatives was the leading body as it had been during the
initiation of the war. That chamber’s institutionalized committees
and efficient, targeted operation resulted in its procurement of
most war directives. Throughout the course of the conflict, the
Senate proved unable to manage the flood of legislation the
House sent; this would likely precipitate the establishment of
the Senate’s own standing committee system after the conclusion
of the War of 1812. Meanwhile, the House considered major
changes, including the institution of a single Committee of Public
Defense to manage the war effort. After much deliberation about
the practicality and safety of such a system, the House resolved
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to create the Military Affairs Committee that collaborated with
the executive administration in much the same way that the
Continental Congress war committees cooperated with General
George Washington during the American Revolutionary War.
Although not officially a standing committee in its own
right, the House Committee on Foreign Relations remained
perhaps the most powerful panel in the body like in the previous
session. It claimed jurisdiction over diplomatic affairs and
the general spirit of the war. In describing the committee’s
aggrandized role in the course of the war, Representative Samuel
Taggart (F-MA) wrote that it was “a junta composed of 5, 6, 7,
8, or 10 [members]….” Representative John Randolph, prone to
exaggeration, charged that the Committee on Foreign Relations
had “outstripped the Executive [President Madison].” Randolph
further implored, “Shall we form a committee of this House,
in quality a Committee of Public Safety, or shall we depute the
power of the Speaker… to carry on the war?”90 While Clay
and Calhoun possessed powers far from those maintained by
leaders of the sanguinary French Revolution (1789-1799), such
as Maximilien Robespierre and Louis Antoine de Saint-Just,
the allusion exudes the unprecedented power that a legislative
committee was exercising over the formation of foreign policy
and the conduct of diplomacy.
As the war carried on, the jostling between the Madison
Administration and Congress reflected the dismal war effort. In
general, American forces were being whipped on the continent but
enjoyed surprising success in naval engagements despite British
focus still being directed to the ongoing conflict with Napoleon
in Europe. A year and a half into the conflict, the war had
exhausted hawkish passions and inflicted its substantial damages
upon both belligerents. By early 1814, there was considerable will
on both sides to resolve the conflict; subsequently, initial peace
talks commenced. As then-Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (DPenn History Review
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WV) identified in his narrative history of the Senate in 1988,
the constitutional requirement for the upper house to provide
its “advice and consent” to treaties has resulted in interesting
quandaries over the years regarding the active participation of
members of Congress in the physical conduct of diplomatic
negotiation. The first time this occurred though was in 1814,
when Speaker Clay joined Senator James Bayard (F-DE) in a
bipartisan five-member delegation to negotiate a peace with
Great Britain in the Flemish city of Ghent, Belgium. While Clay
had resigned from the House in order to attend and Bayard had
not been re-elected for another term in the Senate, their presence
in the negotiation of the treaty stirred some speculation about
their political role in securing congressional support for the peace
accord and the constitutional consistency with the separation of
powers.91 While this would be the first noticeable instance of
congressional participation in diplomatic negotiation, it would
not be the final time the presence of senators and representatives
on diplomatic delegations would be questioned.
Congress had its two representatives at Ghent to ensure
the war it had waged was terminated on the federal legislature’s
terms. Congress need not have worried that the result would
be unsatisfactory, for the Western Star himself was to bring
the British to task. As Clay stepped down from the Speaker’s
chair amid the jubilatory well-wishes of his doting colleagues,
one observer enthusiastically wrote at the time, “The war in
which he had been most active in hastening, and most energetic
in prosecuting, he was now to close…”92 Needless to say,
Clay’s presence on the diplomatic delegation would guarantee
smooth adoption of the agreement back in Congress, while also
establishing credibility for the treaty among the war’s initiators
and the public.
However, with Napoleon on his heels by April 1814,
the British were reinvigorated in their aggression in America.
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They stalled the peace negotiations through the summer while
their forces defeated the U.S. Army at the Battle of Bladensburg
in Maryland and then occupied Washington D.C., burning the
Capitol and the White House to the ground. President Madison
and Congress were forced to abandon their residences and flee
for safe havens; Clay and the other peace commissioners could
only watch helpless from Belgium as the devastation of the
summer of 1814 unfolded. Congress returned to the capital in
September 1814 to find the Capitol a smoldering pile of rocks
and ashes; in the meantime, it met in the lobby of Blodgett’s
Hotel while the citizens of Washington D.C. desperately built
the congressmen a temporary brick capitol building so that the
federal legislature would not move the nation’s capital back to
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Doubtless while sitting in the hotel
lobby in post-mortem, members of Congress would have
reflected upon the lessons that the present war had impressed
upon them. Thankfully for these legislators, Baltimore, Maryland
was held in American control because of the efforts at Fort
McHenry, repelling the British Royal Navy in one of the final
major campaigns of the year and likely ensuring the survival of
the American Union and the arrival of peace.93
With the failure to close the campaigns of 1814, British
commissioners at Ghent now seriously began seeking a peace
settlement with the Americans. Negotiations proceeded quickly
and by December 24, 1814, the Treaty of Ghent was signed
by the two diplomatic delegations and ratified by His Majesty’s
government three days later. The Treaty of Ghent reached
Washington D.C. in February 1815 and was ratified unanimously
upon receipt by the Senate with little, if any, debate.94 With blessed
peace finally realized across the continent, there was a new sober
recognition of the hardships of war: 2,260 American soldiers
had been killed in combat and an additional 4,505 were wounded.
In total, it is estimated that some 15,000 American soldiers lost
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their lives as a result of all causes related to the conflict.95 But in
its wake, the United States emerged intact with independence
firmly secured from the former imperial motherland. And with
the simultaneous defeat of the French at Waterloo (in presentday Belgium), the Napoleonic Wars also drew to a close.
For the first time since independence, internal American
politics and foreign policy would no longer be measured in
relation to the eternal struggle between Great Britain and France:
the United States was now finally free at last to pursue its own
destiny among the nations of the world. American culture in
the postwar flourished with new symbols of national identity,
including the poem “The Star-Spangled Banner,” and the zeitgeist
reflected the optimism Americans had for their young republic’s
future. The following Era of Good Feelings (1816-1824), an age
of national political peace in which the Democratic-Republicans

The United States Capitol was razed by the British expeditionary forces
under Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cockburn and Major General Robert
Ross on their march into Washington City on the evening of August 24,
1814. The nation’s capital was almost totally destroyed and Congress
had to relocate to a temporary meeting hall until the United States
Capitol could be rebuilt after the War of 1812.
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virtually wiped out their Federalist opponents after the latter’s
ill-fated secession attempts in New England, would allow the
nation to heal and to begin building a bold new role for itself
in the world beyond simply a pawn in the game between two
imperial powers.
In addition to the conclusion of the War of 1812 and
the emergence of the young republic from the Anglo-French
dichotomy, the Age of Democratic Revolutions was slowly giving
birth to a constellation of independent states in the Western
Hemisphere; the United States would gain several sister republics
in an increasingly-populated American neighborhood. When the
French occupation of the Iberian Peninsula was defeated by the
alliance of Britain, Portugal, and Spain in 1813, the American
colonies were restored to their imperial authorities for a few
years before rebellion broke out again. But the earlier Latin

The British delegates, led by Admiral Lord Gambier (holding the Treaty of
Ghent, center left), shakes hands with American delegate and U.S. Minister to the United Kingdom John Quincy Adams (center), concluding the
War of 1812. Adams stands in front of Secreaty of the Treasury Albert
Gallatin. Speaker Henry Clay observes the scene from afar, sitting in the
chair behind the standing Senator James Bayard (hand on hip).
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American juntas had introduced reformed government with
democratic principles and localized sovereignty; Spain’s attempt
to return the status quo of central monarchical authority over
these colonies in the wake of Napoleon’s defeat in the Peninsular
Wars, therefore, resulted in backlash and the resurgence of the
Latin American revolutions by 1815. Thus, the Americas would
once again be reopened by the end of the War of 1812 as a
battleground for U.S. interests, which the young republic would
consider pursuing more and more vigorously following its
vindication in the “Second War for Independence.” In the next
decade and a half, the earlier signs of congressional statecraft in
the Western Hemisphere, seen through legislation such as the
Mitchill Resolution, would serve as important antecedents for
further action and points of contention for those seeking to
remain faithful to a more reserved foreign policy.
But just as changed by the War of 1812 as the international
circumstances surrounding it, the United States Congress would
emerge from its first substantial instance of foreign policy
leadership as a renewed body vying for more agency in the
accelerating statecraft of the American Republic. By the end of
Clay’s first two terms as Speaker in 1814, there was little reason
to doubt that “Harry of the West” would be remembered in
the annals of American history as “the most powerful man in
the nation from 1811 to 1825.”96 In his mad dash to lead the
nation into war and thus assert a sovereign American order in
the Western Hemisphere, Clay had accrued substantial political
powers into the previously impotent office of Speaker of the
House. Contemporaneous to this centralization of power, the
House began establishing a viable standing committee system
that would enable specialization, permanency, and independence
in the legislative branch.
This first period of congressional initiative in foreign
policymaking led by the War Hawks and their precocious
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chief Henry Clay would precipitate the continued institutional
maturation of the House and the Senate’s power structures. With
the War of 1812 as its harbinger, Congress would be transformed
by these developments and the emergence of a visionary
generation of lawmakers that would produce the first age of
American statecraft empowered through legislative assertiveness.
And this ascendant generation of young lawmakers aspiring for
the American Founding Fathers’ glory had their guide, their
Western Star. The young Speaker of the House was poised to
lead Congress into an evolving age of legislative preeminence
in foreign affairs that would last through the nineteenth century.

Penn History Review

88

The War That Congress Waged
David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American
(New York: Random House, 2011), 84-85.
2
Quentin Scott King, Henry Clay and the War of 1812 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2014), 78.
3
Joel Achenbach, The Grand Idea: George Washington’s Potomac and the Race to the
West (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 217.
4
Ibid., 217.
5
William C. Allen, History of the United States Capitol: A Chronicle of Design,
Construction, and Politics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
2001), 8.
6
Heidler and Heidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American, 84-85.
7
Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft
of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
8
Annals of Congress, 11th Congress, 3rd session, 63-64.
9
Heidler and Heidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American, 84-86.
10
Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, edited by Mary Sharon Hall
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 55-56.
11
King, Henry Clay and the War of 1812, 94.
12
Heidler and Heidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American, 85.
13
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 52.
14
Henry Clay, John Calhoun, and Daniel Webster were destined to become
rivals, colleagues, and friends in the next decades and became collectively
known as “the Great Triumvirate” of Congress, the most prominent American statesmen in the first half of the nineteenth century in which the Congress was the dominant weight in the U.S. Government. For more, see Heidler
and Heidler’s Henry Clay: The Essential American (2011).
15
Charles W. March, Reminiscences of Congress (New York: Baker and Scribner,
1850), 34.
16
U.S. House Journal, 13th Congress, 1st session, 26 May 1813; U.S. House Office of History and Preservation, and U.S. Senate Historical Office, “Congressional Biographical Directory (CLERKWEB),” Biographical Directory of the
United States Congress, accessed September 18, 2015, http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.
17
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 52.
18
U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Historian, Representatives Apportioned to Each State: 1st to 23rd Census, 1790–2010 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
House of Representatives Office of the Historian, 2007).
19
J. Mackay Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 27.
20
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 52.
21
King, Henry Clay and the War of 1812, 79.
1

Penn History Review

89

The War That Congress Waged
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 52.
Ibid., 53.
24
Jack R. Van Der Slik, “The Early Institutionalization of Congress,” in The
Congress of the United States, 1789-1989: Its Origins and Early Development, by Joel
H. Silbey (New York: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 265.
25
Jeff Broadwater, James Madison: A Son of Virginia & a Founder of the Nation
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 145.
26
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 54.
27
Marshall Smelser, The Democratic Republic, 1801-1815 (New York: Harper &
Row, 1968).
28
Kevin R.C. Gutzman, James Madison and the Making of America (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 2012), 304.
29
Cecil. V. Crabb, Glenn J. Antizzo, and Leila E. Sarieddine, Congress and the
Foreign Policy Process: Modes of Legislative Behavior (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2000), 29.
30
Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg, Madison and Jefferson (New York: Random House, 2010), 494-497.
31
Ibid., 314.
32
U.S. House Journal, 12th Congress, 1st session, 4 November 1811.
33
Thomas W. Skladony, “The House Goes to Work: Select and Standing Committees in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1828,” in The United States
Congress in a Transitional Era, 1800-1841: The Interplay of Party, Faction and Section,
edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1, (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 36.
34
King, Henry Clay and the War of 1812, 103.
35
Ibid., 103.
36
Gerald Gamm and Kenneth Shepsle, “Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825,” in The
United States Congress in a Transitional Era, 1800-1841: The Interplay of Party,
Faction and Section, edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1 (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson
Publishing, 1991), 80; Gerald Gamm and Kenneth Shepsle, “Emergence of
Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 18101825,” in The United States Congress in a Transitional Era, 1800-1841: The Interplay
of Party, Faction and Section, edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1 (Brooklyn, NY:
Carlson Publishing, 1991), 80.
37
King, Henry Clay and the War of 1812, 79.
38
Clement Eaton, Henry Clay and the Art of American Politics (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1957), 25.
39
Annals of Congress, 12th Congress, 1st session, 576.
40
Ibid., 570.
41
Rep. (Rev.) Samuel Taggart to Rev. John Taylor, November 7, 1811, “Letters
to Samuel Taggart,” Proceedings, American Antiquarian Society (Worcester, MA:
22
23

Penn History Review

90

The War That Congress Waged
American Antiquarian Society, 1924), New Series, v. 33, Pt. 2:361.
42
Charles W. March, Reminiscences of Congress (New York: Baker and Scribner,
1850), 42.
43
Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989l, Vol. 2, edited by Wendy Wolff
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 217.
44
Joseph Cooper, “Jeffersonian Attitudes Toward Executive Leadership and
Committee Development in the House of Representatives, 1789-1829,”
in The United States Congress in a Transitional Era: 1800-1841: The Interplay of
Party, Faction and Section, edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1 (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson
Publishing, 1991), 59.
45
George Godwin, Jr., The Little Legislatures: Committees of Congress (Amherst,
MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), 7.
46
Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, Committees in Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 10.
47
Gamm and Shepsle, “Emergence of Legislative Institutions,” 81.
48
Ibid., 77.
49
Ibid., 86-91.
50
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 55.
51
Elaine K. Swift, “Reconstitutive Change in the U.S. Congress: The Early
Senate, 1789-1841,” in The United States Congress in a Transitional Era, 18001841: The Interplay of Party, Faction and Section, edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1
(Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 106-107.
52
Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), 267.
53
David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, Encyclopedia of the War of 1812
(Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 389-393.
54
Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, edited by Mary Sharon Hall
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 54.
55
U.S. House Journal, 11th Congress, 2nd session, 1 May 1810.
56
Stephen W. Stathis, Landmark Legislation, 1774 - 2002: Major U.S. Acts and
Treaties (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 32-34.
57
U.S. House Journal, 12th Congress, 1st session, 5 November 1811.
58
Quentin Scott King, Henry Clay and the War of 1812 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2014), 98.
59
Annals of Congress, 12th Congress, 1st session, 414-417.
60
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 57.
61
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 57; Stathis, Landmark Legislation, 34-37.
62
King, Henry Clay and the War of 1812, 104-111.
63
Henry Clay to James Monroe, March 16, 1812, in The Papers of Henry Clay,
edited by Mary W.M. Hargreaves and James F. Hopkins, Vol. 1 (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1959), 637.

Penn History Review

91

The War That Congress Waged
King, Henry Clay and the War of 1812, 115.
Annals of Congress, 12th Congress, 1st session, 1587-1598.
66
Ibid., 1587-1598.
67
King, Henry Clay and the War of 1812, 132-138.
68
U.S. Senate Journal, 12th Congress, 1st session, 1 June 1812.
69
Ibid., 1 June 1812.
70
Annals of Congress, 12th Congress, 1st session, 1546-1554.
71
Ibid., 1633-1637.
72
Leland R. Johnson, “The Suspense Was Hell: The Senate Vote for War in
1812,” in The United States Congress in a Transitional Era, 1800-1841: The Interplay
of Party, Faction and Section, edited by Joel H. Silbey, Vol. 1 (Brooklyn, NY:
Carlson Publishing, 1991), 197-216.
73
Arthur Preston Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1964), 61-80.
74
Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1963), 21.
75
Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 47-58.
76
Ibid., 47-58.
77
Ibid., 79-90.
78
David C. Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over International Relations, 1789-1941 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009),
78-80.
79
U.S. House Journal, 12th Congress, 1st session, 5 November 1811.
80
Annals of Congress, 12th Congress, 1st session, 428.
81
Ibid., 428.
82
Ibid., 428.
83
Ibid., 428.
84
Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 83.
85
Brian Loveman, No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010),
22-27.
86
Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, 3rd ed., 23.
87
Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter
with the World since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 58.
88
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 57.
89
William Ray Barlow, Congress During the War of 1812, Ph.D. dissertation, The
Ohio State University, 1961 (Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1961), v-vii.
90
Ibid., 22-24.
91
Robert C. Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 2, edited by Wendy Wolff
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 15.
64
65

Penn History Review

92

The War That Congress Waged
King, Henry Clay and the War of 1812, 263.
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 61-65.
94
U.S. Senate Executive Journal, 13th Congress, 3rd session, 16 February 1815.
95
Donald R. Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship! Myths of The War of 1812 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2006).
96
Byrd, The Senate, 1789-1989, Vol. 1, 55.
92
93

Images:
Page 44: “Henry Clay,” painting, 1818, via Wikimedia Commons, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/Henry_Clay.JPG (accessed
May 4, 2016).
Page 55: “Henry Clay Senate3,” engraving, circa 1855, drawn by Peter F.
Rothermel, engraved by Robert Whitechurch, via Wikimedia Commons,
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ce/Henry_Clay_Senate3.jpg (accessed May 4, 2016).
Page 85: “US Capitol 1814c,” drawing, 1814, George Munger, via Wikimedia Commons, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/
US_Capitol_1814c.jpg (accessed May 4, 2016).
Page 86: “Signing of Treaty of Ghent (1812),” painting, 1814, Amédée Forestier, via Wikimedia Commons, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/7/73/Signing_of_Treaty_of_Ghent_%28128%29.jpg (accessed
May 4, 2016).

Penn History Review

93

The Fallacy of the Ideological Press

The Fallacy of the Ideological Press:
How American National Newspapers
Reacted to the French Revolution
from 1789-1793
Aaron R. Senior
INTRODUCTION
“Many people read newspapers who read little
else—They live in retired situations, and feel a
strong curiosity to know the news, and to join in the
opinions of the day. To a retired man, a newspaper
is always company—sometimes instruction.”1
– Benjamin Franklin Bache
According to Benjamin Franklin Bache, newspapers in
the United States sat at a vital juncture between the citizens and
their government. Newspapers gave citizens the opportunity to
learn about current events and gave politicians and newspaper
editors the chance to publicize their opinions through editorials.
However, as Benjamin Franklin Bache noted, newspapers not
only provided a prominent method for education, but also
commanded public participation. As political leaders in the
United States competed with each other for power and influence,
they used local and national newspapers to express their opinions
to the public. With the explosion of newspapers during the
1790s and the introduction of partisan national newspapers,
competing political communities formed as the gap between the
government and the public closed. Newspaper editors, therefore,
had an unprecedented amount of influence during this time and
this thesis will analyze such influence.
***
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September 9, 1789 issue of the Gazette of the United States
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From the establishment of the original colonies through
the ratification of the Constitution in 1788, local newspapers
served their purpose in providing the relevant political,
commercial, and miscellaneous news to their readership. In
1789, however, John Fenno, a young businessman from Boston,
Massachusetts, decided to launch the new country’s first federal
newspaper. With the help of Rufus King and the support of
Alexander Hamilton, Fenno hoped that his newspaper, the
Gazette of the United States, would be just that: a newspaper that
covered and supported the newly formed government of the
United States. As Fenno wrote to King, the newspaper was
“for the purpose of demonstrating favorable sentiments of the
federal constitution and its administration.”2 For this reason,
Hamilton gave Fenno full access to the government’s resources;
in return, Hamilton was given a public forum to express his own
political opinions. Indisputably, the Gazette of the United States was
courted, sponsored, and favored by the new government.
Toward the end of 1790, Benjamin Franklin Bache,
decided to launch his own newspaper after returning from years
spent in France. Bache originally launched his General Advertiser
as a local Philadelphia newspaper, but it soon took on national
distribution and significance. Bache was a staunch Republican
and by the middle of 1791, Bache’s paper became fiercely
partisan, arguing for the restoration of republican principles
in the government. Bache and his republican peers specifically
disliked Hamilton’s fiscal plans, as they believed that a national
bank would place too much power in the hands of the national
government and favor business elites over working class citizens.
Instead, Bache and others argued for republican principles that
would place more power in the hands of the states.3
Yet Bache’s republican newspaper was not sufficient as
the sole voice for the entire Republican Party. In October of
1791, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison sought to launch
a government-sponsored national newspaper that officially
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represented their own republican views. They found their
editor in Philip Freneau, a revered Revolutionary War poet and
writer. Jefferson even hired Freneau as a translator in the State
Department and gave him access to exclusive dispatches and
government information. Freneau’s National Gazette directly
opposed Fenno’s Gazette of the United States, bringing Jefferson’s
republican principles in direct public conflict with Hamilton’s
federalist arguments. As this debate became transcribed in
national newspapers, it was clear that partisanship had moved
from President George Washington’s cabinet to the countrywide public square.4
Almost every scholar who studied these national
newspapers has made one key observation: as opposed to today’s
strict separation between the government and the media, these
Early-American gazettes served as unequivocal mouthpieces
for the political elites. In describing Fenno’s relationship with
Hamilton, historian Eric Burns writes, “Fenno was Hamilton’s
employee, but he was federalism’s servant, and on one occasion,
he went to extraordinary lengths, even in these times of scorchedearth journalistic practice, to do what he believed would promote
his master’s interests.”5
This scholarly orthodoxy extends to the republican
newspapers as well. Historian Jeffery Pasley writes in The Tyranny of
the Printer, “The Virginia leaders [Jefferson and Madison] became
so closely involved in Freneau’s operations that several subscribers
wrote to Madison rather than the editor with complaints about
delivery problems.”6 Scholars note that Jefferson and Madison
maintained some distance from their newspapers, so as not to
seem subversive to the federalist government. Yet they gave
Freneau a job in the government, absolved him of all financial
risk by finding the newspaper a financial backer, and even helped
Freneau assemble a list of subscribers. Burns further points out
that Jefferson and Freneau “virtually [had] the same relationship
that Hamilton had with Fenno.”7 Madison published regularly
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in the National Gazette on every topic, from fiscal policy to the
French Revolution to his general dislike of the federalists.
Scholars point to Benjamin Franklin Bache, ironically
the national editor not directly associated with government
affairs, as the most partisan editor of the three newspapers.
Pasley explained that by the end of 1791, Bache took the liberty
of outwardly polemicizing with Fenno, criticizing Washington,
vilifying Hamilton, and supporting Jefferson’s republican
principles.8 Although Bache did not take orders from Jefferson
and Madison directly, Bache toed openly with the Republican
Party line, denouncing politicians by name instead of by their
policies. For example, when the National Gazette launched an
attack on Hamilton’s fiscal plans, Bache followed suit with an
even stronger criticism of Hamilton’s plan for a national bank.9
Bache was a more extreme version of Freneau and thereby a
more extreme editor supporting the Republican Party line.

Benjamin Franklin Bache (1769-1798),
founder of the General Advertiser
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There were moments when these three editors published
something that diverged from the opinions of their government
patrons and their ideological pastors. For example, Fenno
published a peculiar letter defending Jefferson, which said that
criticisms leveled at Jefferson were “founded in the basest calumny
and falsehood.”10 However, these moments were exceptional, as
many scholars still maintained that Fenno, Freneau, and Bache
aligned themselves ideologically on almost every major issue.
One of the major issues that occupied the pages of all
three national newspapers was the French Revolution. Beginning
in July of 1789, the French Revolution became an American
obsession. In the Capitol, after violence broke out in 1791 and
after factions in France began to develop, major disagreement
arose within Washington’s cabinet. Broadly, Jefferson supported
the French revolutionaries strongly, arguing that the French
attempt to secure liberty and to check the monarchy was a
laudable project worthy of the American government’s backing.
Hamilton and John Adams, on the other hand, criticized the
radical and violent factions in France, proposing that they were
leading the revolutionaries down a dangerous path. Quickly,
support for France became the central partisan issue within
the government. The issue became more polarized over time;
from the Citizen Genêt Affair of 1793-94 to the Neutrality
Proclamation of 1793 to the ensuing debates regarding military
support for France, Washington’s advisors bickered about this
issue throughout Washington’s entire presidency and beyond.
Furthermore, Jefferson himself admitted to Washington that he
helped establish the National Gazette in the hope that it would
cover French affairs more sympathetically than the Gazette of the
United States.
Several historians over the past decade have covered the
American reaction to the French Revolution, but almost none
of them devote research exclusively to the reaction of these
national gazettes. Historian James Tagg, as well as Burns and
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Pasley, all give examples of newspaper coverage of the French
Revolution, but this research is done as just another example
of how these editors mimicked the opinions of their respective
political elites. Scholars David Waldstreicher and Simon Newman
discuss American celebrations of the French Revolution and the
coverage of those events in newspapers, but these historians do
not spend any time analyzing the opinions of the newspaper
editors themselves.11 Seemingly, they concur with the traditional
narrative: the celebrations and their respective coverage in
the newspapers fell along party lines with the Republicans
supporting the French Revolution and the Federalists opposing
it. Finally, historians Matthew Rainbow Hale and Colin Wells,
among others, have devoted time to examining the American
reaction to the French Revolution, but none of them examine
the nuances between any of the particular newspapers.12 Each
of these historians thereby assumes that across the board,
politicians, editors, and citizens alike fell into either the Federalist
or Republican camp at almost the exact same time and in the
same manner. Overall, historians have spent time examining the
American reaction to the French Revolution and the debates
that went on surrounding this issue, but none have analyzed the
reactions over time of the national gazettes themselves.
Do the three national gazettes between 1789 and 1793
truly align themselves with the opinions of the party leaders
on the issue of the French Revolution? Within the current
scholarship we have no reason to assume that they did not align,
but this essay will take a closer look.
Partisan politics in Early America has too often been
studied through the lens of political decision makers. This has
allowed so many historians to mistakenly assume a homogeneity
within each of the emerging parties. The realities of partisanship
are often much more complicated. The diverse reactions of the
first national gazettes to the French Revolution is only one small,
but important way of complicating this conventional approach.
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The opinions of political elites are valuable and warrant further
study, but these ideologically-driven politicians do not speak
for everyone. Analyzing other political players within their own
contexts and through their own words is therefore a necessity.
Devoting my analysis solely to these newspapers’
commentary on the French Revolution and the differences that
existed between these newspapers on that very question, I hope
to give a definitive answer to this currently underexplored and
over-assumed topic. I hope to demonstrate that newspapers’
alignment with party ideology and political sponsors is an
insufficient explanation of each newspaper’s early thoughts on
the French Revolution.
AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS LOOKING OUTWARD:
THE INADEQUACY OF IDEOLOGY
Despite the more than three-thousand-mile distance
between Philadelphia and Paris, France, American newspapers
were filled daily with news concerning French affairs. From
military updates to legislative changes to open letters and
anecdotes, editors during the early 1790s sometimes filled several
pages of their four-page newspapers with French matters.
The three national newspapers of the time were of course no
exception, and even had an advantage over local newspapers
due to their closer proximity to and better relationship with the
government. Although news took about three months to travel
from France to the United States, these national newspapers had
first access to everything, from French intelligence to private
letters exchanged between political elites from both countries.13
Additionally, quantitative evidence further supports
the claim that the French Revolution was a significant chunk
of newspaper reporting and discourse. Key words and phrases
such as “France,” “French,” and “Louis” were prolific. The
National Gazette, with only 207 issues in total, mentioned the
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word “France” 1,166 times, the word “French” 1,340 times,
and the word “Louis” 213 times. A similar search of The General
Advertiser’s 1,232 issues produced the same key words 3,743,
6,557, and 557 times, respectively. Lastly, within the Gazette of the
United States’ 447 issues, these words appear 1,469, 1,531 and 293
times, respectively. When examined on average usage per day,
each newspaper produced similar results—using the first two
words between three to six times an issue and the last word about
once an issue.14 Therefore, the French Revolution was a major
topic, if not the major topic, of American national newspapers
between 1789 and 1793.15
The basic questions follow: why were American
newspapers nearly obsessed with the French? Was it the historical
connection between the United States and France? Was it the
shared values and principles of liberty, equality, and hatred
for despotism? Or did newspapers highlight the topic because
everyone around the world was writing about it too? American
historians, unsatisfied with these cursory answers, provide insight
into editors’ true interest in French affairs. The conventional
scholarly account states that just as partisanship began to rise
between Federalists and Republicans, each side looked at the
French Revolution through its own ideological lens—using
the French Revolution to argue for its respective philosophy.16
In essence, the ideological approach that Washington’s cabinet
members took toward the French Revolution was replicated
in the national newspapers.17 On one hand, the Republicans
supported the French Revolution due to shared principles of
popular sovereignty and anti-monarchy. On the other hand,
the Federalists opposed the French Revolution because it bred
violence and it overthrew law in favor of chaos. The French
Revolution also abolished the orderly and hierarchical structure
of a stable government. In essence, this standard explanation
views ideology as the main catalyst for the debates surrounding
the French Revolution. 18
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This conventional approach is supported by
overwhelming evidence, from the American thoughts on the
Thomas Paine–Edmund Burke debates of 1789-95, to the
letters of Jefferson and Adams, to the Citizen Genêt Affair,
to the Neutrality Proclamation, and to the Jay Treaty of 179495. However, this perspective analyzes the political elites and
assumes that every political actor below them—newspaper
editors and citizen leaders alike—took the same approach.19 The
Federalist and Republican newspapers say something much more
complex though. As I will show through this essay, newspaper
coverage of the French Revolution—and particularly, the three
main themes of universal liberty, friendship, and monarchy—
did not always mimic these partisan divides based on ideology.
This chapter will show in both the data and the reading of the
sources that this conventional approach does not apply well to
the national newspapers of the time.
Universal Liberty
One of the most popular themes in American national
newspapers was the French move toward universal liberty.
The conventional account, therefore, claims that while both
Federalist and Republican politicians and newspapers agreed
in the beginning of the French Revolution on the merits of
France’s move toward universal liberty, the Federalists, when
violence arose, ceased their support for liberty in favor of order.
While the Republicans remained strong in their support of
the French cause since their ideology championed liberty, the
Federalists, due to their ideological support for government
stability, could not support the French Revolution’s actions any
longer. However, as one will observe, there are two problems
with this explanation. First, the Federalist press’ turn away from
the French fight for liberty did not coincide with the beginning
of violence and radicalism in France. Additionally, opinions
published in the Gazette of the United States on French matters did
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not coincide with the ideological debates of leading politicians
such as Adams and Hamilton in mid-1791. Rather, the Federalist
and Republican newspapers agreed on the merits of the French
Revolution for much longer than expected—through the middle
of 1792. Thus, the basic contention of scholars does not hold
up; while one would have excepted the Federalist press to oppose
the French Revolution as early as 1791, the Gazette of the United
States’ opposition surfaced much later.
Across all three newspapers, including the federalist
Gazette of the United States, the usage of the word “liberty” rose
over the beginning years of the French Revolution. While in
the 1789 issues of the Gazette of the United States, “liberty” was
used in the French context only 9 times, it was used 29 times
in the 1793 issues. Similarly, in 1791, “liberty” was used in the
French context only 8 times by the National Gazette, but 30
times in 1792 and 50 times in 1793. Finally, the General Advertiser
mentioned “liberty” in the French context 20 times in 1790, but
56 times in 1792 and 49 times in 1793.20 While these numbers
may appear small, it is important to note that two of the three
newspapers published only four-page newspapers twice a week.
Using “liberty” and “France” together in 50 articles over the
course of a year is a clear indication of the rise of this rhetorical
connection. Violence began in July of 1791 with the killings at
the anti-royalist demonstration at Champ de Mars and continued
through 1792 and 1793 with the September Massacre and other
counterrevolutionary feuds. Additionally, in June of 1791,
Federalists such as John Quincy Adams wrote in opposition to
Paine’s celebration of the French cause, while simultaneously
Jefferson despised the federalist newspaper coverage of the
French Revolution; but despite all of this, opinions surrounding
liberty during the French Revolution continued to rise in usage
across the board. The supposed ideological divide is absent from
these years. A further examination of the newspaper content will
shed a more complex light on both Federalist and Republican
Penn History Review

104

The Fallacy of the Ideological Press

support over these five crucial years.
From the very beginning of the Federalist Gazette of the
United States, Fenno’s newspaper praised the French Revolution
for its support of universal liberty. As one will observe, the
rhetoric from 1789 through 1792 consistently remained positive
and even increased in frequency over time. The apparent
violence in France and partisanship in Washington’s cabinet
apparently did not affect Fenno. Buried on Page 2 of the July
29, 1789 issue of the Gazette of the United States, was a short but
powerful passage, praising King Louis XVI of France for calling
the Estates-General to order on April 27th. The passage began:
The magnanimous policy conspicuous in the
above speech—the openness, candor, and paternal
affection which breathes in every line of it,
contrasted with edicts of former Kings of the same
nation, evince the liberality, enlightened policy, and
superior wisdom of the present age—THE ERA
OF FREEDOM—OF UNIVERSAL LIBERTY!
In the Western world, she first broke the chains
which held mankind in servitude—and having fixed
her temple in our favored country, she is spreading
her salutary reign throughout the world.21
American writers viewed this calling of the Estates-General in an
exceedingly positive light. Three unique elements emerge from
this celebratory piece. First, the American writer saw the French
Revolution as a major shift away from tyranny and towards
liberty by calling a meeting between the three French Estates—
the clergy (First Estate), the nobility (Second Estate), and the
common people (Third Estate). Second, the author specifically
praised the King of France as the “wise and magnanimous
monarch of France.” Despite not altering the very structure of
the French monarchy, the Americans still praised the French
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monarch and considered the King’s move to be one of “paternal
affection.” Third, the author noted that this new French liberty
was an extension of American efforts, a symptom of the ripples
caused by the American Revolution.22
Over the course of the French Revolution, the Gazette
of the United States became almost obsessed with its global
impact. On Page 3 of the January 2, 1790 issue, three of the
seven articles in the folio discussed the French Revolution and
its recent accomplishments. As the New Year’s edition of the
newspaper, the editor published several poems and articles that
reviewed the previous year of 1789.
If one had any doubt about the American interest in the
French Revolution, one should look no further than the “Ode
to the New Year.” With a full stanza dedicated to the French
Revolution, the ode celebrated 1789 as the year that “saw our
rights secured, and Europe freed.” Only months after the
Storming of the Bastille, the author shrewdly noted the immense
historical significance of the French Revolution’s beginnings,
stating, “Long shall thy numbers, in our annals shine.” The
author continued, “It almost finished; Europe almost free, / May
Frenchmen use their power, so late retrieved, / In Humbling
pride, and righting the aggrieved.” This dramatic applause of
French accomplishments also demonstrated a deeper connection
between the Americans and the French; the author used the
viewpoint of “ours” and not of “theirs”—“in our annals shine”
and “that saw our rights secured”—indicating a shared goal and
project.23
Although it started more than a year after the Gazette
of the United States began, the General Advertiser under Benjamin
Franklin Bache employed similar rhetoric. On October 4, 1790,
Bache published a letter by Madame La Chevaliere D’eon that
stated, “Louis XVI: thou art the first Monarch in the world who
has confirmed in the face of heaven and earth the liberties of
thy people…worthy the love of the whole human race.”24 On
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the next day, the newspaper printed additional letters and a toast
about France. One letter claimed, “Liberty is a plant of quick
growth, takes deep root in short time, and spreads rapidly.”25 The
toast read as follows:
The Majesty of the People. Universal Liberty. Those
who have lost their lives in defense of it. The father of
our constitution. Those who have laid its foundation in
their immortal works: Locke, Milton, Rousseau, Sidney,
Needham, Mably, Price...The memory of those who
perished in the dungeons of the Bastille. The United
States. May the closest union, founded on a solid basis
of commerce and friendship, subsist between them and
France.26
Similar to the Gazette of the United States, the author of the toast
used many of the same themes: universal liberty, the United
States’ role in that liberty, a celebration of the Bastille, and the
friendship between the United States and France.27
This optimism and praise remained consistent through
1791. On July 6, 1791, Fenno published an article that showed
how individual writers were successful in both predicting and
catalyzing the French Revolution through the spread of their
ideas. The article ended,
The Philanthropist and Philosopher are highly gratified
in reflecting that this Revolution has taken place, and
upon such principles as must ensure its success; and
may safely conclude from this pleasing prospect, that
similar revolutions, in favor of the rights of humanity,
and founded on similar principles, will soon pervade not
only Europe but the world.28
Despite reported violence and conflict at this time in France, the
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federalist newspaper maintained this identical rhetoric.
On November 30, 1791, the Gazette of the United States
continued to praise the French Revolution, remarking, “Liberty
is not only secured against many former dangers, but it has fewer
enemies to contend with. As knowledge spreads through Europe,
it gains authority over the hearts of its adversaries; Kings begin
to talk like good republicans—they give a tone to the fashion
of being free.”29 Fenno cited republican sentiments themselves,
making it clear that even in late 1791, positive sentiments toward
the French remained. While the conventional historical approach
expects Federalists to contend strongly with republicanism at
this point, this is clearly not the case.
In his letters, Jefferson claimed that in April 1791 he and
Madison commissioned Freneau to form a republican newspaper
because he disliked Fenno’s coverage and opinion of, among
other things, the French Revolution.30 However, when looking at
Fenno’s newspaper up until this point, the supposed turn against
the French Revolution is not found. From 1789 through 1791,
Fenno remained true to the French Revolution’s effects and
potential. This is further proof of a divide between the ideology
of leading politicians and the opinions of newspapers and their
editors.
Some may point to the Publicola debates, however, as
proof that the federalist newspapers did turn against the French
Revolution in 1791. At the end of June 1791, John Quincy
Adams penned an article under the pseudonym Publicola, which
eventually was published in the Gazette of the United States.31 In
the article, he sharply criticized Paine’s Rights of Man and drew
a distinction between the American reformation of the English
constitution based on enlightened principles and (contrary
to?) the French radical revolution that wished to overthrow an
entire governmental structure. Adams argued that the French
Revolution’s reforms would not take root because they did not
impose natural and comprehensive change of government.
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Immediately, Publicola became a public focus, receiving
no fewer than 25 responses under the pseudonym Brutus, whose
articles were published in the General Advertiser in July and August
of 1791. Critics took issue with almost every claim Adams made.
However, the Gazette of the United States’ support for the French
Revolution and the liberty it produced did not change after
Adams’ article was published. While Republicans were fast to
criticize, they were indeed criticizing politicians including Adams,
not the newspapers or their editors themselves.
Through 1792, praise of French activities still remained,
though most articles were relegated to the sides of the
newspapers under the “Philadelphia” section, which discussed
events happening in the nation’s capital. Seemingly, the Publicola
article was an exception, as praise for the French cause continued.
On April 28, 1792, for example, the Gazette of the United States
defended the people of France against governmental and
religious censors. The article stated, “Two things are clear—
that the people adopted, and that they support the present
government. It is the glory of Americans that they have done
this…The people of America have as many good reasons to
approve their own deliberate work, as the French nation.”32
Invoking the principles of republicanism, the author gave full
support behind the revolutionaries who exercised their power to
establish the government and tailor it to their will. Additionally,
in celebration of Bastille Day (July 14), the Gazette of the United
States recounted “various demonstrations of joy,” as well as
seventeen toasts, which included toasts to “The French Nation;
their Constitution and King. May the Freedom which dawned
encircle the globe. Victory to the French armies over the foes of
Liberty. Liberty or Death. The President of the United States.”33
Indistinguishable from the toasts of 1791, this utterance further
proves the extreme regard for liberty that the Federalists had and
their strong alliance with the French cause.
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Furthermore, Federalists maintained hope for the French
Revolution, writing,
The people of the United States are now in possession of
what [a] great part of the European world are laboring to
obtain—a government of their choice…and while every
real friend to the happiness of mankind most ardently
wishes success to the struggles of oppressed humanity
in the eastern hemisphere, he will spurn with indignation
every insidious attempt to blast the prospects of this
country under the auspices of that government whose
basis is freedom, and equal rights of man.34
With caution, Fenno’s newspaper remained in strong
support of the French Revolution, not only for France’s past
accomplishments but for its future potential.
Fenno’s rhetoric was almost identical to that found in the
General Advertiser and the National Gazette alike. Historians have
explained that “During its two-year existence, the National Gazette
was almost identical to the General Advertiser in its praise of the
French Revolution.”35 Established only at the end of 1791, the
National Gazette immediately began covering and commenting
on the French Revolution extensively.36 On December 12, 1791,
Freneau published an article under the pseudonym Aratus, who
claimed that the “assent of the King to the constitution has
completed the French Revolution.” With immense praise for
French progress, Aratus linked it to human progress, asserting,
“As the friend of humanity, I rejoice in the French Revolution.”
However, Aratus went on to write,
But as the citizen of America, the gratification is greatly
heightened. From a variety of circumstances, I have been
led to believe, that if their effort had failed, the calamity
would not have been confined to themselves alone, but
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have communicated its destructive influence to the noble
fabric we have raised. The fate of the two governments
has appeared to be intimately linked together; and that of
either dependent on the other. What their circumstances
are, that should warn every good republican to stand on
his guard.37
The rhetoric surrounding humanity’s progress and the United
States’ influence were similar, but the National Gazette went a step
further than Fenno and Bache. Aratus claimed that the results
of the French Revolution would be extremely impactful on the
American project; if the French were to fail, Aratus warned, then
the American Constitution and its principles will be questioned.
Accordingly, the French Revolution’s principles cannot and
should not merely be admired from afar, but deeply and closely
monitored. This indicated a slight shift in the thoughts of
American newspapers, but surely not in any partisan proportions.
If the federalist support for the French did not turn
during the early chaos, riots, and wars abroad, as well as during
the early partisan bickering at home, when does their support for
universal liberty halt? Within the Gazette of the United States, the
first major criticism came on October 3, 1792, from an article
published under the pseudonym Cato. This finding presents an
immense sixteen-month lag between the violence in France in
July of 1791 and Fenno’s eventual turn away from the French
Revolution in October of 1792. During this period, Fenno
expressed almost identical sentiments toward France and its
praiseworthy pursuit toward universal liberty. This gap between
Fenno and the partisanship of elites, as well as the violence in
France demonstrates that Fenno was not predominantly animated
by Federalist ideology, nor was he the mouthpiece of Adams
or Hamilton. This lag indicates that Fenno acted autonomously
when it came to the French Revolution, allowing the newspaper
to express its own opinions and pursue its independent agenda.
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Finally, when Fenno’s newspaper turned against the
French Revolution, the author known as Cato expressed “deep
concern” over the progression of the insurrection. Cato not only
recounted and despaired over the violence, frenzy, and chaos in
France, but also applied it to the United States in two ways. First,
he stated that
as men anxious for the happiness of our fellow men,…
as Americans who gave example to twenty-five millions
of people,…as individuals possessed with sensibility, we
cannot be indifferent to the future of those individuals
who…are endeavoring to procure for their own country
a participation in that freedom, which they assisted in
procuring for us.38
As Americans who both inspired the French Revolution and
benefited from French assistance in the past, Americans must feel
concerned with French affairs, which were in “extreme disorder
and jeopardy.” Cato here maintained universalist rhetoric, but
argued that the world was failing to achieve that universalism.
Second, Cato argued that the factionalism and the chaos in
France should worry Americans now, since the United States has
men just like those in France who are “discontented” with the
government and who wish to destabilize it.39 Cato thought that
Americans should guard the country from those people, namely
the Republicans, or else events that happened in France will
unfold in the United States. Cato used the French Revolution as
a polemical device, not because others disagreed with his analysis
of the French Revolution, nor because Cato and the Gazette of
the United States suddenly realized that their ideology did not fit
with the French Revolution.
Additionally, in early November of 1792, the Gazette
of the United States took its first shot at Bache’s understanding
of the French Revolution. On Saturday, November 3rd, the
Penn History Review

112

The Fallacy of the Ideological Press

newspaper published a letter to Fenno signed by Philanthropis.
The letter criticized the French Revolution, noting, “that the
people of France have swerved from the original principles of
their revolution—that the new constitution has essentially been
violated—and that reason and judgment are overwhelmed by
the boisterous voice of faction.” The Federalist view clearly
shifted here against the violent wars and treatment of the King.
Furthermore, Philanthropis responded to those who claimed the
violence was all due to the tyranny of the monarchy by asking,
But what despotism bears half the ills in its train as that of
anarchy and confusion, where every sacred mound raised
for the security of life, liberty and property, is levelled
[sic] by the torment of lawless power? The unhappy
situation in France, while it demands our sympathy,
presents a thinking example of what is to be expected
from the passion of men uncontrolled by government
and laws.
While the revolutionaries claimed that their actions were in line
with liberty and security, in fact, they violated those principles
by creating chaos and torment. The federalist newspaper here,
therefore, completely flipped away from its original support of
the French Revolution.40
In the next issue of the Gazette of the United States, a
Federalist reader used the Philanthropis article to parody and to
criticize the Republicans. The author wrote, “Mr. Fenno, please republish the following parody on the piece signed Philanthropis.”
The new article was addressed to Bache and noted “that the
people of France have improved upon the original principles of
their revolution, by a bold step of rational republicanism, and a
dereliction of the gothic system of inviolability in the supreme
executive.” The author continued parodying the republican
stance, adding, “As to the late excesses, they are the natural
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effects of the flings of old wounds, received from the hands
of despotism” and further showed a “striking example of the
excesses that may be expected from the efforts of men, rising
from oppression and breaking the shackles imposed on them by
lawless ambition.” The author closed the parody with a supposed
message to Americans: “May America continue that happy
country, where the supremacy of the people, the best securities
of their liberties, shall always be superior to the restless efforts
of an aspiring law.” In a scathing and almost humorous parody,
the author mocked what a Republican may write to Bache—not
only are the excesses justified, but also that law in general may
be disposed of in favor of the wishes of the people. To that line
of argument, the author broke from the parody in an asterisk
below, stating, “One of the first principles of republicanism is,
that the Law is Supreme.” If one assumed that the will of the
people is supreme, this writer argued, it would therefore create
two Supremes—an impossible situation according to the author,
citing the English playwright William Shakespeare. Without
the sole supremacy of the law, “Liberty almost expires in the
contemplation—confidence is annihilated, and existence hangs
upon a thread.” As Fenno turned against the French Revolution,
he not only criticized the French themselves, but also poked fun
at the domestic supporters of the French Revolution.41
While criticism of France came from the Gazette of
the United States, the republican newspapers stayed steady in
their support for the French Revolution. The General Advertiser
called the French Revolution “a glorious cause of liberty”
and led celebrations to commemorate every French act from
the establishment of the French Constitution of 1791 to the
anniversary of the establishment of the French Republic in
1792.42 The newspaper not only kept the language of liberty
intact throughout, but also frequently mentioned the strong
connection between the French and American Revolutions.
On January 2, 1793, the General Advertiser published a piece that
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covered a large republican celebration of the French triumph at
Valmy—a crucial French victory. The article enumerated fifteen
“truly republican toasts” including a toast to France, “may her
republican form of government last as long as the sun shines or
the waters run,” and to President Washington, “because he is a
friend to the rights of man.” Additionally, toasts were given to
ideas, including, “the undisguised political principles of 1776”
and “May the sun of liberty illuminate the universe.”43 In this toast
and several others, Republicans showed that not only were their
republican principles being applied in France and throughout
the world, but also that the very principles of the American
Revolution and the Spirit of ’76 were being applied in France.
Thereby, the Republicans claimed to be the authentic carriers
of the American Revolutionary tradition. Throughout 1793, the
General Advertiser covered all major celebrations including the
Franco-American Alliance, the Storming of the Bastille (July 14,
1789), and the Insurrection of August 10, 1792.44
Freneau’s National Gazette shared similar sentiments.
In 1793, the National Gazette recognized a strong uptick in the
popular sentiments around the French Revolution. An author
wrote in 1793, “a year ago, the merits and importance of the
French Revolution, were confined…to but a few speculative
politicians in this country. But at present…thousands who were
then scarcely affected by its animating influence are now warmed
and invigorated.”45 Although the tens of celebrations from the
beginning of 1791 debunk this theory of popular inactivity, the
author’s thought still shows how the French Revolution was
central in 1793. This supposed increase in celebrations coincided
with the federalist turn against the French Revolution. While
some may claim it was the violence, wars, or King that caused
this split, the newspapers themselves do not hint it, nor would
this line of thought explain the sudden republican rise from “a
few speculative politicians” to the “thousands” of supporters.
Therefore, this phenomenon does not suggest a sudden
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Philip Freneau (1752-1832),
editor of the National Gazette

ideological divide between the newspapers, but a political one in
which the Republicans highlighted their support for the French
Revolution to break with the Federalists.
In 1793, familiar rhetoric was used by the National Gazette
including statements such as, “it is natural for every American
to feel a peculiar interest in the affairs of France since besides
the common motives of philanthropy and love of liberty, he
must consider the struggles of France as a continuation of the
glorious struggles of his own country.”46 The author, writing
under the pseudonym of Philadelphus argued that Americans
should not only care about the humanitarian concerns and the
common principles of both Revolutions, but also about the
contemporary well-being of the country. Another author urged
readers to “aid the causes of republicanism in France, if not
from principles of gratitude…[then] from motives of your own
prosperity.”47 Seemingly, the United States’ prosperity hinged on
the outcome of the French Revolution. Whether it tangibly hurt
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the United States economically or it just theoretically called the
vitality of republican principles into question, the writer here
showed that care for the French Revolution went beyond the
classical principles of republican ideology and fundamentally
impacted American prosperity.48
In their reactions to the French Revolution, national
newspapers used the language of liberty to celebrate the French
cause. The language used in opinion pieces and celebrations
typically repeated the concept of universal liberty and the deep
connection between the Americans and the French. Although
a split over France did eventually fall along party lines, the split
did not come when the politicians themselves split; between the
end of 1791 through the end of 1792, the French Revolution
was violent, the American political parties were forming, and
yet everyone agreed on the French Revolution and its merits.
Furthermore, even after the split occurred, both federalist
and republican writers seemed to go beyond ideology in their
rhetoric—hinting at more complex and political motives. By
ignoring the day-to-day opinions of newspapers, the conventional
historical account fails to see the divide between republican
and federalist newspapers and the ideological politicians of the
period. As one will later observe, the newspaper editors were
more beholden to the ideas of journalistic nonpartisanship than
were their patrons.
Friendship and Sympathy
Reading through the philosophical and political
discourse on the French Revolution, it is almost impossible to
miss the language of sensibility, friendship, and brotherhood.
After all, one of the three French principles was fraternité, or
brotherhood. While sensibility, friendship, and brotherhood are
not synonymous with one another, they each imply a connection
between the United States and France that runs deeper than
just outside viewers and commentators.49 American newspapers
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declared shared motives, goals, principles, and outcomes with
the French Revolution. Toasts, poems, and celebrations not only
served as intellectual congratulations, but also displayed emotional
and familial relations between the countries. Additionally, these
sentiments not only pervaded the top echelons of American
politics, but also were latent in the newspaper coverage of
the French Revolution. Interestingly, however, politicians and
newspapers used these phrases differently and at different times.
This section will provide further proof for the phenomenon
displayed above—the commentary of newspaper editors on
the French Revolution was not driven by ideology, but by some
other factor. According to Wells,
The language of liberty owed its ascension in the 1790s to
a very different discursive source as well: notwithstanding
the political origins of the discourses of liberty and
rights in Enlightenment thought more generally, it also
drew particular power from the degree to which it also
overlapped with another emerging discourse of the
time–that of sensibility or sentimentalism, which had
pervaded literary discourse (if not political) throughout
the 1780s in Britain and elsewhere.50
Several other historians have also discussed this era of sensibility,
sentimentalism, and feelings and have shown its pervasiveness in
popular political culture.51
On October 27, 1789, the Gazette of the United States
published an article entitled, “Authentic Information,” discussing
the concept of sensibility in the United States. It declared, “A
happy revolution of sentiments is observed to have taken place
throughout the United States: Local views, and narrow prejudices
are universally reprobated—A generous national spirit pervades
the whole Union…even the distinctions of the states are
scarcely heard…we are proud to be distinguished by the name
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of the Country we inhabit, Americans.” In a newspaper filled
with local news and opinion articles, a sociological observation
seems strange and out of place. This puzzlement regarding
the relevance of the rise in national culture and sensibility was
answered in the next paragraph though. According to the author,
the United States in its sentimental and national state has the
ability and the obligation to look past its borders and recognize
its influence worldwide. When looking at France, the author
claimed, “America may indulge [in] a laudable pride on this
occasion” due to its ability to spread the ideas of liberty through
friendship.52
Picking up on the existing discourse of the time, American
newspapers like the Gazette of the United States applied the language
and ideas of sentimentalism to their brethren across the Atlantic
Ocean who seemed to be engaging in a similar revolution. This
was the perfect opportunity for Americans to express their care
not only for those within their own borders, but also those
fighting for similar causes, no matter their location. As Wells
noted, the form of sentimentalism was a natural continuation
from universal liberty—once a universal community is formed
to fight for liberty, people within the community will sympathize
with the struggles of others within it.53 As the Gazette of the
United States commented in 1789, “Every citizen of the world—
every friend to the rights of mankind—and more especially
every citizen of the United States, must feel interested in the
important transactions in the Kingdom of France.”54 Friendship
and citizenship, in short, require feeling and sensitivity.
In this section, I hope to support two separate, but
related, claims. First, the language of sensibility does not seem
to follow the supposed partisan divide, as Republicans failed to
invoke the language of friendship and sympathy until the end of
1791. This furthers the claim that the French Revolution was not
as ideologically driven as many people think. Second, the very
nature of these discussions brings the parties beyond ideology.
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Through the language of friendship and sensibility, newspapers
showed not only their support for the French Revolution, but
also a deep connection to it. From 1789 through 1791, the
partisan paradigm flipped, as federalists displayed this deep,
sensible connection while republicans did not. Then in 1792,
the parties exchanged positions on this very issue. Whereas
there was little partisan difference until late 1792 between the
federalist and republican newspapers on the topic of universal
liberty, partisan difference existed immediately on the topic of
friendship. The question is what motivated this partisan divide:
differing ideology or some other factor? This back and forth
between the newspapers indicates much more than ideological
differences, as no ideological change was even reported at this
time. The eventual departure on lines of friendship shows
that the terms of this debate were about political legitimacy—
an argument not over philosophy, but over who were the true
friends of the American project.
One observes this trend explicitly in the usage of the
terms “friendship” and “sensibility” over this period. The Gazette
of the United States used “friend” and “France” in the same context
4 times in 1789, up to 8 and 7 times in 1790 and 1791, respectively,
and down again to 4 and 5 times in 1792 and 1793, respectively.
Conversely, the General Advertiser used “friend” in the same
context only 1 and 11 times in 1790 and 1791, respectively, but
then 15 and 25 times in 1792 and 1793, respectively. The National
Gazette also associated “friend” with “France” 9 and 17 times in
1792 and 1793, respectively, as opposed to only 1 time in 1791.55
Although the changes seem small and possibly insignificant,
taken in relation to each other, there is a clear inverse trend
between the federalist and republican national newspapers.
The same analysis with the words “brother” and “France”
uncover similar results. The federalist newspaper used “brother”
and “France” together 1 time in 1789, then 10 times in 1790
and 5, 4, and 5 times in 1791, 1792, and 1793, respectively—
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The usage of the word “brother” by all three
newspapers in the context of the French affairs

indicating a peak in 1790. The opposite is found in the republican
papers. In 1790, the General Advertiser used these words together
1 time, while it used them 5, 10, and 8 times in 1791, 1792, and
1793, respectively. Similarly, the National Gazette used the words
together only 2 times in 1791, but used them 7 times in both
1792 and 1793. While no such trend exists in terms of liberty
over the same period, the trend within friendship is apparent—
indicating a partisan proclivity in terms of American sensibility
to the French Revolution, not a mere ideological difference. Only
once republican usage went up while federalist usage went down.
The graph below elucidates this trend for the word “brother.”
Further analysis of the usages of friendship, brotherhood,
and sensibility will illuminate these trends even more. As
Americans became aware of the French Revolution, writers
urged their readership to support it. The line of argument often
went as follows:
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The friends to the rights of human nature, and
particularly every American, must feel interested in
the commotions which now agitate the Kingdom of
France. The prospect that opened upon that people,
of a complete emancipation from a state of abject
despotism, impressed the most pleasing sensations
upon every philanthropic mind. That they may
finally establish a free government, is most devoutly
wished.56
Writers argued that as friends of human nature, and ostensibly
of the enlightenment values of human nature and freedom,
Americans must be interested in the French Revolution. Not only
are Americans believers in human nature, but they are also friends
of it—implying a deep connection and care for it. Additionally,
authors invoked feelings of interest, wishes of free government,
and pleasing sensations of emancipation—all phrases expressing
an authentically personal care for the French cause.
This type of wishing and interest was a typical motif of
the federalists at the beginning of the French Revolution. As
opposed to acting or urging, the federalists watched with interest
and pride as a caring friend.57 However, this motif slowly lost
popularity within the Gazette of the United States, as support for
the French Revolution eroded—at least, that is the approach
most historians hold. In my view, the federalist shift within their
newspaper is only in response to the republican change of heart;
therefore, we must first examine the republican shift.
While the federalist newspaper discussed friendship and
the French Revolution, the recently founded General Advertiser
scarcely mentioned it in 1790 and throughout most of 1791.
Some mentions spoke of people as “friends of the Revolution”
or “friends of mankind,” but seldom did the newspaper discuss
deep sentiments between the United States and France.58 The lack
of sentimental care in these newspapers did not go unnoticed.
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On November 24, 1791, the National Gazette published a letter
which stated,
It has been observed by several foreigners, that,
considering the immense benefits which the French
Revolution promises to the human race, that grand event
has passed in America with less éclat, less sympathy of
joy, than could have been reasonably expected from a
people, who but seven years before, had almost by dint
of mere enthusiastic bravery, emancipated themselves
from the chains prepared for them by the parent state.59
With similar values and experiences, one would have expected
the Americans to be more sympathetic, the author thought. In
reality, the federalist press recounted sympathy, but for some
reason the republican press had not. The explanation the author
gave for the lateness in sympathy is even more telling, remarking
that
…characters were not wanting in this country who
exerted such abilities as they possessed, in endeavoring
to persuade the people that the principles for which they
had so recently fought and bled, were nugatory—and
the right of enacting laws and governing themselves lay
not with the multitude of any nation, but with certain
favorites of heaven, certain political magicians…the
establishment of a free government in France, has
thrown a damp upon the advocates of such doctrines.
In essence, the writer pointed to some people who did not
want others in the United States to learn and to advocate for
the same solution the French were promoting—namely, “the
pure doctrines of Republicanism” and the sovereignty of the
people. In a purely partisan and polemical fashion, the author
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unjustly and maliciously blamed federalists—who apparently did
not want others to find out about republicanism—for the lack
of sympathy in the United States. Ironically, the federalists had
been the only ones using the language of sympathy so far.60 With
this malicious attack on federalists though, sympathy was used
not as an ideological point of departure, but as a political point
of controversy.
Not surprisingly, around the time of this article, the
republican usage of sympathy and sentimentalism soared and
these articles typically had a federalist jab attached as well.
The main source for these sentimental articles was from the
coverage of celebration and toasts to the French Revolution
and its various anniversaries. With the July 4th celebration in
1792 rained out in Philadelphia, local officials decided to move
the celebration ten days later to Bastille Day. Both republican
newspapers covered the day extensively and their coverage was
filled with references to friendship and sympathy. In the July 7th
edition of the National Gazette, after hearing that the firework
show would be delayed to July 14th, a writer commented that
on the anniversary of the French Revolution, “it is expected,
there will, in future, be a general rejoicing in every part of the
United States, by all who are friends to the French Revolution,
and consequently real friends to the revolution in America.”61 The
two words, “real friends,” packed a sympathetic connection to
the French Revolution with a partisan polemic all in one. By
celebrating the French Revolution, the republicans thought of
themselves both as the friends of the French and as the true
protectors of the American Revolution.62 Clearly, the unfounded
invocation of “real friends” highlights the political jousting that
took place between the republican and federalist press. These
debates were not the same ideological debates that political elites
were having at this time; rather, the partisan press, by couching
their rhetoric in true friendship, was engaging in a debate over
which political party was truly legitimate.
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In 1793, these celebrations further intensified with the
visit of Citizen Genêt to the United States. Genêt arrived to sway
American opinion toward France, as opposed to neutrality. While
hundreds came out to celebrations for him across the country,
this did not change President Washington’s decision in favor of
neutrality. However, aside from the foreign policy outcomes,
the result of Genêt’s visit could be seen as more significant and
impactful in terms of the reaction of the American populace.
Genêt’s ability to bring scores of people out to celebrations
and festivals led historian David Waldstreicher to conclude that
Genêt “enabled the people to celebrate themselves and their
participation in national politics. It seemed to make ordinary
Americans into makers of foreign policy.”63 With such popular
appeal, both Genêt and the population expressed feelings of
brotherhood and friendship between the nation of the United
States and the people of France. Genêt wrote in the General
Advertiser,
I have received abundant proofs on my journey
from Charleston to Philadelphia. In every place
the general voice of the people convinced me, in a
most sensible manner, of their real sentiments, and
sincere, and friendly dispositions toward the nation
which I have the honour to represent, and for the
advancement of that common cause which she
alone supports with so much courage…I assure you
that the day your brethren in France shall receive
it [your sentiments], will be a day of gladness to
them.64
Saturated with references to sensibility and friendship, Genêt’s
speeches served as the emotional conduit between the American
public and the French people. Several citizens also published
their letters to Genêt in the newspaper. One letter from Charles
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Biddle stated, “For such feelings, sir, we have been naturally
led to contemplate the struggles of France with a paternal
eye, sympathizing in all her calamities, and exulting in all her
successes.”65 Biddle claimed that not only was France a brother
and friend to the United States, but also that the United States
was a paternal figure—caring for France and taking pride in all
its successes. Another letter from P.S. Du Ponceau, the Citizen
Minister of the French Republic, contained an outpouring of
feeling and connection between the French and the Americans.
He wrote that when France still had its despotic government,
many Frenchmen fled to the United States and were accepted
openly. De Ponceau continued, “But in becoming Americans,
they have not ceased to be Frenchmen; for no individual can
be more intimately connected with either than the two nations
are with each other…An union cemented by the blood of the
citizens of both nations and founded on so solid a basis as
similarity of sentiment and principle.”66 Again, sentiment was
central to the connection between France and the United States.
For republican newspapers, Genêt’s visit was not seen
primarily as a rally for tangible involvement in French affairs,
but as a rally to express affection for the French. “An Old
Soldier” wrote, “The bosoms of many hundred freemen beat
high with affectionate transport, their souls caught the celestial
fire of struggling liberty, and in the enthusiasm of emotion,
they communicated their feelings to the worthy and amicable
representative of the French nation.”67 The writer’s words display
the broad-based excitement Genêt and the French cause brought
to the United States. The celebration around Genêt, in summary,
was not just a political rally to show support for his cause; rather,
it was an outpouring of American emotion, enthusiasm, and
brotherhood. Consequently, these rallies had more of an effect
on its participants than on the policies for which they attempted
to advocate.
However, the purely emotional explanation behind
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the Genêt visit obscures one key aspect of this period: the
partisan portion of it. While I do not deny that some of the
popular display was genuine, the publication of these longwinded articles seems positioned for a different purpose. The
article from the “Old Soldier” only dedicates the first paragraph
praising Genêt and France, while it spends the rest of the twopage column discussing the federalists and their “royal folly.”
Genuine philosophical feelings were not the only, or even the
main, reason for publishing the articles related to the French
Revolution; rather, political jousting seemed to be the true goal.
By denouncing the federalists, this author and other republicans
hoped to legitimize their own opposition. As one has seen
throughout, rhetoric surrounding friendship rose among
republicans when partisanship was at stake. Additionally, not
only did rhetoric rise, but it also skyrocketed. The May 22nd issue
of the National Gazette spoke almost solely about Genêt and did
so in a repetitive fashion. This extreme coverage and verbose
language describing the French cause indicates a more complex
yet fundamental motive.
Once the republicans politicized friendship and searched
for the “real friends” of the Revolutions, the federalists were out
of options. The republicans had co-opted the 1780s language
of sentimentalism for their own partisan agenda.68 Broadly, the
partisan flip-flop within the realm of sentimentalism hints at
something beyond ideology that moved back and forth.
Monarchy
In the practical sense, the many onlookers regarded the
issue of monarchy as the most important issue of the French
Revolution. From the Storming of the Bastille until the end of
1792, the revolutionaries attempted to salvage the monarchy,
albeit curbing its powers through a constitution and a new
legislative structure. However, with growing frustration, the
revolutionaries abolished the monarchy, executed the King and
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Queen, and established a new French Republic.
Watching closely, American newspapers commented
extensively on the French monarchy, its merits, and its relation
to the United States’ past, present, and future. The Gazette of the
United States between 1789 and 1793 used the words “King” and
“France” in the same context 190 times; between 1790 and 1793,
the General Advertiser used them 224 times, and the National Gazette
between 1791 and 1793 used them 140 times. In other words,
discussions of the King were extremely common. Additionally,
as expected, usage increased over the years, as the revolutionaries
slowly began to consider terminating the monarchy. For example,
during 1791 and 1792, respectively, the Gazette of the United States
made 40 and 54 mentions of the King, the National Gazette 21
and 66 had mentions, and the General Advertiser contained 84
mentions during both years.69 As the monarchy became more
relevant, American newspapers spoke about it more often.
As expected, many historians argue that the federalists
favored the monarchy and considered the beheading of the King
barbaric, while republicans favored the abolition of a powerful
monarchy that perpetuated hierarchy, limited popular liberty,
and perpetuated tyranny. Historians such as Wells even point to
proof from national newspapers. Wells cites Peter Pindar’s poem
in the Gazette of the United States entitled, “The Captive King”
and Freneau’s article published under the pseudonym Brutus,
“Louis Capet has lost his Caput.” Ostensibly, these articles show
that “the ideological distance between this growing number
of critics and the Revolution’s unwavering supporters would
be even more pronounced.”70 However, upon examination,
neither of these articles display a sharp ideological divide. “The
Captive King” was written as a song that King Louis XVI recited
while imprisoned. The song is surely dramatic, with lines like
“No more these walls my grief shall hear” and “When sorrow
dies, and ruthless Fate can give the parting pang no more!” It
also expresses empathy for the King and even states, “Behold,
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a brighter crown is thine;” but lacks any deliberate claims that
would align it with the supposed federalist position.71 The song
never explicitly supported the monarch or the monarchy, nor did
it make any partisan claims. Brutus’ article “Louis Capet has lost
his Caput” does not align with the republican position either, as
it begins, “From my use of a pun [in the title] it may seem that I
think lightly of his fate. I certainly do. It affects me no more than
the execution of another malefactor.” However, the article was
not meant to be the mainstream republican opinion. By his own
admission and admonishment, Brutus ended the article, “Why
then such a noise even with republicans about the death of
Louis?” Apparently, many people, including republicans, pitied
or even opposed the execution of the King. While Brutus cannot
comprehend such pity, this article nonetheless goes to disprove
the conventional approach with respect to republicans, whose
position on the monarchy, even in 1793, was not agreed upon by
all.72
In searching for the true positions of federalist and
republican newspapers, one discovers two things. First, the
supposed federalist support for the King is oversimplified and
misunderstood. The federalist newspaper did at first support
the King, but later came not only to dislike him, but also to call
for the establishment of a French Republic in his place. Second,
there was never consensus among republicans on the issue of
the monarchy. The General Advertiser and National Gazette present
two different positions on the issue. Consequently, the complex
issue of the monarchy as told through the newspapers went
beyond the straightforward ideology that was espoused by many
of the political leaders of the time.
At the very beginning of the French Revolution, the
federalist and republican positions were indistinguishable. On
November 21, 1789, the Gazette of the United States published
a letter from Marquis de Caseaux, which proclaimed, “in very
simple terms” that “the people is everything. No legitimate power
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can exist but from them and for them.”73 Shockingly to some,
this paradigmatic republican statement was a featured topic in
a federalist newspaper. However, this line of argument did not
call for an immediate abolition of the monarchy, but rather an
end to tyranny and despotism. As the Gazette of the United States
declared, “At all men are tyrants by nature,” and it is up to the
people to curb this tyranny.74 With statements such as, “Deliver
from vestige of feudal tyranny” the Gazette of the United States
was distinctly opposed to the French tyranny of the past, not to
the institutional monarchy itself.75
Republicans and federalists alike simultaneously
supported King Louis XVI and the French Revolution. Despite
the thoughts of some historians, republicans were not always
opposed to the monarchy.76 For republicans, the form of
government was not as significant as the amount of liberty that
was provided to the people. On October 4, 1790, the General
Advertiser wrote, “Louis XVI: thou art the first Monarch in the
world who has confirmed in the face of heaven and earth the
liberties of thy people, which God and Nature have bestowed
upon us all. Beloved Monarch! Worthy of the love of the whole
human race, enjoy this day and the reward of thy glory and thy
virtue!”77 Not only did these proto-republicans tolerate King
Louis XVI, but they also adored him and wished him to continue
his policies of liberty.
Despite favoring an orderly, strong, and centralized
presidency, as exemplified by the popular George Washington,
the federalist newspaper also supported the deposition of
the King—a break from the traditional understanding of the
federalist position.78 On November 7, 1792, the Gazette of the
United States published a piece of French intelligence describing
the popular march to the King’s palace in order to arrest him
and his family. The march was bloody, as the entire Swiss Guard
was murdered. As the author described, “the walls and floors
were stained with blood, covered with broken weapons, and
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the limbs of men.” However, the scene was a “horror not to be
exceeded. Yet even this horror might be endured, by recollecting
who had been the inhabitants.” Amidst the chaos, the author
recalled, “a strong mixture of harmony, fraternity, sensibility,
vengeance, generosity, and barbarity.” Even during the violent
turn of the French Revolution, the author published in the
federalist newspaper still managed to see the positive qualities of
the event. This is explicitly because the author blamed the King
for all the violence in France. As the author noted, “By the side
of this scene sat Louis XVI, the author of all these lamentable
tragedies.” Lastly, the author closed by hoping that the royal
palace and surrounding barracks would be used as the future
hall for the assembly of Bureaus and the apartments for “the
Ministers and President of the Republic.” Even as partisanship
roared and violence was in clear sight, the author not only
opposed the King—the supposed republican position—but also
favored the establishment of a French Republic.79 The federalist
position, therefore, was not so simple.
Astonishingly, the National Gazette also maintained its
support for the King through the beginning of 1793. Almost
all published toasts in Freneau’s paper were toasts to the King
himself and to his health.80 However, the General Advertiser
seemed to turn against the King much more quickly—beginning
their criticism in 1791. The toasts Bache published did not toast
the King.81 Additionally, many articles Bache published in 1791
by Brutus severely criticized the monarchy.82 While the General
Advertiser favored Washington in the toasts it covered, calling
Washington “the Father of Freemen” and “friend to the rights
of man,” this can be seen as a polemic against the French King—
the National Assembly and Washington were praised, while
King Louis XVI was omitted.83 By 1793, the General Advertiser
published a toast stating, “May royalty and priest-craft expire
together.”84 As one observed earlier in the article entitled “Louis
Capet has lost his Caput,” republicans were split on the issue
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of the monarchy from 1791 through the execution of the King
in 1793. The support from the National Gazette shows that the
republican position regarding the King was also not as simple as
the consensus theory makes it out to be.
Overall, the expectations surrounding the positions
of these newspapers on the French Revolution were not met
in terms of timing, content, or even ideological polarization.
When discussing universal liberty, the Gazette of the United
States departed from the ideologies of its political patrons by
supporting and praising the French Revolution for much longer
than many historians predicted. Despite rampant violence and
the denouncement of the French Revolution by many politicians,
including John Adams, the Gazette of the United States still praised
the French pursuit of universal liberty until October of 1792. This
sixteen-month lag is unaccounted for within the conventional
approach offered by historians. Additionally, republican writers
used the concepts of liberty often to polemicize with their
federalist counterparts, hinting at something more complex at
hand than just republican expressions of ideology.
When analyzing the usage of friendship and
sentimentalism in relation to the French Revolution, ones
expectations were also not met, as the conventional approach
cannot account for several aspects of the analysis above.
First, the newspapers were in much more agreement on this
issue than the conventional approach would have one believe.
Second, when the newspapers did disagree, the timing of their
departure did not line up with the violence and leading political
partisanship of 1791. From 1789 through the middle of 1792,
the federalist newspaper used these terms of friendship and
sentimentalism often to praise the French Revolution, while
the republicans seldom used them. In the middle of 1792, one
observes a flip, where republican newspapers began using these
phrases often to polemicize with federalists, and thus, the Gazette
of the United States nearly stopped using these words altogether.
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The conventional approach fails to explain this odd pattern.
Friendship, it seems, was not used by the republican newspapers
to express their ideology, but instead to delegitimize the other
party while legitimizing its own opposition.
Finally, in terms of the newspapers’ opinion on monarchy,
the newspapers agreed for much longer than the conventional
approach predicted. Indeed, the republican newspapers showed
that there was no consensus among Republicans regarding the
institution of monarchy. While the General Advertiser opposed the
King in France as early as 1791, the National Gazette supported
and even praised the King well into 1793. Additionally, the
federalist newspaper even supported the deposition of the King,
contrary to what many historians would have expected from a
federalist journal commissioned and supported by Hamilton.
In short, the conventional approach cannot account for
the complex and nuanced opinions of these newspapers on the
French Revolution.
CONCLUSION
“The revolutionary wars of Europe, commencing
precisely at the moment when the Government of
the United States first went into operation under
this Constitution, excited a collision of sentiments
and of sympathies which kindled all the passions
and embittered the conflict of parties till the nation
was involved in war and the Union was shaken to its
center.”85
– John Quincy Adams
In his 1825 presidential inaugural address, John Quincy
Adams made essentially four claims in one sentence. First,
the revolutions of Europe—most prominently the French
Revolution of 1789—coincided with the ratification of the
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American Constitution. Although Adams did not tell the
audience why this is significant, it is safe to assume it related
to his next claims. Adams then stated that the revolutions in
Europe excited American sympathy toward those revolutions,
and that those sentiments toward Europe’s revolutions led to
a partisan divide that caused conflict between those parties.
This third assertion likely relates to the significance of the first
claim, as only in a federal union under a constitution could the
entire nation become divided along partisan lines. Lastly, partisan
conflict became so bad that war broke out because of it—shaking
the very foundation of the United States.
These four simple claims, comprising a single sentence,
may be seen by many as a restatement of the conventional
approach on the impact of the French Revolution on the United
States. Since the 1790s, politicians and historians alike saw the
French Revolution as a partisan divider within the new nation,
creating such an ideological rift that the sentiments toward a
revolution thousands of miles away caused bitter political divide
and culminated in a violent war.86 At its heart, the conventional
approach claims that political philosophy and ideology are at
the center of the American political square. Looking outward,
many American citizens and politicians understood the French
Revolution through the lens of their own political philosophies—
federalist or republican. To be fair, most of the writings of the
political elite make this explicit. But the national newspapers
paint a more complicated picture—a picture that Adams, if read
more closely, seemed to understand thirty years after the fact.
In analyzing the federalist and government-sympathetic
Gazette of the United States alongside the republican General
Advertiser and National Gazette, the expected reaction of each
newspaper to the French Revolution’s events was not always
observed, especially between 1789 and 1793. Historians who
take the conventional approach may have expected to see the
republican newspapers tout French sympathies immediately,
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while in reality, they only began expressing such sympathies
in 1792. They also expected these republican newspapers to
oppose monarchy and support the deposition of the King,
when in truth the Republicans could not come to agree on this
issue, even in 1793. Additionally, the Federalists supported the
French Revolution for much longer than expected, championing
the pursuit of universal liberty until 1793. Finally, the federalist
newspaper itself supported the deposition of the King even
after witnessing the bloodshed involved in his execution.
What is clear from this analysis is that the republican
and federalist newspapers had their fair share of agreements and
disagreements, but ideological differences between the factions
were insufficient to explain them. Adams himself admitted
that the reaction to the French Revolution was not based on
ideology, but instead pervasively expressed in sentiments and
sympathies.87 Additionally, Adams said that the parties only
formed after sentiments over the French Revolution were
expressed and not beforehand. Furthermore, historians claimed
that party ideology led the different parties to react in the unique
way that they did, while Adams and the national newspapers
claimed that the French Revolution itself helped form these
parties in the first place. This explanation is in disagreement
with many other politicians and historians who claimed that
the partisan split happened in 1791—only two years after the
beginning of the French Revolution. This analysis departs from
the conventional approach not by refuting its claims about
politicians and their beliefs, but by showing that when looking at
other realms of political discourse and controversy—namely, the
partisan national newspaper editors—the narrative is much more
complicated than assumed by these historians.
The simultaneous shift in the global and American
political landscapes allowed American political elites and citizens
to use international events to help shape the American trajectory.
National newspaper coverage of the time reflected the American
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obsession with the French Revolution, but ideological alignment
does not suffice to explain this obsession. Rather, the newly
formed opposition party, the Republican Party, was faced with
an impossible task—maintain the American sense of unity while
simultaneously opposing Federalist Party policies and opinions.
To uphold unity, republican newspapers often agreed with the
federalist government and even denounced faction at almost
every opportunity. However, the Republicans had several points
of disagreement with the Federalists, including Hamiltonian
fiscal policy, Federalist favoritism toward economic elite, and the
Federalist proclivity toward monarchy and aristocracy.
In order to express disagreement while still maintaining
the perception of unity, the republican newspapers often
displaced their factionalism to the French context. Thus, the
republican newspapers used their comments on French affairs
to polemicize with Federalists and their policies. Primarily, the
republican newspapers used the language of friendship and
sentimentalism to show that Republicans were the “real friends”
of the French and in turn republicanism, while the Federalists
upheld the un-American ideals of monarchy and despotism. The
republican newspapers knew that the Federalists also used the
language of friendship and sentimentalism to refer to the French,
but the republican newspapers hoped to show that federalist
monarchical policies made these sentiments worthless. Adams’
explanation was thus precise—sympathies and sentiments
surrounding the French Revolution did draw the parties apart,
specifically allowing the Republicans to oppose and polemicize
with the Federalists.
Furthermore, as Adams pointed out, these partisan
developments were only possible with the creation of a national
government. Accordingly, the newly established centralized
government was now in charge of setting policy for the entire
nation. This naturally opened up debate, not only within
the government itself, but also within the populace. This
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phenomenon thereby placed national newspapers at the center
of the partisan conflict. These newspapers were commissioned
by the government and provided citizens with the information
they needed to inform their individual opinions. The newspapers
themselves explained their significance: “Many people read
newspapers who read little else—they live in retired situations,
and feel a strong curiosity to know the news, and join in the
opinions of the day.”88 With this in mind, newspaper editors
had tremendous influence on public opinion and in shaping the
partisan landscape of the time. This type of national partisan
conflict was only possible, as Adams noted, after the ratification
of the Constitution.
President Adams continued his speech, “This time of
trial embraced a period of five and twenty years, during which
the policy of the Union in its relations with Europe constituted
the principal basis of our political divisions and the most arduous
part of the action of our Federal Government.”89 According
to Adams and other historians, European affairs, namely the
conflict between Great Britain and France, served as the key issue
of partisan conflict from 1789 until the end of the Napoleonic
Wars in 1815. This essay calls that claim into question. The above
argument shows that the partisan divisions of 1789 through
1793 were not equivalent to the partisan divisions of 1793 and
onward. After 1793, the newspapers indeed divided themselves
based on their views regarding geopolitics, but from the very
beginning of the nation, the newspapers often used European
affairs as a vehicle for partisan displacement, not as the source
of ideological quarrel.
This narrative also serves as a case study on both the rise
of partisan politics in new republics, as well as the gap between
political elites and the public. Partisanship in Early America was
not welcomed by the newspapers, but rather discouraged and
stigmatized. In turn, a two-party system was not established
from the outset; instead, there was one party—the governing
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party. Despite what Federalist No. 10 stated and despite being
founded for partisan reasons, the national newspapers fought
against the existence of factionalism. While politicians such
as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison explicitly broke on
ideological ground with Alexander Hamilton and John Adams,
republican newspaper editors attempted to uphold a more
balanced approach of unity and displaced partisanship. In order
to maintain a perception of unification and to follow, to some
extent, the journalistic imperative of impartiality, these editors
opposed faction. The positions of the newspapers eventually
came into line with the opinions of the political elites, but only
when factionalism became more solidified and accepted within
American political culture. In light of what Adams discussed in
his presidential inaugural address, the geopolitical issue of the
upcoming decades did become the central partisan divider for
both the elites and the public alike, but it took four years for this
to emerge.
The emergence of partisanship during the first four years
after the signing of the Constitution was not revolutionary, but
evolutionary: it did not happen immediately, but rather became
publicly more pronounced and accepted over time. In a new
republic, opposition does not arise in full strength all at once.
Only through evolutionary opposition can dissenting newspapers
pronounce their disagreement while simultaneously maintaining
a perception of good intentions. As seen in the American
context, those who favor the governing politicians will strongly
resist any oppositional move. The federalist newspaper clearly
understood the republican newspapers’ plan for displacement
and accused them of being enemies of the republic. Striking
the balance between opposition and unity may be extremely
difficult, but it is an imperative step on the road to full-fledged
partisanship and oppositional legitimization. As Adams noted
in his presidential inaugural address, partisanship became an
integral part of American politics, but it did not start that way.
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“The Evil of the Age”:
The Influence of The New York Times on
Anti-Abortion Legislation in New York,
1865-1873
Sahand K. Rahbar
Princeton University
INTRODUCTION
But could even a portion of the facts that have
been detected in frightful profusion, by the
agents of the TIMES, be revealed in print,
in their hideous truth, the reader would shrink
from the appalling picture.
– August St. Clair, Excerpt from “The
Evil of the Age” in The New York Times
(August 23, 1871)
When Augustus St. Clair elected to make a second visit
to the Fifth Avenue private home of Dr. Jacob Rosenzweig in
July of 1871, he could scarcely have expected his life to be in
great danger. Much to his own astonishment, however, he soon
found himself pointing a revolver at Dr. Rosenzweig before
making a quick exit into the street. “I felt there was but one
thing to do,” he later wrote, describing the circumstances which
led Dr. Rosenzweig to grow suspicious of his guest and prevent
St. Clair from leaving his home, “either to be conquered or to
conquer, and leave the house I must or else suffer violence at
his hands.” St. Clair was a newspaper reporter for The New York
Times (NYT), and his assignment that summer compelled him to
go undercover in order to investigate the lucrative underground
world of abortion.1 In 1871, as many as two hundred abortionists
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were thriving in a city that boasted fewer than one million
residents.2 Dr. Rosenzweig was one such figure, and St. Clair had
seen his covert advertisements in local papers. In the process
of making his hasty exit from the doctor’s home, St. Clair
happened to spot a young lady standing on the stairs. Only days
later, he would see that same woman again at the morgue, dead
from a botched abortion procedure. In a NYT article entitled,
“Something More Concerning Ascher’s Business,” St. Clair
wrote, “I positively identify the features of the dead woman as
those of the blond beauty before described and will testify to
the fact, if called upon to do so, before a legal tribunal.”3 In
making this firm association, St. Clair provided a highly public
and damning indictment against Dr. Rosenzweig and against
the widespread practice of abortion, one that also established
the NYT as a public and widespread proponent of moral virtue
and righteousness in the period to come. This story represented
but one of many sensational examples of abortion-related press
coverage from the end of the American Civil War onward, and
these stories were emblematic of the changing attitudes toward
abortion during this era.
CHANGING ATTITUDES, CHANGING LAWS
In the nineteenth century, the legal attitude toward
abortion underwent a series of gradual changes at the state
level. This rising intolerance to abortion was evidenced by the
criminalization of abortion in all states by 1910.4 New York
stood as a particularly compelling example of these mounting
changes, for New York lawmakers quickly altered the state
abortion law in three distinct sessions between 1869 and 1874.5
These adjustments are noteworthy, because they represent a
surge of exceedingly strict anti-abortion legislation following a
period of legislative inactivity on the matter. In fact, the only
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previous abortion law in the New York criminal code went into
effect in 1830. This law deemed the termination of a late-term
fetus to be second-degree manslaughter. It also imposed criminal
liability upon the abortionist and not on the pregnant woman
seeking the procedure.6
With this historical context in mind, the changes made
from 1869 to 1874 are significant, because they altered the legal
recognition of abortion. Prior to the passage of the 1869 law,
New York—like other states—approached the issue of abortion
with the quickening doctrine in mind. This doctrine stipulated that
a pregnancy could only be verifiably recognized as a pregnancy
after ‘quickening’—the moment in which a pregnant woman first
perceives fetal movement, which usually occurs at the midpoint
of gestation.7 In Commonwealth v. Bangs (1812), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court established the widespread precedent of
disregarding abortion cases in which quickening could not be
established.8 The law in many states was unable to truly recognize
the existence of a fetus in criminal cases before it had quickened
in the womb.9 This doctrine provided a wide degree of legal
tolerance for the practice of early pre-quickening abortion in
most states. The 1869 New York law, however, abolished any
consideration of the quickening doctrine and thereby made
abortion a criminal offense irrespective of gestation period.
Not only did this law remove the stipulation of quickening as
a legitimate indicator of pregnancy, but it also removed the
consideration of pregnancy altogether. The administration of
abortifacients with the intent to induce miscarriage was deemed a
criminal offense “whether [the woman] be or be not pregnant.”10
In other words, state law no longer regarded a woman’s pregnancy
status as a crucial component of its anti-abortion statutes, thus
mitigating the need to refer to a pregnant woman’s judgment in
considering whether a pregnancy was sufficiently advanced to
warrant prosecution in cases of abortion. This naturally lowered
the burden of proof on prosecutors as well, making it much
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simpler to convict abortionists. The 1872 law, in continuation
of the increasingly strict trend, made abortion a felony for any
woman who attempted it, successfully or not, upon herself or
who voluntarily sought an abortion from a practitioner, bucking
the established practice that focused legal ire on abortionists
rather than on pregnant women.11 Finally, the 1874 law allowed
the dying testimony of a woman to be used as admissible
evidence in abortion trials, once again making it easier to convict
abortionists.12 That such momentous changes—the utter
elimination of the quickening doctrine, the criminalization of
abortion for pregnant women, and an overarching turn toward
stricter legislation against abortion—would occur in such a short
period of time, between 1869 and 1874, is naturally the source
of much curiosity.
Historians have previously sought to explain the timing
by linking the surge in anti-abortion legislation to the intense
lobbying activities of the nascent American Medical Association
(AMA). Historian James Mohr has demonstrated that the AMA,
guided by Horatio Storer in the middle of the nineteenth century,
systematically worked to influence popular opinion against
abortion and also influence related legislation.13 Historian Janet
Farrell Brodie has noted that the efforts of AMA physicians
were largely predicated on their desire to “drive out irregulars
and sectarians,” attract public respect for their profession, and
present themselves as promoters of virtue and arbiters of
morality.14 Dr. Hugh L. Hodge of the University of Pennsylvania,
for instance, outlined the prototypical views of his profession in
a lecture before an obstetrics course in 1869. “It seems hardly
necessary to repeat,” he said, “that physicians, medical men, must
be regarded as the guardians of the rights of infants. They alone
can rectify public opinion; they alone can present the subject in
such a manner that legislators can exercise their powers aright
in the preparation of suitable laws.”15 Dr. Hodge clearly viewed
himself and his medical colleagues as protectors of virtue and as
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important influences on legislative decisions.
Scholars have pointed out that the efforts of the AMA
and its constituent physicians were largely motivated by a desire
to establish themselves as professionals rather than as ‘quacks.’
Quackery was an especially damaging charge in the first half
of the nineteenth century, when many doctors graduated
from unregulated medical schools and formed a considerable
population that challenged the so-called establishment physicians,
who studied at respectable schools.16 Consequently, the efforts of
the establishment doctors to restrict abortion may be interpreted
as part of a larger movement to push irregular physicians—
including abortionists, many of whom were midwives—out of
the way in order to grant increased authority in medical matters
to the regular physicians. Although these arguments regarding
the physician’s crusade against abortion explain the motivations
of a very prominent group of anti-abortionists, they do not
adequately explore the motivations of another group: the
legislators. This group is of crucial interest precisely because it
consists of those individuals who made the decision to legally
restrict abortion. These lawmakers were no doubt influenced by
the various medical pamphlets that abounded in the Postbellum
Period, many of which singled out abortion as a vicious and
unconscionable crime.17 But legislators, like most other citizens,
consumed a great variety of popular literature during this period,
and newspapers may be counted as one of the most prominent
literary features of the era. I argue that the newspaper coverage
of the NYT—including such extraordinary pieces as Augustus
St. Clair’s “The Evil of the Age” (“EoA”)—was highly influential
in altering legal sentiment toward abortion in a process that
culminated in the increasingly harsh criminalization of the
practice. This new legal sentiment was the gradual consequence
of journalistic practices that sought to raise the profile and the
authority of the NYT, while simultaneously preying on popular
fears about the safety of women and the supposed deterioration
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“The Evil of the Age,” penned by Augustus St. Clair,
sensationalized the abortion issue and set off a new wave of
stylistically dramatic news coverage

of the United State’s white, Protestant population.
GENERAL SENTIMENT AND LEGAL SENTIMENT
It is important to distinguish the the attitudes of the
public at large from the attitude of the lawmakers. General
sentiment refers to the opinions of the wider public. Accordingly,
the general sentiment toward abortion should represent the
prevailing attitudes of all Americans, given a particular period
and time. The use of general sentiment, however, is flawed
because it is far too broad. Women, for instance, will likely
have a much different outlook on the abortion issue than men,
and different subgroups of women—the unmarried, the poor,
women of color, immigrant women, and so on—will also harbor
different views. The recognition of these important demographic
differences fails to remedy the scarcity of sources available to
historians. Where evidence may be found, it skews in favor of
the elite strata of society—those who are white, literate, and
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male—and thus prevents us from making accurate observations
about other groups.
Legal sentiment, which is the attitude displayed by
lawmakers, is infinitely easier to gauge because it can be analyzed
through codified statutes; one can witness the evolution of
legal sentiment and see a change in the approach and stance
of lawmakers to pressing social issues. This evolution is clearly
evident in the case of New York, where one sees a series of
major changes to existing anti-abortion laws within a span of
six years. An illustration of the importance of this distinction
between general and legal sentiment arises when considering the
quickening doctrine. Mohr asserts repeatedly that the United States
public was exceedingly tolerant of abortion in the earlier decades
of the nineteenth century, in the absence of later developments
such as the lobbying efforts of the AMA.18 In Mohr’s view,
pregnant women who had not experienced quickening “believed
themselves to be carrying inert non-beings…a potential for life
rather than life itself.”19 Other scholars have challenged this
view. Author Marvin Olasky insists on the popular acceptance
of the preformation doctrine, which held that humans were
preformed and alive even prior to conception, existing in
some inactive form either in the mother’s egg or in the father’s
sperm.20 In a similar vein, historian Anthony Joseph complicates
the widespread assumption of tolerance by noting the various
interpretations given by English legalists to the viability of the
fetus.21 According to Joseph, recent scholarship shows that the
early nineteenth century understanding of the permissibility of
feticide relied not on actual cases, which were unknown until
recent decades, but on the interpretations of legal scholars who
offered their own rules for measuring the validity of life. None
of these various interpretations resemble the quickening doctrine
as Mohr understands it.22 Instead, they suggest that the idea of
quickening was not as universal or as widespread among all
nineteenth century Americans as scholars once believed. Mohr’s
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assertion that quickening played a crucial role in a woman’s own
understanding of fetal vitality holds for only some cases. In light
of Joseph’s evidence, Mohr’s assertion about general sentiment
is problematic because it uses legal evidence—the absence of
legislation as a marker of widespread tolerance—even though
this absence really only tells one about legal sentiment.
As such, it seems that the quickening doctrine was simply
a highly practical legal method of verifying the existence of a
pregnancy, especially during a time when the absence of medical
technology could not verify pregnancy in any other manner.
This means that the early legal sentiment towards abortion was
tolerant based on the legal evidence available, which provides no
basis on which to make claims about the general opinions of the
wider public. Legal sentiment is governed by a set of principles
hinging on practicality and provability. Individual lawmakers,
like other Americans, may have considered the beginning of
life to occur well before quickening, even before the established
physicians encouraged that sort of thinking. Nevertheless,
lawmakers maintained the importance of the quickening doctrine
for its practicality. In the absence of more sophisticated medical
technology, the physical fact of a pregnancy could only be legally
established through the practical testimony of a pregnant woman
who had experienced quickening.
This practicality would soon outgrow its usefulness in
New York. Since one can trace the legal sentiment of the state’s
legislature through the language of the law, one is able to link the
three major legal changes made between 1869 and 1874 to the
wider coverage of popular print media on the nature of abortion.
My analysis of the NYT will span the decade immediately
following the American Civil War, from 1865 to 1874, and will
involve curated insights from the examination of over three
hundred articles, some investigative, some opinionative, and all
concerning abortion. This analysis will be chronological and
separated into two sections, one covering the period between
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1865 and mid-1871, and the other covering the period from late
1871 to 1874. This chronological bifurcation serves to highlight
several important differences between the earlier articles and
those published after “EoA,” the famed mid-1871 article that
sensationalized the abortion issue in New York.
SENSATIONALISM AND THE FIRST WAVE (1865-1871)
The first period of abortion-related press coverage in
the NYT was sensational chiefly in subject, whereas the second
period following the publication of “EoA” was sensational
both in subject and in style. Sensational writing is engineered to
provoke a “startling impression.”23 Contrary to its connotation
and to popular applications of the word, sensationalism is neither
fundamentally harmful nor beneficial. In its most basic form,
sensationalism merely draws a reader’s attention and supplies
him or her with absorbing facts and details. The presence of
sensationalism hinges on two features: subject and style. On
one hand, there exist, in each particular time and place, various
subjects that are naturally sensational, such as violent crime,
supernatural phenomena, and political scandal. These stories do
not require the assistance of highly imaginative or descriptive
prose in order to excite excessive interest in readers; people are
naturally attracted to such topics. Style, on the other hand, relates
to the presentation of the material—the intensity of the diction
and the presence of figurative language. A story about President
Grover Cleveland’s alleged illegitimate child is a sensational
subject, but only the writing of the story or the manner of its
placement in the newspaper would make the story stylistically
sensational. To put it succinctly, sensationalism consists of two
constituent elements, subject and style, and news stories may
feature one or both components.
The first wave of these abortion stories in the NYT
began in October of 1865, just a few months after the end of
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the American Civil War. A measly four paragraphs—the last
one no longer than a sentence—appeared at the bottom of a
column under the headline, “THE WOLFER MURDER” in
the October 21st issue of that year. The story about the alleged
murder of Emma Wolfer by Dr. Charles Cobell via abortion
almost appeared as an afterthought, relegated to the very
bottom of the page and headlined with smaller print than the
surrounding articles. Indeed, the paragraphs did not detail much
in the way of a story at all. Rather, the author presented a very
brief excerpt of a courtroom narrative, providing summaries
of the courtly segments he witnessed—the testimony of Jacob
Wolfer, brother to the deceased, and his cross-examination by
the defense attorney—followed by an addendum noting that
the case will be continued the following week. The summaries
were not overly-embellished and featured the sort of brevity one
would expect from hasty telegram announcements: “His sister
was never married to his knowledge; went to the place because
he was told she was there dying; she was vomiting when the
medicine was sent for; would not have known of her condition
if he had not been told.” The repeated omission of the subject
from every other clause betrayed an underlying urge to paraphrase
and to narrate rather than to elaborate and to embroider. The
actors of the narrative were overshadowed by the events and
the characters were displaced by the consequences. At no point
did the author insert himself into the narrative in order to
personalize the stakes, as one saw in the case of St. Clair. Nor
did the author take pains to describe the witness on the stand.
The only sensational aspect of the article was the subject matter,
which itself was noted only by the premature mention of the
word ‘murder’ in the headline and the mention of “death…by
procurement of abortion” in the first sentence.24 This snippet
from the first sentence was emphatically sensational in subject,
though in style it sounds awfully formal, emulating the legalese
of courtroom attorneys. The trend continued in a later article in
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which the author summarized the testimony of another witness:
“…witness went into the room, when the doctor said he had
delivered deceased of a fetus.”25 The terminology here, once
again, is formal to the point of being practically clinical. The
author made no effort to underline the tragedy of the woman’s
death or the demise of her child; instead, he referred to the
former as the “deceased” and the latter as a “fetus,” employing
words that deprive the two of vitality and personhood.
The coverage of the Dr. Cobell abortion case illustrated
a few defining trends in the first wave of sensational newspaper
coverage. The first and most important trend was the nature of
the sensationalism, which was epitomized principally through
subject matter and not through any elaborate literary stratagem.
In other words, the abortion articles were sensational because
they were about abortion. This is manifested in another article
from the summer of 1867 noting the arrest of a Massachusetts
doctor accused of murdering a woman by means of abortion.
The author of the piece provided the necessary details without
adornment, mentioning that the “victim was unmarried, 18 years
old, and [had] a father living in the city.”26 Despite the deceased
woman’s apparent youth and unmarried status at the time of
death, the author offered no additional stylistic ornaments to
sensationalize the story. Indeed, in many cases—including that
of the Dr. Cobell case—the crime itself appeared to be of less
interest than the proceedings of the court. This may be taken to
an extreme, as evident in the Strong divorce case that dominated
a great expanse of space in the pages of the NYT from late
November of 1865 to early January of the following year. The
headlines of the Strong case certainly signposted the scandalous
nature of the court’s proceedings. The NYT showcased the
most exceptional articles—particularly those that were part of a
series, as was the case in many ongoing trials—with multi-tiered
headlines. Thirteen of the fourteen Strong articles featured these
terraced titles, with sensational subtitles such as, “Remarkable
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Charges of Murder, Bribery, Perjury and Corruption.”27 The
references to abortion in this chain of stories, however, were
scarce, and the vast majority of the coverage consisted of
summaries of the speeches and the testimonies given in
court. Yet again, the editorial needs of the NYT at the time
favored the use of summary rather than the presentation of
an engaging story. This was perhaps a legacy of the American
Civil War, during which the accurate and timely conveyance of
highly desirable information was among the chief duties of the
daily newspapers.28 The Strong case nevertheless affirmed the
existence of sensational subjects in the NYT during the early
Postbellum Period and revealed the tendency of these authors to
supply dry summary in lieu of imaginative storytelling.
The last two defining trends emblematized by the first
wave articles were closely related. One was the total anonymity
of the author, whose name was not supplied to readers in a
byline, contrary to popular journalistic practice today. Ford
Risley, a professor of communications at Pennsylvania State
University, remarks that although the use of bylines was not
unheard of even as far back as the 1830s, it most certainly was
not widespread during the Postbellum Period, after which it
gradually came into popular usage.29 Consequently, the author
was a veritable nonentity and the authorship of individual
articles was instead relegated to the impersonal, faceless
authority of the newspaper publication itself. The first wave
articles exacerbated this trend even more, since their authors did
not insert themselves into the narrative. The authors related the
action without doing any of the acting—an effect that certainly
seems credible and respectable from a modern perspective, but
one that also necessarily diminishes the sensational elements of
the stories by removing personal stakes from the narrative. In the
Lattin case of 1868, for example, the NYT’s coverage consisted
chiefly of a summary of the inquest presented as a sort of rapidfire dialogue with questions asked to and answered by a doctor
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involved in an abortion case: “Q—Did she at any time ask you
to treat her for an abortion? A—No, quite the reverse, because
she desired to have the child in order to make Houghton marry
her.”30 This style of journalism, in addition to summarizing
the disclosures of the inquest in question, narrowed the focus
uncompromisingly on the subject for a long stretch of time
without distracting the reader with the intrusion of ancillary
characters. Without the author serving as a sort of protagonist in
the story, as St. Clair did in his encounter with Dr. Rosenzweig,
readers have no surrogate with whom they can empathize and
thus the news stories appeared less like sensational works, with
all the literary trappings of compelling fiction, and more like
abridged, digestible chunks of information—more like reading a
dialogue than watching a play.
Finally, the lack of a centrally featured, empathetic author
also thwarted the publication’s ability to adopt a ‘crusading’ moral
position on controversial issues covered in the articles. St. Clair’s
decision to publicly denigrate Dr. Rosenzweig was all the more
powerful because it boiled down highly contentious matters—
abortion and abortion-induced homicide—into a conflict
between strong and identifiable personalities. It is much easier
to support or to condemn distinct figures than it is to fight with
shadows, and St. Clair and Rosenzweig served as suitable proxies
for their respective factions, the anti-abortion moralists and the
abortionists. Bereft of this, the first wave articles more often
featured objective description rather than subjective moralizing.
Nevertheless, it would be improper to assert that the NYT was
by any means toothless during the early Postbellum Period,
even on the abortion issue. Newspapers are fundamentally
curated publications; the final form of each publication relies
on the consent and the concord of the publication’s overseers.
Accordingly, even though the NYT did not publish stories of
the crusading-type backed by its own moral authority, it may be
said that the newspaper nevertheless expressed its views through
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literary ventriloquism by voicing its outlook in the selection of
articles it chose to publish.
An 1868 article, for example, in summarizing the
proceedings of a State Medical Society meeting, quoted the group
president speaking out against the crime of abortion and its status
in the law. “If these words, ‘with a quick child,’ could be omitted,
and the statute otherwise remain as it is, the period [during which
the procurement of abortion would be deemed second-degree
manslaughter] would be made to cover the whole period after
conception.”31 This speech was typical of the view that many
establishment physicians, as the self-avowed protectors of life,
had regarding abortion. It is significant that this article received
from the NYT a rare byline—“From Our Own Reporter”—
thus emphasizing the NYT’s ownership over the collection of
facts assembled in the report, and perhaps even its endorsement.
Regardless of these speculations, this extraordinary article
represented a remarkable intersection between newspersons,
lawmakers, and physicians, since it featured the wide circulation
of a prominent medical man’s idea for additional restrictions in
the state abortion law. This dissemination of medical opinion
likely influenced passage of the 1869 law that altogether
dismissed the quickening doctrine, since the law was passed on
May 6, 1869, a little more than a year after the publication of
this article.32 Another article in 1868, headlined, “Responsibility
of the Medical Professions” and penned by an anonymous
author, proposed additional legislative restrictions as well. The
writer observed that abortion was “practiced at this day to a
very alarming extent and some means, both by enforcing the
present laws and by providing still more stringent ones, should
be adopted to lessen it.”33 As a result, despite its unwillingness
to declare a crusade against abortion at the time and despite
the dearth of stylistically sensational stories, the NYT provided
its tacit endorsement to anti-abortion advocates and influenced
wider sentiment, possibly even legal sentiment, by publishing the
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viewpoints of these advocates.
THE STATE OF NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALISM
IN 1870
For American newspaper publishers in the nineteenth
century, sensational subjects provided an inexhaustible source
of consumer interest. In the Postbellum Period, newspapers
were lucrative due to a rising urban working-class population
that supplied an increasing number of readers.34 By 1870, there
were about 4,500 newspapers circulating in the United States,
up from the 3,000 that proliferated in 1860 before the start
of the American Civil War. Most newspapers at the time were
small weeklies, but daily newspapers such as the NYT were
growing steadily in number, with 574 dailies throughout the
United States by 1870.35 These newspapers benefited from a
steady readership; in 1870, the total circulation of urban daily
newspapers was 2.6 million.36 The rising urban population—
itself a product of European migration to New York and the
general migration of rural Americans to cities in search of
employment—and the abundance of daily newspapers in 1870
mingled with an additional characteristic of the era.37 The
United States boasted considerably high literacy rates in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. In 1870, eighty percent of
the total American population over the age of ten was literate.38
Significantly, only about twenty percent of the black population
was literate at that time, meaning that most newspaper readers in
the immediate Postbellum Period were white.39 By 1870, demand
for information and entertainment via newspapers was high, and
this desire was met continuously by newspapers that published
engrossing and entertaining content for their readers.
This rise in demand stemmed partly from influence of the
American Civil War, which casted a long shadow over journalistic
practices and public appetite in the Postbellum Period. In fact,
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the demand for information during the war was so great that
the NYT began publishing its additional Sunday issue in 1861.40
The war made newspapers indispensable and provided great
eminence and respectability to journalists, who were presented
as liaisons between newspaper readers and the horrors of the
battlefronts. As academic Karen Roggenkamp notes, newspapers
in New York kept large staffs of war correspondents to feed
the abundant public hunger for war coverage. Readers came to
see these correspondents as “adventurous, reliable storytellers,”
and journalists at large found themselves moving progressively
inward from the periphery of public notice.41 This increased
reliance on journalists stemmed partly from the invention of
the telegram, which made it possible for war correspondents to
report information very quickly—more quickly, in many cases,
than military officials, who would then have to rely on newspaper
reports for accurate information.42 Future Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. best expressed the public dependence
on the press in 1861 when he wrote, “Everything else we can
give up…Only bread and the newspaper must we have, whatever
else we do without. How this war is simplifying our mode of
being!”43 These American Civil War influences continued to
affect the manner of journalism years after the war’s end. By
1870, newspapers were widespread and urban readers relied upon
them and their writers for accurate and compelling information
on various subjects.
Yet not even the war could compel the NYT to publish
overtly lurid stories. Though the “EoA” article ignited a stream
of subsequent sensational abortion articles, these contrasted
sharply with the type of journalism found in the NYT years
earlier. Prior to the advent of the 1870s, sensationalism existed
in the NYT chiefly in the form of subject, not style. This curb
on explicit sensationalism may be attributed to the management
of the paper. The NYT was founded by Henry Raymond in
1851 as a deliberate effort to produce a more reserved and
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Henry Raymond deliberately co-founded The New York Times to
publish non-scandalous news. His death in 1869 paved the way
for the appearance of sensationalism in the newspaper.
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less scandalous publication than the two existing national daily
New York newspapers, the New York Herald and the New-York
Tribune.44 Newspaper historian Aurora Wallace contends that
these rival newspapers sought to lure readers “through expanding
coverage of the city’s police, criminal courts, and political
scandals,” whereas the NYT focused on news of the “factual,
noncrusading” variety.45 Raymond’s approach to the news was
remarkably conservative, as typified by his own statement:
We do not mean to write as if we were in a passion,
unless that shall really be the case, and we shall make it
a point to get into a passion as rarely as possible. There
are very few things in this world which it is worth while
to get angry about, and they are just the things that anger
will not improve.46
Raymond’s editorial methodology was clearly not
conducive to the sensationalism that would later creep into his
publication. As noted by historian George H. Douglas, Raymond
“wanted nothing to do with sensationalism, and he wanted
nothing to do with crusading.”47 It is significant to note, then, that
the second wave of abortion articles, which were sensational both
in subject and style, only appeared following Raymond’s death
in 1869, after which the NYT ultimately fell into the complete
supervisory authority of Raymond’s co-founder, George Jones.48
The NYT would achieve notable success in the 1870s under the
leadership of Jones, especially for its investigation of the Tweed
Ring.49 As such, the highly dramatic and more sensational tone
adopted by the NYT journalists writing about abortion in the
1870s may partly be credited to the standards of a new authority
figure.
As is evident from the above, the ubiquity of newspapers,
the public demand for information, and the high literacy rates of
the era made the influence of press coverage on all Americans
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a significant factor. But not all newspapers enjoyed the same
gravitas. By 1871, the NYT had established its supremacy with
an incredible exposé on corruption in the Tweed Ring.50 This
style of investigative journalism naturally elevated the status
of the publication and gave it more authority in relation to
its peers. As such, the publication of the Tweed investigative
articles paved the way for further crusading endeavors carried
out by the journalists of the NYT—endeavors that would not
have been tolerated in earlier years under the management of
the more restrained Raymond. The new wave of abortion stories
was sensational both in subject and in style. This too may be
seen as a natural consequence of the Tweed articles. Political
and economic scandal was inherently sensational, but the NYT
flavored its stories with higher stakes by dramatically publicizing
the attempts of William “Boss” Tweed to form a company in
order to buy out the NYT. Jones, as the new authority, boldly
declared the following in a spring issue of the NYT:
No money that could be offered me should induce
me to dispose of a single share of my property to the
Tammany faction, or to any man associated with it, or
party whatever until this struggle is fought out.51
This sort of engagement was the very essence of sensationalism.
The author, Jones, thrusted himself into an ongoing conflict
and presented it as a capitalistic clash—a “struggle” that must
be “fought out”—between rival personalities: the stalwart Jones
and his “property” versus Tweed and his “faction.” The effect
of such sensationalism was twofold. First, the author managed
to raise his own respectability, made possible by his decision to
position himself in an existing news narrative and amplified in
his self-presentation as a man unable to be influenced by the lure
of money. Second, the author managed to vilify an opposing
individual in a highly public medium simultaneously. These
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effects obscured the objectivity of the narrative and transformed
the news into a personal struggle featuring named actors. The
result was a media-fueled crusade that disregarded any notion
of journalistic neutrality and instead championed a distinct
outcome, whether that be the exposure of a scandalous political
machine or the prosecution of abortionists.
SENSATIONALISM AND THE SECOND WAVE
(1871-1874)
The anti-abortion crusade began in remarkable fashion
with the publication of the “EoA” story in late August of 1871.
St. Clair’s famous article set the precedent for future sensational
articles regarding abortion. In brief, the article functioned
as a call-to-arms and strove to raise public awareness and to
encourage public outrage and action. St. Clair’s concluding
words, which promote “the necessity of taking some decided
and effectual action,” hinted at the investigative, rather than
descriptive, nature of the article.52 St. Clair was not just writing in
reaction to an event to chronicle it accurately for readers; rather,
he hoped to expose an inadequately explored world of crime—a
desire that shaped his article and supplied it with a prescriptive
and not merely descriptive tone. In doing so, St. Clair essentially
enumerated a list of active abortionists, many of whom he found
through advertisements in other newspapers. His descriptions
evoked the atmosphere of the various clinical spaces he visited
and filled the reader with a sense of foreboding dread at the
prospect of medicinal tablets, powders, and procedures. The
most important distinguishing feature to notice was the presence
of a sensational style. The use of style was especially important
in “EoA,” because the sensational subject was left deliberately
mysterious in the actual text of the article—the word abortion
was not mentioned once, though later articles used it freely.
How, then, did St. Clair present his sensational style
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in “EoA”? One of the tools in his arsenal was the untethered
hyperbole, by which he made grand and even outlandish claims
without much substantiation. This hyperbole is manifested in
the egregious statistics he mentioned as well as in the extreme
register of his diction. In the case of the former, for instance,
St. Clair made reference to the “thousands of human beings
[who] are…murdered before they have seen the light of this
world, and thousands upon thousands more of adults [who] are
irremediably ruined in constitution, health, and happiness.”53
These numbers were not reliably sourced, nor were they meant
to be taken seriously. They did, however, effectively project
the impression of a massive throng of victims and collateral
casualties, highlighting the extent of the crime. St. Clair’s diction,
too, portrayed a stark and unforgiving reality. His references
to “great evils,” “depravity,” and “a systematic business in
wholesale murder” combined to establish a link between the act
of abortion, utter moral laxity, and excessive greed.54
Relatedly, the lack of substantiation behind St. Clair’s
outlandish statistics was aggravated by the proliferation of
anonymous sources in his article. One source, a “retired
practitioner,” told St. Clair how he gave his patients placebo pills
in lieu of actual abortifacients since the “retired practitioner” did
not support abortion.55 This article, therefore, also featured two
remarkable developments: the unapologetic use of anonymous
sources and the increased prominence of the author, who was
mentioned explicitly in the article as the “writer.” In the case
of the first development, one must recognize that St. Clair’s
reporting thrived off of hearsay. After all, he noted that a book
attributed to one of the physicians he condemned “is said to
have been plagiarized from a French author,” with the use of
the passive voice eliminating the possibility of assigning anyone
responsibility for the origin of the rumor.56 Though this might
have made St. Clair’s comment seem unproven, paradoxically,
it also made it difficult to disprove. Who can one question to
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determine the truth of the plagiarism? St. Clair’s reliance on
hearsay appealed to the ever popular neighborhood authority
of gossip and poisoned the reader’s impression of the so-called
plagiarizer even without corroboration. W. Joseph Campbell, a
scholar of yellow journalism, points out that the implementation
of anonymous sources is one of the hallmarks of sensationalistic
reporting, along with a tendency for self-promotion and for
the promotion of the newspaper and its achievements.57 The
penchant for publication promotion was also evident in later
stories. The author of an article detailing the investigation of
an abortion-linked murder in which a young woman’s body was
found stuffed in a trunk was not hesitant to praise the role of his
publication in the unfoldment of the whole affair. “The Press,
therefore,” the author wrote, “became a powerful auxiliary to the
Police, and, in fact, brought the case to a successful culmination.”58
Though the author of that article did not know it at the time,
the NYT would soon assist the affair in a more dramatically
powerful fashion, since the deceased young woman was the very
one St. Clair later claimed he saw in Dr. Rosenzweig’s home.
In the case of authorial prominence, which was the second
development mentioned above, it is intriguing to notice that St.
Clair later even eschewed the convention of avoiding bylines and
signed his name at the end of the article in which he dramatically
announced his recognition of “the blonde beauty” allegedly
killed by Dr. Rosenzweig. St. Clair’s journalistic practices in this
period serve to highlight the role of the individual author as an
active and engaging part of the story.
At the same time, St. Clair’s representation of the
abortionists and the victims presented a prototypical model
that later sensational articles also followed. In “EoA,” St. Clair
enumerated countless abortionists whom he had discovered
in scandalous advertisements. He even noted whether a given
doctor was of foreign origin. For example, he stated that Dr.
Rosenzweig was either a Russian or a German Jew, a Dr. Evans
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was from Scotland, and a Dr. Franklin was most certainly a
German Jew.59 These subtle national markers served to further
the distance between the abortionists and everybody else by
imposing a racial divide between them, thereby associating the
act of abortion with foreign influence in a way that imperceptibly
fed into nativist discontent with immigrants. But the abortionists
were not the only individuals portrayed in the abortion articles.
Without a doubt, the most important persons were the various
unfortunate women who sought to procure an abortion. These
women were all white and they were nearly always portrayed as
victims. Take, for example, the NYT article about Emily Post,
whose abortionist attempted to abandon her when she became
ill. Post was referred to as an “unfortunate woman” and a “sick
woman.”60 Both adjectives highlighted her despair and did little to
underscore the triumph of her story—her ability to write down
her testimony prior to death. It was the propagation of such
stories that likely encouraged the New York Legislature to pass
the 1874 law which declared the deathbed testimony of abortion
victims admissible in court. Notwithstanding Post’s testimony,
later coverage continued to emphasize the tragic nature of her
demise by saying that her married lover “accomplished her ruin”
after promising to marry her though he was already married.61
Since sensational abortion coverage most often featured women
who had died, the coverage of the NYT suggested to readers
a near one hundred percent mortality rate. Even in death, the
author of these articles often exaggerated the beauty of the
deceased, once again highlighting the tragic loss of gorgeous
femininity. The following is an excerpt from the first article to
cover the abortion-related murder of the young lady recognized
by St. Clair:
…the young girl, for she could not have been more than
eighteen, had a face of singular loveliness. But her chief
beauty was her great profusion of golden hair, that hung
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in heavy folds over her shoulders, partly shrouded the
face, and lay in heavy masses upon her breast.62
The language employed in the above description is highly
evocative and even coquettish, lingering over the slender grace
and loveliness of a five-foot young woman whose corpse, it must
be noted, was crammed into a box that was two and a half feet
long on the sides and eighteen inches deep.63 In spite of this
grotesque disparity between the macabre and the magnificent,
the emphasis on the girl’s noticeably white phenotypical
characteristic—her blonde hair—once again provoked nativist
anxieties, this time about the future of the white Protestant
population. Scholar Sara Dubow illustrates just how pervasive
this fear was in the late nineteenth century. In Dubow’s reckoning,
physicians were the ones who tied existing anxieties about elite
white “health, fitness and vitality” to racial concerns. In the
face of a dwindling European-American population, men such
as the AMA’s Storer “championed the idea that the upsurge of
induced abortion threatened the nation’s future.”64 Though the
NYT never explicitly pronounced this view, the echoes of these
white anxieties were noticeable in the descriptions of the female
victims, who were predominantly white and dead by the time they
were featured in articles. Faced with the frightening prospect of
race suicide, which was spurred through the efforts of the AMA,
New York lawmakers may have considered the demographics of
victimized women in the newspapers to be representative of the
actual demographics of dying white women.
THE UPHEAVAL OF THE AGE
The interconnections between the legislative sphere and
the mass media are highly complex and ever shifting. Finding
a direct causal link between the actions of one group and the
responses of another is difficult enough to accomplish in the
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contemporary world, much less in the world of nineteenth
century America. Nevertheless, by observing trends in the
manner of newspaper reporting in the Postbellum Period and
linking these trends to the characteristics of the era, one can
better understand the myriad of influences that coalesced to
encourage legislative changes.
Within this framework, the lawmakers reigned supreme.
They were the individuals ultimately responsible for the drafting
and passage of laws, so it was their concerns and anxieties
that must be considered when analyzing legal sentiment. As
noted above, in the case of American lawmakers, the primary
concerns with respect to abortion were the provability of
pregnancy, the safety of women, and the potential dwindling
of the white population. So sensational and pervasive was the
newspaper coverage in the Postbellum Period that the concern
for provability was dismissed altogether in favor of stricter laws
that would hopefully protect women and safeguard the white
population. This was partly the result of newspaper reporting
that consistently detailed horrific botched abortion procedures
and abysmal mortality rates. Neither the NYT in particular nor
all New York newspapers in general were primarily responsible
for influencing anti-abortion legislation. Rather, sensationalized
newspaper coverage was an important part of the puzzle—albeit
one that has been largely overlooked—and, in tandem with other
pieces, such as the lobbying of the AMA, it helped to shape
public and legal opinion.
Although the lawmakers reigned supreme, the journalists
and newspersons should not be discounted. The newsmen of the
NYT were largely motivated by a desire to promote themselves
as respectable journalists, as in the case of Augustus St. Clair, to
increase the authority of the publication they worked for, and
to promote sales by increasing readership. Sensational stories
provided the ideal avenue for pursuing all three goals at once.
As exemplified in St. Clair’s “EoA,” the journalists of the NYT
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were certainly not hesitant to make all sorts of callous digs at
rival publications. In “EoA,” St. Clair consistently referred
to the New York Herald as “a paper which contains strings of
disgraceful advertisements,” employing an unflattering adjective
that highlighted a self-imposed sense of dishonor and thus
juxtaposed this characteristic of the New York Herald with the
assumed moral superiority of the NYT.65 In that same article, St.
Clair repeatedly quoted multiple abortion advertisements, tracing
each and every one to the New York Herald, thus establishing it
as a publication filled with scandalous materials. Readers of the
NYT in the post-Tweed Ring period would consequently place
a great deal of faith in the newspaper’s expertise in matters of
great social prominence, making them much more receptive to
future investigations. Importantly, the crafty digs at opposing
peer publications hinted at an underlying motive latent in the
NYT newsmen. These journalists and editors were not only
concerned with raising the profile and increasing the sales of their
own publication, but also in denigrating the quality and moral
standing of rival publications. Sensational articles thus served as
a sort of subliminal battleground for journalistic supremacy in
an age when more and more newspapers were being printed and
read by the masses.
The question of age is an important one, for both the
journalists and the lawmakers examined in this paper were
the products of their time. For journalists, the American Civil
War fueled an insatiable demand to record and to provide
information to the public—a demand that would not perish with
the conclusion of the war. For lawmakers—and, indeed, for all
Americans—the American Civil War presented a traumatic and
stark change from the usual modus vivendi. The war carried with it
a staggeringly high casualty list. Such a palpable brush with death
and a familiarity with its ensuing grief may have awakened in
all a desire to protect the sanctity of life in all quarters, making
lawmakers that much more susceptible to the influence of
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the physicians and that much more alarmed by the reports of
abortion and death in the newspapers. The factors, as promised,
were many and complex, but they all mingled together to help
explain why lawmakers were amenable to enacting legislative
changes that would criminalize abortion to a greater extent than
ever before.
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“There grows in the land here neither wine nor meat”:
Governance and Conflict in the German Rule of 16th
Century Venezuela
Ryan Anderson
This thesis examines a period in the early history of Spanish
Venezuela, wherein a company of German speaking men, funded
by a rich Augsburgian family, administered the colony for 28
years on behalf of the Spanish Crown. In discussing this period
of colonial history, this work primarily discusses the reasons
why the German administration collapsed with such speed and
severity, fitting into a centuries-long historiography on the same
issue. My approach, fitting with those of historians writing in the
past fifteen years, is to describe the difficult contexts in which
a German administration had to work in a Spanish empire, and
how multiple forces - poor administration, adventure seeking,
and mistreatment of the Indians on the Germans’ behalf, and
a tide of changing domestic opinion and scapegoating of the
German presence on the Spanish crown’s side - colluded to
yield the colony’s demise. Secondarily, this thesis works to
foster the growth of an English-language historiography on
the issue. Almost all histories written to this date have been in
either German or Spanish traditions, a property that makes the
furthering of the study in English more difficult and lends itself
to easy biases, e.g. a nationalist bent. I hope that this work will
encourage other English speakers to study this peculiar trans(proto)-national phenomenon and enrich our understanding of
its complications. My main primary sources for this study were a
pair of travel narratives, written by two of the conquistadors in
the 1530s and 1540s, as well as some of their correspondences.
However, the decrees of the Spanish Crown on the German
colony as well as near-contemporary histories on Venezuela were
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critical additions to these materials. This research emphasizes
overall the agency of the Spanish elite and the Spanish Crown in
the administration of the German colony, suggesting that under
the guise of protecting the Indians yet motivated principally
by their dismal financial returns, the King of Spain moved to
actively displace the Germans from his empire.
“To Preserve Them from Extinction”: Richard Henry
Pratt and the Indian Education Movement
Emily Delisle
My thesis examines the establishment and operation of the Carlisle
Indian School, the first federal off-reservation residential school
for American Indian children and young adults. The school was
founded in 1879 by a man named Richard Henry Pratt, an officer
in the United States Military who had served both the Civil War
and the “Indian Wars” on the Western frontier which continued
after the Civil War had come to a close. Pratt’s personal contact
and experience with Native American peoples during his time
in the West ultimately inspired his lifelong mission to assimilate
Native American children through forcible acculturation and an
educational program whose explicit intent to “kill the Indian,
save the man” remains a deeply troubling episode in American
history. My research, relying heavily on Pratt’s own writings and
correspondences with both Native American individuals directly
affected by his policies and the many government officials
responsible for Indian Affairs at the time, investigates the racial
ideology and federal policy behind the school’s establishment,
the evolution of Pratt’s work and thought both before and during
his early years as the school’s superintendent, and the vast range
of experiences of the Indian students themselves at Carlisle.
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Budding Life in a Barren World: The Revival of Jewish
Life and Community in the Post-World War II Displaced
Persons Camps
Sarah Emmerich
This thesis explores the rehabilitative process experienced by
the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in the post-World War II
Displaced Persons (“DP”) camps. In the immediate aftermath of
World War II, a network of DP camps was established by various
Allied organizations. While these camps were organized and
ran by Allied officials, the Jewish survivors took on remarkable
leadership roles which allowed life within the camps to flourish.
Between the years 1945 and 1951, life for the Jewish survivors in
all its varied facets and capacities thrived within the DP camps.
Just months after the liberation of Hitler’s concentration camps,
children were playing in the streets and attending schools and
adults were regaining their health and receiving professional and
vocational training. Moreover, in 1946, Jews were marrying on a
daily basis and the Jewish DPs boasted the highest birthrate in
the world. In the aftermath of the war, therefore, those Jews who
managed to evade Hitler’s Final Solution were able to establish
a societal framework within the refugee camps in which they
found themselves, and to recreate lives that had purpose and
meaning amidst darkness. By exploring the confines in which
this life emerged, this thesis analyzes the way in which the Jewish
survivors created a life for themselves—with assistance from
their liberators—in an otherwise hopeless time.
Moral Education in Public Schools: The Complexities of
Teaching Controversy
Sarah Engell
In 1974 the proposal and adoption of new language arts
textbooks, that sought to emphasize themes of multiculturalism
and egalitarianism, sparked a violent year-long protest in Kanawha
County, West Virginia. The opposition perceived the texts as
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overly sexual, anti-American, and intrusive while supporters
celebrated the diversification of narratives and information. The
ability of newly adopted language arts textbooks to spark an
explosive controversy reflects the impact of textbooks and,
more broadly, public education on creating a sense of identity
and belonging. Through objecting or supporting the textbooks
and the language they contained, the citizens of Kanawha
County were bitterly fighting to protect their own definitions of
what it meant to be a good student, parent, teacher, community
member, and American. Furthermore, through protesting and
ultimately reworking the process of textbook adoption and
inclusion, the citizens redefined who and what was included in
their notion of a good public school education. The research
seeks to understand how a community’s perception of public
education and the role it should play in a child’s life impacts
the inclusion of the public in academic decision making as well
as the insertion and definition of controversial matter in the
classroom. In addition, the research seeks to better understand
the triangulation of rights in public school between students,
teachers, and parents.
“Prompt, Adequate, and Effective Compensation”:
The Role of American Businesses in Cuban-American
Relations, 1959-1961
Taylor Evensen
The nationalization of American property by the Castro regime
totaled more than $1.8 billion, or $9 billion in today’s dollars.
It was the largest property seizure in American history by a
foreign government. 6,000 individuals and firms, including many
Fortune 500 companies such as Coca-Cola and Exxon Mobil,
lost their holdings. This thesis examines the role of American
companies in Cuban-American relations from the passage
of the First Agrarian Reform Act in May 1959 to the Central
Intelligence Agency’s support of the Cuban exile invasion at the
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Bay of Pigs in April 1961. In doing so, this work aims to provide
clarity to this tenuous period of relations and expand on the
work of scholars who have focused almost exclusively on the
role of diplomats. This study includes an extensive examination
of the correspondence between U.S. government officials and
corporate executives, as well as an analysis of internal corporate
documents and personal memoirs. The findings of this research
challenge the traditional historical notion that firms did not play
a decisive role in American foreign policy. Although corporate
executives disagreed with the Department of State’s policies at
times, they nevertheless regularly communicated with the U.S.
government and provided valuable intelligence and insight into
Cuba’s domestic conditions. Ultimately, as relations deteriorated,
American companies emerged as an instrumental means for
the U.S. government to apply pressure on Cuba without overtly
breaking diplomatic ties.
Delinquents, Rebels, Lovers, and Lost Souls:
Representations of American and French Youth Culture
in Film
Carolyn Grace
This thesis examines the various representations of America’s
youth culture over the postwar period, beginning in the early
1950s and ending in the late 1960s. Specifically, this thesis will
explore the representations of American youth culture through
one particular lens: a cinematic one. It addresses the film
industry’s popular representations of youth culture and its impact
on Americans’ larger understanding of youth. At this point in
American history, youth underwent a lot of public scrutiny, and
for a variety of reasons. In the 1950s, concerns about juvenile
delinquency -- stemming from World War II -- reached levels
of mass hysteria. Hollywood perpetuated the image of riledup, antisocial youngsters for moral and exploitative purposes,
wanting to participate in the national conversation about youth,
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but also wanting to attract audiences. By the 1960s, however,
many elements of youth culture that had once been reprimanded
were now celebrated as wholesome aspects of young American
life. But this image did not last into the mid and late 1960s. In
its place, the film industry presented youth who were uncertain
and unsure of their lives, unable to be satisfied in the present
and incapable of envisioning a brighter future. This shift in
representation was due not only to major cultural shifts in the
United States, but largely to the influence of France and its
movies representing youth culture. The subtle, stoic behaviors
of young French stars and the personal philosophies of their
directors made an impact on the shift between the way American
films showed youth in the ‘50s and the way they portrayed them
in the ‘60s. This became a part of the two countries’ alreadyexisting transnational exchange of experiences with youth
culture. Although youth were viewed as the “other” in other
forms of popular media, the film industries in both France and
the United States played a far larger role in perpetuating this idea
given its visual dominance.
Redefining American Motherhood: Emily Mudd’s Mission
at Home and Abroad
Helen Hunter
In 1929, Emily Hartshorne Mudd risked arrest by volunteering as
a nurse at Philadelphia’s first birth control clinic. Visibly pregnant
with her second child, Mudd relied on an antiquated law that
barred the incarceration of a pregnant woman in order to serve
women in need of contraceptive advice. Before this bold venture,
Mudd had worked for a decade as her husband’s unpaid research
assistant in immunology and had personally experienced the
conflicting pressures on women in the early twentieth century
who aspired to be both mothers and professionals. Over the next
seventy years, Mudd became a key player in the development
of marriage counseling as a way to help women navigate their
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maternal and professional ambitions. Scholars have remembered
Mudd for her contributions to the field of marriage counseling
but have failed to recognize the extent of her larger professional
ambitions. This thesis reconsiders her achievements by examining
her early career in the birth control movement and her trips to
Germany and the Soviet Union around the Second World War,
where she examined and warmly approved of government
support for working mothers. These missions characterize Mudd
as a strong-willed and pragmatic realist making concessions to a
slowly changing social order.
Sir Percy Loraine and Anglo-Turkish Rapprochement 19341939
Otto Kienitz
This thesis weaves the tale of British Ambassador to Turkey Sir
Percy Loraine through the fabric of interwar diplomatic history,
uncovering the personal relationships and key turning points in
Britain’s foreign relations with the newly founded Republic of
Turkey. Only years after the fierce animosity of the First World
War, Britain tentatively reached out to Turkey to form a political
and economic ally in the Eastern Mediterranean, a partnership
that could bring stability to the Balkan Peninsula, protect British
imperial interests in the Middle East, and preserve the status
quo in the Mediterranean Basin. Following the rise of Fascism
in Italy and Germany, the Anglo-Turkish relationship began to
develop with a sense of urgency, and one man stood at the center
of this diplomatic exchange. Sir Percy Loraine, one of the last
professional diplomats of the old European state system, was a
polished ambassador with a track record of working with Eastern
strongmen from Persia to Egypt. I explore Sir Loraine’s archival
legacy, using his assiduous diary entries, official correspondences,
and private papers to craft a narrative of personal contacts and
tête-à-tête conversations to provide a closer look at diplomacy
in action. Tracing Loraine’s relationships with his Secretary of
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States and his cousin in the Foreign Office in London, and his
friendships with the Turkish President, Prime Minister, and
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ankara, I am able to direct attention
to the behind the scenes rapprochement that picked up speed
between 1934-1939, and provide a more firsthand understanding
of the Anglo-Turkish alliance and the reasons for its collapse
soon after the outbreak of the Second World War. This thesis
charts the personal, social, economic, political, and diplomatic
underpinnings of Anglo-Turkish relations in the interwar period,
blending personal narratives with the geopolitics of southeastern
Europe to create an engaging exploration of diplomatic history
in vivo via Sir Percy Loraine’s ambassadorial savoir-faire.
Informed Mourning: Museum Representation of the
Holocaust in Berlin and DC
Alex Levy
This thesis examines the creation of national memory of the
Holocaust in the United States and Germany. It traces the
trajectory of Holocaust memory from the end of World War II
in 1945 to the present day, in which world-renowned museums
have been built in the capitals of both countries. This expands
upon existing research by synthesizing information about the
museums in Berlin and DC while also connecting it to the
process of creating national memory. The research methods
utilized include qualitative analysis of the museums, newspaper
articles, and interviews with prominent museum staff. Secondary
accounts of museums are included to supplement these sources.
The findings of this research conclude that while these museums
have provided an accessible history of the Holocaust, they have
not eradicated the issues that inspired their creation. Therefore,
the field of Holocaust memory merits continued study and
analysis.
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“Spies All Their Lives”: African Americans and Military
Intelligence During the Civil War
Carly Mayer
This thesis examines African American men and women’s military
intelligence efforts during the American Civil War. In particular,
it focuses on why and how African Americans participated in
clandestine activities. In doing so, this work aims to challenge the
disjointed nature of existing literature that narrates the efforts
and contributions of African American spies. Most authors
who engage the topic fabricate elaborate heroic narratives, a
consequence both of immense public fascination with the topic
of spies and the lack of easily accessible sources. Where is the
truth of these people and their efforts noted in the history we
read and write? This thesis, then, seeks to set the foundation
for a cohesive body of literature that compiles and narrates
the efforts of African American spies. It analyzes the military
intelligence activities of specific African American men and
women and their contribution to the Union cause, and also strives
to highlight the masses of “intelligent negroes,” who, despite
being unnamed, significantly assisted the northern war effort.
Ultimately, this work confirms that African Americans became
the Confederacy’s unanticipated yet undeniable “chief source of
weakness,” as they proved, time and again, their vast abilities to
assist the Union army and navy. The independent slaveholding
republic fell victim not just to Union forces but also, notably,
to the determined resistance of its enslaved population. War
transformed enslaved men and women into an “enemy within”
that the Confederate South was simply unable to suppress.
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One Nation Overseas: The Statecraft of the United States
Congress in the Age of Democratic Revolutions
Varun K. Menon
This thesis chronicles the influence of the United States
Congress in shaping the American encounter with the world
through foreign policymaking, primarily documenting the 12th
through 20th Congresses from 1811 to 1826. By presenting
American diplomatic history during this tumultuous period of
global revolutions from the perspective of Congress, this work
contends that the Legislative Branch began to actively assert its
power in international matters that had been largely dominated
by the Executive Branch under the first three presidential
administrations. From the declaration of the War of 1812 to the
independence of the Latin American nations, Congress began
to exercise significantly more influence over foreign relations
in response to various interests facilitated through the body’s
institutional growth and maturation. Various actions throughout
this period from declaring war, to negotiating and ratifying
treaties, to regulating international commerce, to recognizing
foreign actors, to confirming diplomatic nominations, to
legislating and appropriating the nation’s foreign apparatus as a
whole were subject to new assertions of Congressional authority
that set important precedents for where formal and informal
power resides in the foreign policymaking process. Through the
records of Congress, its members, and its constituents, this thesis
comprises a narrative of how the membership and structure
of the Senate and the House of Representatives transformed
in order to act on and react to international events during the
earliest decades of the American Republic. In exploring the
dynamic currents of power over foreign relations first truly
tested during the period under review, this work illuminates the
role that Congress gradually constructed for itself in the making
of the American relationship with the world and how the body—
and the country—changed as a result.
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Resolution 3379: Israel and Zionism at the United Nations
Celine Moussazadeh
On November 10, 1975, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted Resolution 3379, which declared Zionism a form
of racism and racial discrimination. This thesis examines
the genesis of this resolution, tracing its roots to geopolitical
shifts in the 1970s that remade the world order and forever
changed the conduct of international affairs. Decolonization
processes in the 1960s, coupled with Arab appropriation of
the oil industry and a decline in American diplomatic prestige
following the Vietnam War transformed the global balance
of power. An Arab-Soviet alliance quickly capitalized on
American vulnerability, activating Third World hostility towards
the imperialist West. Seizing upon the United Nations as their
salvation, this coalition found itself with an invincible majority at
the General Assembly. The launching of the Decade to Combat
Racism and Racial Discrimination enabled Arab and Soviet
diplomats to delegitimize their enemies in Israel and the West by
labelling them racist agents. I examine both arguments for and
against the resolution, giving voice to claims of Israeli injustice
and discrimination against the Palestinians and articulating the
corresponding defense of Zionism as the legitimate nationalist
movement of the Jewish people. This resolution thus provides
unique insight into the evolution of Israel’s diplomatic standing
and its legitimacy and sustainability as a Jewish state in the
Middle East. The scholarship of this resolution has largely been
a footnote in the histories of other subjects; it has never been
meticulously dissected in and of itself. Using archival resources
from the U.S. State Department and academic articles drawn
from the period, this thesis contributes a more nuanced and
comprehensive understanding of this historical moment. 1975,
indeed, marks a high tide of anti-Israel sentiment throughout the
world. Perhaps partially informed by entrenched anti-Semitism,
the adoption of Resolution 3379 in 1975 resulted from a much
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more complex—and obscure—constellation of forces.
Guns, Race, and Power: The Postbellum Rise and Fall of
African American Police Forces in Two Southern Cities
Efraim Saltzman
This thesis documents that the role of race in policing, contentious
in current times played a pivotal role in the Reconstruction
South. It first examines the complicated political, social, and
military factors which collided to precipitate the inclusion of the
first blacks in the police forces of Wilmington, North Carolina
and Charleston, South Carolina. It proceeds to provide an in
depth vantage point of the performance of black police. Close
examination of the rule books guiding police behavior, census
and city directory data all show that black police constituted large
portions of these two cities’ police forces. Examination of black
police and the forces they contributed to, through arrest records
correspondence and both military and municipal records, reveals
similar if not more proficient service than their previously all
white counterparts. Despite such valiant attempts to police a
racist society, the south eventually returned to white supremacy
through Redemption. In Charleston, white Democrats’ political
might effectively ended black police. In Wilmington, as recounted
by period newspapers white Democrats and supremacist violence
combined to crush insurgent black police power. The story of
the brave men in blue who defied the social order of the South
through policing whites, often risking their lives, is told in this
thesis.
The Fallacy of the Ideological Press: How American
National Newspapers Reacted to the French Revolution
from 1789 to 1793
Aaron Senior
Three important events of the early 1790s fundamentally
changed American politics: the creation of a national newspaper
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culture, the beginnings of the French Revolution, and the
birth of political parties. The collision of all three phenomena
is the subject of this thesis. Primarily, this thesis examines the
conventional historical claim that the national newspaper editors
of the early 1790s served as mere ideological mouthpieces for
their Federalist and Republican political patrons. The obsession
with and reaction to the French Revolution in the Federalist
Gazette of the United States and the Republican National Gazette
and General Advertiser serve as the test case for this historical
claim. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of these newspapers
show that the Federalist-Republican ideologies are not sufficient
to explain how these newspapers responded and reacted to the
French Revolution. Instead, a major divide is observed between
the writings of the partisan newspapers and the opinions of
the party founders. In explaining this divide, this thesis posits
that the Republican press attempted to dissent from Federalist
policies while also trying to maintain a perception of unity in the
United States. In order to escape the perception of factionalism,
the Republican newspapers displaced much of their partisanship
to their commentary on the French Revolution. Thus, the French
Revolution served a key role within American political culture—
not so much as another ideological battleground, but instead as
a haven for political dissent.
“Forcibly and Against Her Will”: Sexual Violence, Military
Justice, and Race in the American Civil War
Anne Weis
This thesis explores occurrences of sexual violence perpetrated
by Union soldiers during the American Civil War and is based
upon a close study of a sample of records for Union Army
courts-martial for sexual crimes. It is both a study of the ways
in which sexual violence was carried out during the war and
how the military justice system dealt with instances of sexual
violence perpetrated by its soldiers. This thesis seeks to be a part
Penn History Review

189

Honors Thesis Abstracts

of an emerging scholarship on sexual violence in the Civil War
that has been influenced by recent revelations about the uses
of sexual violence in warfare more generally. In addition, this
project features a robust focus on race, and the story about the
intersection of sex, violence, and race during the Civil War that
the courts-martial tell is at different moments surprising, tragically
expected, confounding, and hopeful. This story both fits within
a long and devastating narrative of the sexual subjugation of
black women that runs through our nation’s past like a poisoned
vein, and breaks from that narrative in stunning ways.
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